

Does gender composition of receiving countries' parliament matter for the pattern of Foreign Aid?

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ABSTRACT

This paper seeks to evaluate whether the gender composition of Parliaments in recipient countries may exert an influence in determining both the level and type of foreign aid sent to some specific sectors as well as that specific foreign aid effectiveness considering the gender composition of Parliaments. By using data from the World Bank and OECD (CRS) databases, the analysis refers to 49 African Countries over the period 1995-2014. The empirical strategy adopted allows overcoming endogeneity problems that may affect the linkages between Aid and Women in Parliament. Empirical findings show that women in Parliament may exert an influence in determining both the level of Aid, total and devoted to some specific sectors, as well as their effectiveness.

Keywords: Foreign aid, Gender, Developing Countries, Institutions and Economic

JEL Classification: F35, J16, O1, O43

1. Introduction

This paper aims to question whether the gender composition of Parliaments in recipient countries may exert an influence in determining both the level and type of foreign aid sent to some specific sectors and to evaluate in certain case its effectiveness. The decision process regarding both the choice of recipient countries and the allocation of aid on different sectors, involves donors as well as recipient's policy maker. Our first hypothesis that Women in political institutions may influence this decision-making process, in particular in the total amount of aid and aid sent to social sector. Second we hypothesize that women in institutions have the power to influence the effectiveness of foreign aid starting from studies on studies that finds that aid effectiveness strongly depends on the specific features of the recipients, mainly linked to the quality of institutions, the goodness of politics, or on the type of Aid.

There is a recently developed literature that highlight a difference in women policy makers behaviour according to their agenda. According to this literature women are more altruistic, fair, less corrupted (Goetz et al. - 2003; Eckel and Grossman - 1998; Croson and Gneezy - 2009; Chattopadhyay and Duflo - 2004; Dollar et al. - 1999; Swamy et al - 2001; Knack et al. - 2001). According to this assumptions, for the aid management, it is also relevant the quality of the institutions, where quality of the institutions means a low degree of corruption, an altruistic attitude of policy makers and a high propensity of policy makers to the collective well-being and not only to the well-being of specific groups. In addition literature states that women are more sensitive to well being needs like education, health, household and gender politics which in least developed countries are crucial for the economic growth process, this attitude may favour a more efficient management of aid which are composed largely by social infrastructures expenditures.

On the other and in literature about the effectiveness of aid on economic growth, there is a debate that has lasted for about 50 years and has not reached a consensus; there are authors who argue that aid are effective in stimulating the growth process (Dalgaard and Hansen - 2000; Hansen and Tarp - 2001; Sachs - 2005; Arntd et al. 2015), others who assess that they are not effective (Friedman; Bauer, Easterly; Rajan and Subramanian - 2008 - 2011; Moyo - 2009; Hoeffler - 2011), still others who believe that they are effective conditionally to the presence of some characteristics of the recipient country (Burnside and Dollar 2000-2004; Michaelowa and Weber - 2006; Clemens, et al - 2004-2012; Masud and Yontcheva - 2005; Mishra and Newhouse - 2007; Nunnenkamp, et al - 2007). The features that have been talked about were the quality of institutions, the type of aid and the stability of the relationship between donor and recipient.

As far as we know, our research question has not yet been object of study in the literature. The only attempt to investigate the role of women in Aid management is represented by the study on Hicks et al. (2015) that finds that the more women are present in donor's Parliaments, the more is the attention focused on social infrastructure issues.

The present analysis is conducted on a sample of 49 African countries because, although they collected the highest amount of Aid, they performed worse than other countries. Our intent is to verify whether women in Parliament of recipient countries may contribute to change in any way the pattern and the effectiveness of development Aid. To this extent, we adopt an appropriate econometric methodology generally used to overcome problems of endogeneity of explanatory variables. The endogenous variable, women in Parliament, will be instrumented with an instrument based on linguistic gender characteristics and universal suffrage. Finally to tackle Women's influence on aid performances, with an OLS strategy, we observe if women managing aid have the power to modify infant mortality rate.

The results obtained show that an higher share of women in parliament has the ability to attract overall foreign aid and, in particular, those sent to the Social Sector (Health and Water supply & sanitation). In addition when women manage foreign aid sent specifically to health they can improve infant mortality rate. The interpretation we provide to this result is that the presence of more women in institutions, increases the effectiveness because they are more orientated to social sector.

The paper is structured as follows: section two includes the literature review and the motivation of the study; section three presents the empirical strategy and describes the dataset, section four shows the results, section five provide a model which explains that when women manage foreign aid sent to health it has a negative effect on infant mortality rate. In the sixth part we conclude.

