From the *Glass Door* to the *Glass Ceiling*: An Analysis of the Gender Wage Gap by Age Groups

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Abstract

Using 2009 EU-SILC data, we decompose the gender wage gap for prime age workers in France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. With the objective to pinpoint whether women face a *glass door* at the early career stages and when the *glass ceiling* effect arises in the female life cycle, we adopt an age group approach. The empirical results show that both the raw gender wage gap and its unexplained part increase with age. French, Italian and British women have to cope with a *glass door*. In all countries, the *glass ceiling* effect is completely realized by age 30 and increases by age.

Keywords: gender wage gap, labor force participation, wage decomposition, glass ceiling, glass door

JEL Classification: C31, C49, J21, J24, J31, J71.

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"*When you put all the pieces together, a new picture emerges for why women don't make it into the C-suite. It's not the glass ceiling, but the sum of many obstacles along the way*"

Alice H. Eagly and Linda L. Carli (2007), *Women and the labyrinth of leadership*

1. Introduction

It is commonly acknowledged that women face a higher complexity of challenges than men during their working career path. In this respect, the metaphor of the 'labyrinth of leadership' suggested by Eagly and Carli (2007) is enlightening. The scholars disentangle this complexity of challenges through the study of the gender pay differential across the quantiles of male and female wage distributions. They identify the presence of a *glass ceiling* and a *sticky floor* effect (Albrecht et al., 2003; Booth et al., 2003), which are generally associated with the existence of a gender difference in pay. Specifically, the evidence of a larger gap at the top quantiles is consistent with the *glass ceiling* effect, whereas a larger gap at the bottom of the wage distribution is associated with the *sticky floor* effect. Hassink and Russo (2010) introduce the concept of *glass door*. They argue that "the *glass ceiling* refers to gender differences in internal promotion, whereas the *glass door* is about gender differences in external hiring. [...] An interesting implication of the *glass door* is that it may reinforce the *glass ceiling*, so that the *glass ceiling* can be sustainable as an equilibrium phenomenon".

The main objective of this work is to measure the impact of the *glass door* and *glass ceiling* effects on the gender wage gap, where by *glass door* we mean the existence of barriers to female career and wage advancements at the very early career stages and by *glass ceiling* we mean the existence of barriers that prevent women from reaching higher status occupations along the career path. The presence of such barriers to female career accomplishments results in lower earnings for women compared to men. This issue deserves great attention since it may have severe consequences, in the short and medium run, on female wages and, in the long run, on female pension entitlements and old age poverty.

Although in the last decades the observed gender pay gap has decreased in many countries, its unexplained part - related to both empirical misspecification and pure discrimination - has remained stable (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2005). Interestingly, a positive correlation between the gender wage gap and age is suggested in cross country reports (European Commission, 1998). Nopo et al. (2012) present graphical evidence of this correlation in Western Europe, showing that the average gap increases with age for workers until 35 years old, while it remains almost constant for oldest workers. However, to the best of our knowledge, the scholars have not yet provided any

empirical evidence or any exhaustive explanation of this positive correlation. The gender wage gap may originate at the very early career stages, because women face unfavorable contractual conditions or barriers to career advancements (i.e., because of the presence of the *glass door* effect), and extend over the life cycle, because the existence of unfavorable employment conditions that keep them stuck to the *sticky floor* or prevent them to outdo the *glass ceiling*. Thus, we believe that a closer look at the gender wage gap across age cohorts allows to better understand *when* and *which* barriers women face along their career path and *how* such barriers prevent women from affording career and wage advancements.

Based on these considerations, we present a cross country analysis of the gender wage gap by age groups with the objective to pinpoint i) whether women face a *glass door* when they enter the labor market, ii) when the *glass ceiling* arises during the life cycle, iii) whether the gender wage gap by age cohorts is due to different characteristics and attributes between men and women or by residual factors. In doing so, we exploit the 2009 European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC, *EuroStat*) data for France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Selected countries differ considerably in terms of female labor market participation, widespread of part-time employment, type of welfare state and industrial and labor relations system. We define the age groups following the *EuroStat* classification of the labor force survey and we distinguish between twenty-years-old, thirty-years-old, forty-years-old and fifty-years-old individuals. The empirical analysis develops in three steps. First, in order to account for a possible sample selection problem, we estimate the female decision whether to participate or not in paid employment. Second, we estimate a log-hourly wage equation for men and a selectivity corrected log-hourly wage equation for women. Third, we decompose the gender wage differential using the Neuman-Oaxaca technique (2004), which accounts for selectivity. The empirical analysis is conducted for each country both on the entire sample of prime age workers and separately for each age group.

