

**Spectators versus stakeholders with or without veil of ignorance:  
the difference it makes for justice and chosen distribution criteria**

*Leonardo Becchetti (University of Roma Tor Vergata)*  
*Giacomo Degli Antoni (University of Milano – Bicocca)*  
*Stefania Ottone (University of Milano – Bicocca)*  
*Nazaria Solferino (University of Calabria-Unica)*

We document with a randomized experiment that being spectators and, to a lesser extent, stakeholders with veil of ignorance on relative payoffs, induces subjects who can choose distribution criteria to prefer rewarding talent (vis à vis effort, chance or strict egalitarianism) after guaranteeing a minimal egalitarian base. The removal of the veil of ignorance reduces dramatically such choice since most players opt or revise their decision in favour of the criterion which maximizes their own payoff (and, by doing so, end up being farther from the maximin choice). Large part (but not all) of the stakeholders' choices before the removal of the veil of ignorance are driven by their performance beliefs since two thirds of them choose under the veil the criterion in which they assume to perform relatively better.