2. Literature review and motivations

2.1 Women in institutions

The theme of women in institutions has long been debated in the literature. Some studies (Jain - 1998; Chattopanday and Duflo - 2004; Paxton et al. - 2003; Childs et al. 2005) suggest that the involvement of women in politics bring considerable changes within societies. Some empirical analysis on the subject (Shwindt and Bayer - 2006; Shevchenko - 2002; Caiazza - 2002; Powley - 2006) shows that when the presence of women in Parliament increases is given more emphasis to


policies against gender discrimination, to promote health and families; also the laws that reflect their rights, priorities and experiences increases. According to the literature about women in institutions there are a lot of reasons why women govern differently than their male colleagues. These reasons are due to different priorities and experiences that lead them to make different decisions. The literature (Goetz et al. - 2003; Croson and Gneezy - 2009; Chattopadhyay and Duflo - 2004; Eckel and Grossman -1998 and others) has identified some reasons why women in politics govern in a different way from men. Women have different life experiences than men and bring their experience to support their political decisions. In particular, it was observed that women in politics invest more in infrastructure directly relevant to women themselves needs (Chattopadhyay and Duflo - 2004). Women are more likely to see themselves as represented by other women. A study of legislators in the United States made by Rheingold (1992), for example, has shown that women feel a special responsibility to represent other women and are more able to represent their own interests. In Northern Ireland Galligan (2004), for example, found that nearly a third of women who vote thought that a woman would represent their best interests. Their motivations for entering in politics are often different from those of men. In their study Eckel and Grossman (1998) found that women are more "socially orientated" (altruistic), and men are more "individually orientated" (selfish), they also found that women on average donate two times more than men even when it can not be traced back the donor. Hicks et al. (2014) also found that an increase of women in government in donor countries will increase the total aid sent and the portion allocated to social infrastructure. An Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) survey, of women parliamentarians from 65 countries, in 1999, showed that 40% of respondents said they entered politics because of his social interests and 34% through non-governmental organizations, as opposed to the more traditional path of political party often done by men. This result closely reflects a well-established tendency among women to engage in civil society as a way to promote projects that support the survival of families. It is doubtful if they have a different approach to corruption. It was repeatedly said that countries with a higher number of women in politics have lower levels of corruption. The hypothesis of incorruptibility of women is based on the fact that according to some authors (Dollar et al. - 1999; Swamy et al - 2001; Knack et al. - 2001) they would have a propensity to adopt a more ethical conduct in political life and are considered more trustworthy and are more oriented to the public good than men. In particular Dollar et al. (1999) and Swamy et al (2001) suggest that women should be particularly effective in promoting honest government and point out that the increase of women in Parliament, correspond to a decreasing level of corruption. Knack et al. (2001) show that women are less involved in corruption, and are less likely to tolerate bribes. In their study they show that corruption is less severe in countries where women have a greater share of parliamentary

seats, and include a larger share of workforce. However, more recent research indicates that women are not necessarily more honest or adverse to corruption than men (Frank et al. 2011). In fact, they show that women's attitudes and behavior regarding corruption depend on the institutional and cultural context of each country in the specific (Alatas, Cameron, and Chaudhuri 2009; Alhassan-Alolo 2007; Armantier and Boly 2008; Schulze and Frank 2003). For Treisman (2007) they are more likely to be corrupted in autocratic states where corruption and favoritism are often a way to go to do business. Finally, according Esarey and Chirillo (2013) the inclination of women towards corruption is contextual; they believe that women are less susceptible to corruption in democracies, but they are equally sensitive in autocratic systems. In conclusion, with regarding the appearance of corruption there are no clear differences between men and women and it is expected that the increased participation of women in government has uneven effects on corruption which vary widely among the political and social contexts.

2.1.2 Women in African Parliaments

Women in Parliaments in Africa, in recent years, have played an important role in projects that involve them closely. Women in local government in Africa tend to promote social interest, including increased spending on programs related to health, nutrition and education.

FIG.1 WOMEN IN AFRICAN PARLIAMENTS IN 1995 AND 2014



Among the works that analyze women in African parliaments to Gretchen and Bauer (2006), shows that African women working together despite the presence of religious divisions, ethnic and class helping to formulate laws concerning welfare and facilitate more women's interests. In a

previous work Goetz (1998) noted that, despite the adversities, women in government in Africa, particularly in Uganda and South Africa made considerable progress in inserting the interests of women in the political agenda. According to Burnet (2008), the increasing representation of women in government in Rwanda paved the way to democracy and greater social participation.

Powley (2007), finally, analyzed the fundamental role of women parliamentarians in Rwanda in 2000 in passing a law strengthening the rights of women. The new legislation has established the right of women to inherit land, for the first time. In the wake of the Rwandan genocide, which destroyed families, the exclusion of women from land ownership had become a critical issue. In addition to being a violation of their rights, does not allow women to own land had a negative impact on issues such as food production, safety, the environment, settlement patterns and family life. The MPs have also actively supported the increased spending on health and education.