We believe that the age group approach represents a valuable alternative to the quantile analysis and, in some respects, it presents some advantages. Male and female average wages tend to increase with age, but their dispersion increases as well because many older workers, especially women, are still low wage earners. Further, male and female workers might reach the top of the wage distribution at different stages of the life cycle. By focusing on age groups, we avoid to compare bottom earners and top earners belonging to different age cohorts that faced different job markets when they started to work. In addition, if the gender wage gap for actually twenty-years-old workers is due to the current career opportunities in the job market, the gender pay differential pointed out for older age groups may derive from the hoarded effect of barriers since the entry in the labor market. Thus, the age group approach allows to partly isolate the effect of the labor market

structure on earnings. Furthermore, younger women are relatively more educated than the older ones and have modern perspectives over their role within the family, as mothers and housewives. This change in personal observed and unobserved characteristics possibly affects labor market participation and individual earnings possibility. Thus, the age group approach allows to partly isolate the effect of unobserved characteristics.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. The data and the estimation methodology are described in Section 3 and 4, respectively. Empirical findings are presented in Section 5. Section 6 reports some robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.

2. Review of the Literature

More than 263 articles covered the issue of the gender wage gap in the period 1960s-1990s, finding a time decreasing raw pay gap and a stable unexplained gap (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2005). For a recent review of this literature, please refer to Christofides et al. (2013), who also provide a cross country analysis of the *glass ceiling* and the *sticky floor* effects.

The *glass ceiling* is "the phenomenon whereby women do quite well in the labor market up to a point after which there is an effective limit on their prospects" (Albrecht, 2003). This point might be placed at any point of the life course and career path. The *sticky floor* describes "a situation arising when otherwise identical men and women might be appointed to the same pay scale or rank, but the women are appointed at the bottom and the men further up the scale" (Booth et al., 2003). The empirical literature identifies the *sticky floor* and the *glass ceiling* effect by measuring the width of the gender wage gap across the wage distribution. Large differentials for low income earners are consistent with the *sticky floor* (Booth et al., 2003; Chi and Li, 2008), whereas large differentials for top earners are associated with the *glass ceiling* (Albrecht et al., 2003; Napari, 2009). Hassink and Russo (2010) introduce the concept of *glass door*, which deals with gender differences along the hierarchical structure of jobs for new hired workers. While the *glass ceiling* and *sticky floor* deal with gender differences in internal promotion or in wage change upon promotion, the concept of *glass door* refers to gender differences in external hiring.

Empirical results depend on the data and the estimation methodology applied. Empirical evidence for France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom is a good example of the challenge of finding conclusive results. For the sake of conciseness, we review only the literature that refers to these countries.

The 2005 pay differential in the EU-27, measured as the ratio between the log male hourly wage and the female one, was about 15% (Zizza, 2013). At the country level, the same ratio falls to 6% in Italy and 14% in France, while reaches 16% in the Netherlands and 25% in the United Kingdom

(Arulampalam et al., 2007). In 2007, according to Christophides et al. (2013), the British and Dutch gaps remain stable, the French reduces to 7%. Unlike, in Italy the ratio increases up to 10%.

Christophides et al. (2013) find evidence of the *glass ceiling* effect in France. They also point out a significant male advantage and female disadvantage, after controlling for a large set of individual, household and job related characteristics that explain only 26% of the gender pay gap. Differently, Meurs and Ponthieux (2006) find that between 1990 and 2002 around three-quarters of the gender pay differential in France is due to differences in jobs structures, and mainly the difference in working hours. Meurs, Pailhé and Ponthieux (2011) investigate the extent to which children and child related career interruptions affect the gender pay gap. They distinguish between women who have never taken child related time out and women who have experienced career breaks to take care of children. They find that the pay differential between men and women who have never taken time out for childcare remains essentially unexplained after controlling for a large set of variables. They explain the result in terms of statistical discrimination.