All this leads us to conclude that women in parliaments can modify institutional context making it more conducive to aid management of which agree objectives, can make, therefore, less "imposed from above" and encourage the management. For this reason we estimate if women in political institutions may influence the pattern of foreign aid, in particular in the total amount of aid and aid sent to social sector. Our results suggest that more women in institutions will have important implications for the pattern of foreign aid flows.

2.2 The studies on the effectiveness of Foreign aid

According to most studies about the effectiveness of foreign aid, they have positive effects on growth only under certain conditions, related to the institutions quality of the recipient countries, the types of aid sent and the stability of the relationship between donor and recipient. In this framework one of the most influential studies is the one of Burnside and Dollar (2000). These authors argue that donors should be more selective in sending aid favoring countries with good policies, because only in these countries, aid may have a greater impact on growth. They deduce that foreign aid has a positive effect on growth only if the receiving country practice good policies; with weak policies, aid has no positive effect on growth. Following their ideas a lot of other studies have been done on this strand (Collier and Dollar, 2001; Collier and Dollar, 2002; Ovaska, 2003; Guillaumont and Chauvet, (2002); Economides et al., (2004). Guillaumont (2008) argues that aid effectiveness depends on a number of specific characteristics of the receiving countries, so if these characteristics are well identified, should be kept as criteria for allocating aid, so that the aid will be allocated in an effective manner. Other authors have stressed that aid effectiveness depends not only on institutions but also on the type of aid sent. For example, Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004) divided aid into three categories: humanitarian aid, aid that affect growth only in the long run, such

as aid to support democracy, the environment, health or education and assistance that can stimulate growth in the short term, such as aid to support the budget and balance of payments, investment in infrastructure, and support for productive sectors, such as agriculture and industry. They focus on the third group, which accounts for about 45% of all aid flows and find that there is a positive relationship between short-impact aid and economic growth during a period of four years. Michaelowa and Weber (2006) estimate the effectiveness of aid if sent to education and provide the evidence of a positive correlation between growth and development aid that increases the rate of primary school enrollment. Nunnenkamp, Dreher and Thiele (2007) estimate if aid to specific sectors affect educational outcomes. They show that foreign aid significantly increase growth when it is sent to primary school enrollment. Masud and Yontcheva (2005) focus on health aid and demonstrate that aid is effective if intended for health in particular for the reduction of child mortality, but this effect is only significant for the assistance provided by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Mishra and Newhouse (2007) examine the relationship between health, aid and infant mortality. Their specific model assess that infant mortality is a function of foreign aid received in the previous period. They show that foreign aid favors economic growth with evidence of success of specific public health programs. A further feature of foreign aid, which affects the effectiveness, identified by the more recent literature, it is correlated with the type of the relationship between donor and recipient.

Setting in this literature strand we hypothesize that women in institutions have the power to influence the effectiveness of foreign aid. In particular we do this analysis on performances using as Mishra and Newhouse (2007) a model that examine the relationship between health, aid and infant mortality and we calculate also the managing capabilities of women in institutions. Our findings suggest that aid sent to the health sector is effective to reduce infant mortality through the management of women in public offices.


3. Data

This section presents a description of the dataset used for the empirical analysis. We used data on flows of Official Development Aid (ODA) commitment sent to 49 African countries from worldwide donors of the OECD Creditor Reporting System dataset. The period covered is 1995-2014, data are organized with a panel approach. In the time period considered, therefore, for each geographical unit the variables present twenty time observations.

Regarding development aid were used data individual of countries belonging to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and multilateral organizations; data analyzed are on commitments.

Figure 1 shows the quantity of aid (measured as a proportion of GDP of recipient countries) sent from the major donor to all the Sub-Saharan African countries. The figure evidences that France, followed by the United States, Germany, Japan and United Kingdom, are currently the major donors. Data are measured in terms of 2012 US dollar exchange rate. A common features of all donor countries is the existence of a particular relationship with the recipient countries based either on colonization or on political and economical strategies.

FIGURE 1 –MAJOR DONOR COUNTRIES SINCE 1995




Note: aid are in percentage on GDP

The figure 2 shows that the greatest part of foreign aid devolved to Sub-Saharan African countries in the period 1995-2014 went to the Social Infrastructure and services sector (38%).

Less consistent are flows addressed to other sectors like Economic Infrastructure and services, Production and Humanitarian,.


FIG. 2 - FOREIGN AID SECTORS



Whithin the Social Infrastructure and services sector (fig.3), “Health” and the collateral “Water & sanitation” sector receives the greatest amount of aid resources (55%) followed by Government and civil society (26%) and Education (19%).

In our analysis we are interested in identifying the determinants of foreign aid received by African Countries and evaluate the influence of women in recipient counties Parliament on both the ammount of resources obtained and their effectiveness. To this extent we consider the main sector of foreign aid that is social infrastructure and services, and its subsectors.

FIG. 3 SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS



The empirical literature suggests different political, economic, and social factors to explain the foreign aid decision process referring both the recipient and the donor point of view. In particular we focus on recipient countries characteristics and consider the explanatory variables described in what follows.

The data on women in parliament indicate percentages of women in African parliaments countries. These are data from the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) database. The variable institutions, represents the quality of governance within the countries surveyed. This variable is the First Major Component of the six measures of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank with higher values indicating better functioning of institutions: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption (Kaufmann et al., 2010). The WGI indicators are a set of research data summarizing the opinions on the quality of governance provided by experts interviewed in industrialized countries and developing. War is a dummy included to estimate the stability level of government within the country. FDI indicates the net amount of investments made in the countries observed coming from abroad, is used to check for the level of market opening abroad and the amount of foreign capital that came in the country that are not in the form of foreign aid. Trade openness (Trade) as a share of GDP is the sum of total exports and total imports divided by the value of GDP. The variable Government Expenditure in the same way measure the amount of public capital invested in the country. The per capita GDP (GDP_{t-3}) at time t-3 which measures the development level of each country.

The variable Primary Education (I_Education completion rate) monitor for the level of primary education completion within the country. Life expectancy rate (life expectancy) measure life expectancy over a given territory and it is away to measure also the level of health in the country. Influence is a dummy that indicates 0 if the major donor is also the former colonizer, 0 otherwise.

4. Empirical strategy

4.1 The econometric model and strategy

The analysis aims to assess whether the gender composition of national Parliaments in recipient countries may influence in determining both the level and type of foreign aid sent to some specific sectors. To calculate the relationship between women in national parliaments and development aid, we estimated a model structured as follows:

$$\left(\frac{Aid}{Pop}\right)_{it} = \alpha + \beta W_{it} + \gamma X_{it} + \Omega_i + \eta_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where $(Aid/Pop)_{it}$ is Aid per capita in country i ($i=1,\dots,48$) at time t ($t=1,\dots,20$); W_{it} is the Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%) in receiving countries at time t ; X_{it} is the vector of control variables of receiving countries; Ω_i is a vector of countries fixed effects; η_i is a vector of time fixed effects; ε_{it} represents errors.

In order to verify the presence of an association between foreign aid pattern and the proportion of seats held by women in receiving countries parliaments, the model is estimated by means of the Ordinary Least Squared approach. The OLS estimation of the model include lagged values of all the explanatory variables to tackle the source of endogeneity resulting from contemporary variables. We add specific control variables to tackle into account political preferences, development level and ‘crisis factors’.

However there may be an endogeneity problem of the variables of interest as follows: *Reverse causality* since it considers that the seats held by women in parliament in a period could be influenced by foreign aid sent; *measurement errors* in aid when it comes to measuring the flow of aid is easy that there is a high probability of having errors of measurement; *Omitted variables* correlated with foreign aid and share of women in parliament which generate biased results, this is a problem that can be solved in part with country fixed effects. To this extent we control for: Recipient’s policies preferences (*Public spending in different sectors*); Development level (*GDP*); Political stability (*War*); Health conditions (*HIV and Life Expectacy*). IV estimation of the model

instrumenting the endogenous regressor (W_{it}) with a variable based on linguistic gender characteristics and universal suffrage.

To treat the endogeneity problem we also use an instrumental variable model. We hypothesize that the share of women in parliament may be affected by cultural and institutional factors.

In a society with strong differences between men and women the political power of women is heavily reduced (Gay et al 2013). Political institution or rules favouring women participation in politics such as gender quotas, universal suffrage, etc..., enhance women political power (Hicks et al 2015; Beaman et al. 2009)

The presence and intensity of grammatical gender distinctions in language are robustly associated with lower women participation in economic and political life (Gay et al, 2013; Santacreu-Vasut *et al.*, 2013). To this extent we use the dummy variable “Number of gender Intensity Index”(NGII) set equal to 1 for languages with two genders and equal to 0 for languages with three and more genders or with no gender distinctions (Corbett, 2011).

Universal suffrage, the electoral experience of women in a society, when granted earlier, will favour a larger participation of women in political life (Hicks et al. 2015). To this extent we use the variable “SUFFRAGE” that indicates the accumulated years since female suffrage was granted.

We instrument the variable W_{it} with the interaction of NGII and SUFFRAGE.

4.2 Results

The first results of the estimates, are reported in Table 1. These were obtained, initially implementing an OLS model in various specifications. As already pointed out, at this early stage we are evaluating the correlation between aid and Women in Parliament, and we try with different controls to see if the Statistical significance or the sign change in any way.