Several empirical studies have pointed out a substantial and persistent *glass ceiling* effect in Italy (Arulampalam et al., 2007; Christofides et al., 2013; Addabbo e Favaro, 2011). Christofides et al. (2013) detect also a significant male wage premium and female wage penalty. The negative explained part suggests that Italian women have better characteristics than their male colleagues. According to Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) and Pissarides et al. (2005), accounting for sample selection raises the gender pay gap in Italy. The result is due to the positive selection in employment of Italian women. De la Rica et al. (2008) argue that countries with a sizeable selection effect, mainly related to a scanty labor market participation of low skilled women, exhibit a flatter gender wage gap mainly explained by a *glass ceiling* involving more educated women.

Christophides et al. (2013) find evidence of the *glass ceiling* effect also in the Netherlands, where men enjoy a wage premium and women undergo a wage penalty. Albretch et al. (2009) find a positive and significant selection effect for full-time working women. They conclude that the largest portion of the gender wage gap between male and female full-time workers is due to differences in returns to observed attributes between genders. Accounting for both full-time and part-time female workers, Van de Meer (2008) finds that at most thirty per cent of the gender pay gap can be explained by productivity differences, whereas the largest part of the gender wage gap is due to 'price' differences.

Labor market insiders and new entrants might face different barriers. Manning and Robinson (2004) explain the gender pay gap in the United Kingdom with the entrant gap and the share of entrants, which are mostly part-timers. Indeed, British part-time employees are mainly segregated in feminized sectors where earning possibilities are lower (Matteazzi et al., 2014; Mumford and Smith,

2009). Arulampalam et al. (2007) argue that the United Kingdom exhibits the largest evidence of *glass ceiling*. Accordingly, Christofides et al. (2013) find evidence of an increasing pattern of the *glass ceiling* effect along the wage distribution. They also detect a significant male wage premium and a female wage penalty.

It is worth pointing out that the magnitude of the gender wage gap is strictly related to macro institutional variables, like welfare policies and type of wage setting institutions. Indeed, the type of welfare state and industrial and labor relations system matter in explaining the gender wage gap because they shape the size and the nature of the gender earnings differential (Blau and Khan, 2003; Daly et al., 2008; Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008; Rubery et al., 2005). According to Christofides et al. (2013), also the size of the unexplained part of the gender pay gap is systematically related to policies and institutions.

3. Data and age-group approach

The data used in this study come from the EU-SILC (*EuroStat*) for 2009. This survey collects extensive comparable cross-sectional and longitudinal data both at the household and individual level for all 27 (in 2009) EU Member States. We exploit the 2009 cross-sectional wave of the survey[1], because it makes available the information on 2008 labor earnings, which are the last available information on earnings before the recent Great Recession. Indeed, it is well known in the literature that recessions and subsequent sustained downturns influence women's labor market attachment and the pattern of gender segregation, with important consequences on the gender pay gap (Rubery, 1988, 2013)[2].

We focus on a sample of prime age individuals living in France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. We focus on men and women ages 20 to 59 because wage progress and promotion mainly occur at this stage of their career. Students, unemployed, self-employed, family workers, and retired people are excluded[3]. The share of both inactive and part-time men is

[1]We exploit the cross-sectional data, instead of the longitudinal ones, because the former disclose more information on working conditions than the latter. In particular, the variables *firm size*, *being in a managerial position with supervisory responsibility* and the *economic sector*, which play a crucial role in explaining individual earnings and the gender pay gap, are available only in the cross-sectional dataset.

[2] Men and women exhibit a different degree of vulnerability when facing economic and financial recession; this heterogeneity is due to the their different position in the labor market, social norms and gender division of labor inside the household. However, the study of the effect of financial crises on the gender wage gap goes beyond the scope of the present work.