TABLE 1 - OLS ESTIMATION RESULTS: TOTAL AID LEVEL

VARIABLES	Dependent Variable: Total Foreign Aid as % of Population					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
WMN_in_Parliament_lag1	1.847*** (0.627)	1.845*** (0.630)	1.691*** (0.617)	1.385** (0.529)	0.979** (0.482)	1.215** (0.501)
Institutions_lag1	3.998 (2.992)	4.059 (3.032)	4.420 (3.440)	4.710 (3.657)	6.284 (4.037)	9.211 (5.633)
FDI_lag1	-0.0685 (0.341)	-0.0654 (0.352)	0.0546 (0.351)	0.286 (0.430)	0.251 (0.258)	0.639 (0.388)
Trade_lag1	0.301* (0.164)	0.301* (0.164)	0.266* (0.143)	0.475*** (0.175)	0.356*** (0.132)	0.536*** (0.149)
I_Education_Compl_rate_lag1	-0.286 (0.243)	-0.284 (0.248)	-0.101 (0.284)	-0.229 (0.261)	-0.530* (0.312)	-0.435 (0.363)
Influence	-12.89** (5.892)	-12.83** (5.911)	-7.952* (4.340)	-6.705 (4.475)	-7.647 (4.761)	-6.737 (4.617)
War_lag1		1.698 (8.593)	3.352 (10.70)	5.009 (9.049)	3.597 (10.04)	9.449 (9.768)
Government expenditure			-1.153 (1.692)	-1.305 (1.627)	1.341 (0.987)	-1.492 (2.482)
GDP _{t-3}				0.00464 (0.00311)	0.00122 (0.000947)	0.00308 (0.00211)
Hiv_lag5					0.388 (1.698)	
Life_expectacy_lag5						0.608 (2.141)
Constant	57.92*** (18.84)	57.56*** (18.71)	55.74*** (18.08)	30.49 (21.23)	37.64 (25.45)	20.07 (99.52)
Observations	685	685	647	647	536	562
R-squared	0.066	0.066	0.070	0.101	0.084	0.092
Number of Countries	49	49	48	48	46	48

All regressions include fixed effects per country and time; Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In the model (1) we analyzed the effects that Women in Parliament has on total foreign aid; this analysis shows that Women in Parliament is positively correlated with foreign aid; the trade openness is statistically significant and positive; also influence is significant but negative; in the model (2) we add the presence of war, to control for political stability. The interest variable is robust to this inclusion; and is robust also in the models (3-6) where we add one by one the variables Government expending, to control for recipient's policies preferences, GDP_{t-3}, to control for the Development level, and in the last two, in order to control for Health conditions, HIV and Life Expectancy. We consider the model (6) as the most representative. As is evident, the OLS models provide interesting answers regarding the association between women in parliament and foreign aid. Women in parliament appear to have a positive and persistent significant effect on the amount of total aid; The magnitude of the estimated association is nearly 50%-60% larger.

The results in Table 1 indicate that countries with higher percentages of seats held by women tend to attract more foreign aid.

In Table 2 are shown the OLS estimation results, regarding the allocation of aid among sectors, using the same control variables used in the model (6). The four aid sector explored are “Social Infrastructure & Services”, “Economic Infrastructure & Services”, “Production” and “Humanitarian”.

TABLE 2 - OLS ESTIMATION RESULTS: ALLOCATION OF AID AMONG SECTORS

VARIABLES	Dependent Variable: Foreign Aid as % of Population			
	Social Infrastructure & Services	Economic Infrastructure & Services	Production Sector	Humanitarian_Aid
WMN_in_Parliament_lag1	1.281** (0.631)	0.388** (0.187)	-0.0180 (0.124)	0.00801 (0.0443)
Institutions_lag1	5.157 (3.356)	0.561 (1.712)	0.588 (0.679)	-0.943 (0.925)
War_lag1	6.619 (6.253)	0.268 (2.348)	0.358 (1.092)	3.901* (2.032)
FDI_lag1	0.572 (0.388)	0.556** (0.230)	-0.00510 (0.0560)	0.0617 (0.0497)
Trade_lag1	0.240* (0.120)	0.0407 (0.0352)	-0.0221 (0.0246)	-0.0120 (0.0260)
Life_expectancy_lag5	-0.0816 (1.056)	0.791** (0.301)	-0.0137 (0.159)	-0.257 (0.180)
GDP _{t-3}	0.000558 (0.000710)	0.000339 (0.000323)	-0.000180 (0.000160)	-9.92e-05 (0.000170)
I_Education_Compl_rate_lag1	-0.164 (0.257)	-0.156 (0.109)	0.0197 (0.0621)	0.0422 (0.0526)
Influence	-0.0760 (1.458)	-2.983 (2.548)	-0.947* (0.522)	-2.023** (0.888)
Government expenditure	-1.237 (1.000)	-0.0213 (0.198)	0.249* (0.138)	0.0344 (0.263)
Constant	24.90 (48.18)	-32.59** (15.31)	5.544 (7.630)	16.40* (8.864)
Observations	565	562	565	538
R-squared	0.132	0.086	0.018	0.049
Number of Countries	48	48	48	48

All regressions include fixed effects per country and time; Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In the model where the dependent variable are aid sent to social and economic sectors the variable Women in Parliament is still significant and positively correlated with the sector of foreign aid. In the table 3 and 4 we show the OLS estimation results regarding the specific subsectors of social and economic sectors. In the table 3 the results obtained show that women in institutions have the power to increase foreign aid sent to health and to the correlated sector of the water supply and sanitation. In the table 4 the results obtained show that women in institutions have no power to increase the level of these foreign aid. The variable “Women in Parliament” for these type of aid are significant only in the aggregate.

TABLE 3 - OLS ESTIMATION RESULTS: SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE & SERVICES AID

VARIABLES	Dependent Variable: Foreign Aid as % of Population			
	Health_Aid	Water Supply & Sanitation	Education_Aid	Government_Aid
WMN_in_Parliament_lag1	0.315** (0.128)	0.927* (0.531)	-0.000950 (0.0709)	0.0251 (0.0395)
Institutions_lag1	0.837 (1.290)	1.997 (1.738)	0.0909 (1.369)	-0.152 (0.419)
War_lag1	-1.509 (1.846)	5.498 (3.740)	0.789 (1.358)	-1.095 (1.893)
FDI_lag1	0.0777* (0.0452)	0.447 (0.372)	0.139 (0.271)	-0.0408 (0.0293)
Trade_lag1	-0.0525** (0.0235)	0.0893 (0.0682)	0.0471 (0.0316)	0.0935** (0.0398)
Life_expectacy_lag5	-0.00366 (0.517)	0.656 (0.619)	0.112 (0.265)	-0.362** (0.135)
GDP _{t-3}	-0.000296 (0.000247)	0.000498 (0.000356)	-0.00121 (0.00174)	0.000159 (0.000158)
I_Education_Compl_rate_lag1	0.129 (0.103)	-0.168 (0.162)	-0.137** (0.0630)	0.0333 (0.0295)
Influence	-0.642 (0.792)	0.459 (0.915)	-0.650 (0.866)	0.0489 (0.547)
Health expenditure	1.388** (0.641)	-1.084 (1.146)		
Education expenditure			1.224 (1.159)	
Government expenditure				-0.0633 (0.0844)
Constant	-3.630 (22.84)	-38.61 (32.71)	7.917 (15.30)	16.58*** (5.508)
Observations	593	593	330	565
R-squared	0.089	0.088	0.040	0.083
Number of Countries	49	49	47	48

All regressions include fixed effects per country and time; Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE 4 - OLS ESTIMATION RESULTS: ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE & SERVICES AID

VARIABLES	Dependent Variable: Foreign Aid as % of Population				
	Transportation	Communications	Energy	Business	Banking
WMN_in_Parliament_lag1	0.0765 (0.0710)	0.174 (0.173)	0.142 (0.132)	-0.000309 (0.00725)	-0.0217 (0.0233)
Institutions_lag1	1.086 (0.911)	0.759 (0.551)	-1.605 (1.088)	-0.0143 (0.141)	0.0951 (0.232)
War_lag1	0.861 (1.121)	1.591 (1.425)	-1.789 (1.727)	0.0703 (0.114)	-0.187 (0.360)
FDI_lag1	0.185** (0.0846)	0.191 (0.184)	0.145 (0.161)	-0.0118** (0.00490)	0.0228 (0.0177)
Trade_lag1	0.0300* (0.0167)	0.0144 (0.0136)	-0.00460 (0.0435)	-0.00140 (0.00233)	0.00643 (0.00719)
Life_expectacy_lag5	0.245 (0.170)	0.146 (0.132)	0.323 (0.206)	0.0233 (0.0244)	-0.0705 (0.0607)
GDP _{t-3}	0.000127 (0.000262)	-2.88e-05 (0.000106)	5.21e-05 (0.000256)	-3.40e-05 (6.10e-05)	0.000782 (0.000516)
I_Education_Compl_rate_lag1	-0.0651 (0.0544)	-0.0366 (0.0533)	-0.0311 (0.0794)	-0.00165 (0.00799)	-0.0131 (0.0123)
Influence	0.0118 (0.821)	0.274 (0.300)	-2.545 (2.256)	-0.263* (0.151)	-0.711 (0.449)
Government expenditure	-0.0839 (0.136)	-0.268 (0.254)	0.132 (0.130)	0.0247 (0.0170)	-0.0130 (0.0377)
Constant	-6.191 (9.432)	-5.393 (4.841)	-14.55 (10.14)	-0.574 (1.218)	2.824 (2.452)
Observations	510	516	465	451	479
R-squared	0.020	0.092	0.031	0.018	0.027
Number of Countries	48	48	48	48	48

All regressions include fixed effects per country and time; Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

We are well aware that these results can be distorted. The endogeneity problem is the main issue. For this reason we have tried to correct the endogeneity using an instrumental variable model.