[3] We exclude unemployed people because we assume that unemployment is caused by labor market rationing and it is not voluntary chosen by the individual. Thus, in our framework, unemployment is considered as a constraint on individual choice. However, we perform a robustness check by including among voluntary non participant women also those women that self-declare to be unemployed but not actively looking for a job. Self-employed are generally excluded from this type of analysis (Albretch et al., 2003; Christofides et al., 2010; Meurs et al., 2011). Our rationale for the exclusion of self-employed is that we should also control for the presence of a selection effect of workers into dependent work (other than into employment) and this goes beyond the scope of the present work.

negligible (respectively, 3.5% and 3.4%), therefore they are excluded too; on the other hand, we include inactive women to account for female labor force selection bias. The sample size ranges from 4,285 observations for the United Kingdom to 10,231 for Italy, for a total of 23,886 prime age individuals. Following the *EuroStat* classification, we distinguish between twenty-year-old (20-29), thirty-year-old (30-39), forty-year-old (40-49), and fifty-year-old (50-59) individuals.

The four selected countries are representative of the European heterogeneity in terms of female labor market participation, incidence of part-time employment, size of the gender wage gap, and labor market structure[4]. Furthermore, they represent different typologies of welfare state regimes. According to the Esping-Andersen's (1999) classification of modern welfare states, the United Kingdom is a typical example of liberal welfare state regime characterized by minimal means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers, little redistribution of incomes and a strong reliance on market mechanisms. France is a typical example of conservative welfare states, where redistribution is higher than in the liberal ones. In Esping-Andersen's original classification, Italy also is a conservative regime; however, several authors (Ebbinghaus, 1998; Ferrera, 1996; Leibfried, 1992) consider Italy, as well as the other Mediterranean countries, as a sub-type of conservative welfare state because the country shows a limited social insurance coverage and a strong 'familialist' tradition. Esping-Andersen (1990) originally ascribes the Netherlands to the Social-democratic welfare regime type, characterized by a system of generous universal and highly distributive benefits. However, several authors (Shalev, 1996; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Wildeboer Schut et al., 2001) argue that the Dutch welfare system is rather an hybrid case, hardly to be assigned to a specific regime type because it is a system mix of social-democratic, liberal and conservative characteristics. Differently, Korpi and Palme (1998) consider the Dutch welfare system as liberally oriented, whereas Visser and Hemerijck (1997) include the Netherlands among the conservative welfare states.

Our variable of interest is the individual gross hourly wage, that is computed from available information on annual labor earnings, weekly working hours, and months spent in paid employment. As for labor earnings, the dataset provides information on the gross employee cash or near cash annual income in the main and any secondary or casual jobs, before tax and social contributions are deducted[5]. Gross employee income refers to the income reference period, in general the calendar year preceding the interview. Regarding the working schedule, we have

[4]An extension of the analysis to other European countries is currently unfeasible due to: i) very high non response rate for workplace variables (especially for Northern Europe countries); ii) small sample size (less than 100 observations per age group), which threatens statistical representativeness and the respect of the asymptotic properties of the estimators.

[5] It includes wages and salaries, usual paid overtime, tips and commission, supplementary payments, profit sharing or bonuses paid in cash, additional payments based on productivity, etc. In order to ensure consistency between declared labor earnings and job related characteristics, we drop workers with any secondary or casual jobs.

information on the number of hours usually worked per week at the time of the interview including also overtime, either paid or unpaid, and the number of months spent in employment and inactivity during the income reference period. The gross hourly wage is computed as the ratio between gross monthly earnings (employee gross cash or near cash annual income divided the number of months spent in paid employment) and the number of hours usually worked per month (recalculated from the number of weekly hours)[6]. Notice that there might be a lag between the end of the income reference period and the time of the interview; since this time lag could weaken the match between labor income (that refers to a past period) and the number of hours usually worked per week (that refers to the current situation), our dataset includes only those workers who remained stable in their working status and in their job over the year. We also exclude individuals holding more than one job.

For our sample of analysis, Table 1 shows some figures about the proportion of women working as employees, mean hourly wages and gender wage gap by country and age group. Female employment is very heterogeneous across countries and age cohorts. Whatever the age group, Italy is bringing up the rear: female workers in the age group 20-29 are only 66.5%, gradually decreasing to 48.5% for the over 50. The largest employment rate for the twenty-years-old women is observed in the Netherlands, where it is around 87%. The United Kingdom displays the highest employment rate of women over 50. As for the hourly earnings, the highest wages are recorded in the Netherlands, for both men and women. The gender wage gap is computed as difference between male and female earnings expressed as a percentage of male earnings. In all countries, men outearn women. The only exception is represented by Dutch 20-29 years-old women who earn slightly more than their peer male colleagues. The extent of the gender pay gap varies substantially across countries and age groups. The largest percentage differentials are pointed out in the United Kingdom and the smallest ones in Italy. The most striking evidence is the widening of the gender wage gap over the age groups. In France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, there is a clear cut increasing trend; interestingly, in Italy the gender pay gap peaks in the 40-49 age group.