In the table 5 we report the results of an IV strategy.

TABLE 5 - IV ESTIMATES: 2ND STAGE

VARIABLES	Dependent Variable: Foreign Aid as % of Population			
	Total Aid	Social Infrastructure & Services	Health_Aid	Water Supply & Sanitation
WMN_in_Parliament_lag1	2.017* (1.043)	0.759** (0.377)	0.451** (0.194)	0.646*** (0.221)
Institutions_lag1	5.548* (3.287)	2.814 (1.896)	2.168** (0.899)	-0.0943 (0.913)
War_lag1	14.39*** (5.536)	3.717* (2.084)	-0.428 (1.043)	0.789 (0.978)
FDI_lag1	0.606* (0.324)	0.182 (0.145)	0.0821 (0.0712)	0.119* (0.0710)
Trade_lag1	0.232** (0.115)	0.0122 (0.0624)	-0.0466 (0.0349)	0.0387 (0.0250)
Life_expectacy_lag5	-2.347** (1.009)	-1.301** (0.601)	-0.285 (0.396)	-0.389* (0.223)
GDP _{t-3}	0.000569 (0.000905)	-0.000635 (0.000397)	-0.000295 (0.000230)	6.15e-05 (0.000135)
I_Education_Compl_rate_lag1	-0.287 (0.303)	0.132 (0.123)	0.136** (0.0618)	-0.0533 (0.0581)
Influence	-3.296 (3.715)	0.407 (1.507)	0.0194 (0.871)	0.333 (0.586)
Government expenditure	-0.654 (0.499)	-0.259 (0.240)		-0.0979 (0.106)
Health expenditure			0.137 (0.480)	
Education expenditure				
Observations	454	454	471	454
R-squared	0.012	0.057	0.099	0.001
Number of Countries	37	37	38	37
F-statistics	35.56	35.56	44.12	35.56

All regressions include fixed effects per country and time; Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The IV strategy results confirms the OLS ones: an higher share of women in parliament has the ability to attract overall foreign aid and, in particular, those sent to the Social Sector (Health and Water supply & sanitation). In addition, when significant, the variable institutions is positive and statistically significant, it means that raising the goodness of institutions a greater amount of total aid is sent; the presence of wars, foreign direct investments and the level of trade openness positive and statistically significant and has, in the same way, the power to attract total aid.

In the table 6 the results of the first stage are shown. The first stage suggests a highly significant relationship between the instrument and the variable “women in Parliament”, supporting instrumental validity. Furthermore, the instrument report an F-statistic between 35 and 44.

TABLE 6 - IV ESTIMATES: 1ST STAGE

VARIABLES	Dependent Variable: % of Women in Parliaments			
	Total Aid	Social Infrastructure & Services	Health_Aid	Water Supply & Sanitation
NGIIXSuffrage	0.673*** (0.198)	0.673*** (0.198)	0.642*** (0.159)	0.673*** (0.198)
Institutions_lag1	0.787 (1.234)	0.787 (1.234)	0.406 (1.084)	0.787 (1.234)
War_lag1	-0.714 (1.245)	-0.714 (1.245)	-0.532 (1.207)	-0.714 (1.245)
FDI_lag1	-0.126** (0.0588)	-0.126** (0.0588)	-0.135** (0.0572)	-0.126** (0.0588)
Trade_lag1	-0.00351 (0.0291)	-0.00351 (0.0291)	-0.00615 (0.0275)	-0.00351 (0.0291)
Life_expectacy_lag5	0.290 (0.349)	0.290 (0.349)	0.204 (0.339)	0.290 (0.349)
GDP _{t-3}	-0.000133 (0.000216)	-0.000133 (0.000216)	-0.000196 (0.000198)	-0.000133 (0.000216)
I_Education_Compl_rate_lag1	0.183*** (0.0508)	0.183*** (0.0508)	0.183*** (0.0477)	0.183*** (0.0508)
Influence	0.0214 (0.648)	0.0214 (0.648)	-0.0378 (0.605)	0.0214 (0.648)
Government expenditure	-0.00334 (0.126)	-0.00334 (0.126)		-0.00334 (0.126)
Health expenditure			1.035** (0.421)	
Constant	-25.19 (16.01)	-25.19 (16.01)	-25.16* (14.71)	-25.19 (16.01)
Observations	454	454	472	454
R-squared	0.293	0.293	0.336	0.293
Number of Countries	39	39	39	39

All regressions include fixed effects per country and time; Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The IV strategy results obtained confirm the OLS ones: an higher share of women in parliament has the ability to attract overall foreign aid and, in particular, those sent to the Social Sector (Health and Water supply & sanitation). The instrument is highly statistically significant and with the expected sign. Good institutions, the presence of a conflict and international economic linkages have, as expected, increases the level of total aid.

Our first hypothesis is confirmed and namely we verify that Women, considered more altruistic, fair and less corrupted, when in political institutions can influence the foreign aid decision-making process and in particular in the total amount of aid in aid for social sector.

5. Women's influence on aid performances: a preliminary result

Do women in institutions have the power to influence the effectiveness of foreign aid? We start from the results obtained with the IV estimates and analyze the performance of "health aid" via Women in Parliaments on the reduction of infant mortality. In particular we do this analysis on performances using, as Mishra and Newhouse (2007), a model that calculate the connection between health, aid and infant mortality but we consider also an interaction between Women in

Parliaments and “health aid” in order to understand the managing capabilities of women in institutions. In order to obtain a preliminary result, the model is estimated with an OLS strategy.

To calculate the relationship between infant mortality and foreign aid and aid managed by women in national offices, we estimated a model structured as follows:

$$IM_{it} = HealthAid_{it} + W_{it} + HealthAid_{it} * W_{it} + \delta Y_{it} + \Omega_i + \eta_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

where IM_{it} is the Infant mortality rate; $HealthAid_{it}$ is the Aid sent to aid sector; Y_{it} is a vector of control variables of receiving countries; Ω_i is a vector of countries fixed effects; η_i is a vector of time fixed effects; ε_{it} represents errors.

In table 7 we show the results obtained from this further empirical analysis. Also if it is only a correlation we obtain that when the interaction variable increase the infant mortality rate decrease, also if the coefficient is small the result obtained is statistically significant and negatively correlated with the dependent variable.

TABLE 7 – WOMEN MANAGING AID AND AID PERFORMANCES

VARIABLES	Dependent variable: Infant Mortality rate
Inhealth_aid	0.00194 (0.00486)
W	0.000318 (0.000863)
Inhealth aid*W	-0.000519* (0.000286)
Lnortalityinfant _{t-3}	0.795*** (0.0465)
lnLife_expectancy	-0.423*** (0.135)
Hiv_lag3	-0.0113** (0.00509)
Health expenditure	-0.00655* (0.00327)
lnGDP _{t-3}	0.0210 (0.0163)
War	0.0274* (0.0150)
lnPop	-0.158** (0.0651)
Constant	4.928*** (1.250)
Observations	812
Number of Countries	49
R-squared	0.963

All regressions include fixed effects per country and time; Robust standard errors in parentheses;

All other control variable has the attended signs. Indeed with an increasing of life expectancy, the health in public expenditure and the level of population decreases the infant mortality rate. In presence of a war the infant mortality increases.

Our findings suggest that aid sent to the health sector is effective to reduce infant mortality through the management of women in public offices. The explanation that we give to these results is that women interests coincide with the health aid goals because they are more orientated to social sector.

6. Conclusions

In this paper we have seen the relationship between foreign aid and some determinant variables of development and we wondered whether women in Parliament in the receiving countries can affect the aid flow in the amount and the type. Our empirical analysis show that: the amount of total foreign aid and its allocation to social sector rises with the share of women in recipient countries' parliaments. Building on the existing literature we tried to give an answer to the research question. With a empirical model applied to a set of panel data of African countries, we find that women in Parliament increase the level of foreign aid and in particular giving a significant role to the aid to social sector. The results of our estimates confirm the theoretical insight. The correlation between women and foreign aid is positive for the determinant of development analyzed. The OLS results are consistent also when we employ an IV strategy for the total amount of aid, aid sent to social infrastructure and aid sent to health and water supply & sanitation. This outcome confirms the hypothesis that women may affect the decision process in foreign aid allocation according to their own preferences for a more widespread intervention in social policies.

In a further analysis we test on performances using a model that calculate the connection between health, aid and infant mortality and the managing capabilities of women in institutions. In a basic OLS model we obtain that when the interaction variable increase the infant mortality rate decrease, also if the coefficient is small the result obtained is statistically significant and negatively correlated with the dependent variable. These results show that aid sent to the health sector is effective to reduce infant mortality through the management of women in public offices. The explanation that we give to these results is that women interests coincide with the health aid goals because they are more orientated to social sector.

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