To assess a comparison with the quantile approach, in Graph 1 we present the country-specific wage distribution by gender and age. As for the youngest age group (top-left quadrant of each panel), in France, Italy and the Netherlands the male and the female wage distributions almost overlap; in the United Kingdom the male wage distribution lies slightly above the female one. As for the other age groups, men earn more than women along the whole distribution and the distance between the male and female curves increases with age. We also observe an increasing distance between the male and the female wage distributions at the top, suggesting a larger gap among top

[6]To reduce the influence of extreme values, we dropped the top and the bottom 1 percent of the wage distribution.

earners than among bottom earners. However, Italy stands out from other countries in two respects. First, the male and female wage distributions almost overlap also for workers over 30. Second, as for workers over 40, the wage distribution of men and women are always very close in the middle segments, while they slightly diverge for both the top earners and for the low earners.

The cross country difference in male and female wage distributions is usually related to the country-specific industrial and labor relations system. According to Hall and Soskice (2001), the United Kingdom is a typical example of liberal market economy: firms rely on competitive markets to coordinate with other economic actors, trade unions are rather weak, employment protection is low and labor turnover is high. Furthermore, wage setting is highly decentralized and primarily a matter of contract between employers and employees. Contrarily, France, Italy and the Netherlands are coordinated market economies where firms rely primarily on strategic modes of coordination, trade unions are influent, employment protection is high and job tenures are rather long. Unlike the United Kingdom, in these countries the wage bargaining takes place mainly in the sector-based or industrial level.

Table 1. *Female participation rate and hourly wages by country and age group*

Country	Age Group	Employed women (%)	Hourly wage		
			Male	Female	Wage gap (%)
France	20-29	86.1	11.49	10.95	4.93
	30-39	85.4	14.69	12.52	17.33
	40-49	88.1	15.54	13.22	17.55
	50-59	83.2	16.53	13.78	19.96
Italy	20-29	66.5	9.16	8.94	2.46
	30-39	62.5	12.07	11.27	7.10
	40-49	61.5	14.41	12.70	13.46
	50-59	48.5	15.78	14.46	9.13
The Netherlands	20-29	86.8	16.23	16.66	-2.58
	30-39	80.7	21.87	20.20	8.27
	40-49	77.1	25.42	21.18	20.02
	50-59	58.8	26.23	21.12	24.20
The United Kingdom	20-29	76.5	11.33	10.23	10.75
	30-39	73.3	15.90	12.93	22.97
	40-49	84.6	16.82	12.26	37.19
	50-59	88.2	16.78	11.71	43.30

NOTES - Own calculations from EU-SILC data.

Some scholars claim that high level of bargaining coverage and union density, together with a more coordinated bargaining between trade unions and employers associations, tend to compress the

Graph 1. *Country and gender hourly wage distributions, by age group*



Graph 2. *Country and age group hourly wage distributions, by gender*



wage distribution and reduce the earning inequality (Blau and Khan,2000; European Commission, 2008, 2010; Rubery et al., 2002). Graph 1 shows that the gap between male and female earnings for the over 40 is larger in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. This evidence could be related to the diffusion of female part-time employment in these countries, especially among women aged between 40 and 49. As shown in Tables A1-A2 in the Appendix, the share of forty-years-old part-timers ranges from 23% in Italy to 82% in the Netherlands. Also in the United Kingdom part-time employment arrangements are widespread. The degree of job segregation may also play a major role: men are more likely than women to be employed in a managerial position with supervisory responsibility, which is associated with higher wages. The descriptive statistics support this argument: except for Italy, men are overrepresented in best paid occupations and best rewarded sectors of the economic activity such as construction, information, communication, financial and insurance activities. On the contrary, women are more likely to be employed in education, human health, and social work activities, where earnings possibilities are lower.

One might argue that the wage distribution by age mirrors the quantile distribution because the older is a worker, the higher is her wage. Indeed, if we look at the hourly wage distribution of male and female workers by age groups plotted in Graph 2, older workers earn always more than the younger ones. However, it is noteworthy that in all countries the wage distribution of male workers aged 30-39 almost overlaps those of female workers aged 40-49 and 50-59. Furthermore, in almost all countries we observe that the earnings of the twenty-years-old male top earners are higher than the ones of the forty and fifty-years-old female top earners. In this respect, compared to the age group approach that we propose, the quantile approach has the drawback of pooling workers, whatever their age. The age group approach has also the advantage of pooling individuals that have experienced similar labor market conditions, have comparatively homogeneous educational background and, probably, share common social norms and attitudes, thus limiting the problems related to unobserved heterogeneity.

4. Methodology

4.1 The empirical strategy

The empirical analysis proceeds by steps. First, we model the female decision whether to participate or not in paid employment. Second, we estimate the wage equations for male and female workers. Third, we decompose the gender wage gap using the Neuman-Oaxaca (2004) procedure. The empirical analysis is performed, separately, for each country and for each age group.

The female choice with respect to the status in employment depends on some observed attributes (e.g. human capital level) but also on several unobserved characteristics (e.g. motivation, ability,

effort and commitment) that may affect both the decision to work and the individual earning possibilities. Thus, following Heckman's (1979) two-step analysis, in the first stage we estimate a probit participation equation[7] and in the second stage, we estimate a selectivity-corrected wage equation by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS):

(1) $y_g^j = X'\beta_g^j + \delta_g^j \lambda_g^j + \varepsilon_g^j,$

where gender is denoted as *j=(male, female)* and age groups as *g=(20-29, 30-39, 40-49,50-59)*. The outcome variable y_g^j is the logarithm of the gross hourly wage. The vector X includes exogenous independent variables and β_g^j is the associated vector of parameters. λ_g^j is the selection-correction term computed from first stage estimates[8] and δ_g^j is the associated parameter[9]. The error term ε_g^j is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance $\left(\sigma_g^j\right)^2$.

In the third stage of our analysis, we decompose the gender wage gap using the Neuman-Oaxaca procedure (2004), accounting for selectivity:

(2) $\bar{y}_g^m - \bar{y}_g^f = \left[\left(\bar{x}_g^m - \bar{x}_g^f\right)\hat{\beta}_g^*\right] + \left[\bar{x}_g^m\left(\hat{\beta}_g^m - \hat{\beta}_g^*\right) + \bar{x}_g^f\left(\hat{\beta}_g^* - \hat{\beta}_g^f\right)\right] + \left[-\hat{\delta}_g^f \bar{\lambda}_g^f\right]$

where $\bar{y}_g^j$ are the predicted mean log hourly wages, $\bar{x}_g^j$ and $\bar{\lambda}_g^j$ are, respectively, the mean vectors of workers' characteristics and selection-correction terms, $\hat{\beta}_g^j$ and $\hat{\delta}_g^j$ are the estimated returns to wage determinants, and $\hat{\beta}_g^*$ is the nondiscriminatory wage structure obtained from a pooled regression of both male and female workers by age group (Neumark, 1988).

The Neuman-Oaxaca (2004) procedure divides the pay gap into three components. The *explained part*, i.e. $\left[\left(\bar{x}_g^m - \bar{x}_g^f\right)\hat{\beta}_g^*\right]$, refers to the share of the pay differential due to different observable characteristics between male and female workers, as the human capital endowment. The *unexplained part*, i.e. $\left[\bar{x}_g^m\left(\hat{\beta}_g^m - \hat{\beta}_g^*\right) + \bar{x}_g^f\left(\hat{\beta}_g^* - \hat{\beta}_g^f\right)\right]$, refers to the share of the wage differential due to different returns to identical characteristics. All other things being equal, the same characteristics may have different rewards between men and women due to employers' discrimination, unobserved heterogeneity or omitted relevant variables. The existence of wage

[7]We do not incorporate a male participation decision into the analysis because a negligible share of men is inactive.

[8] As in Heckman (1979), the selection-correction term is computed as: $\lambda_g^j = \phi\left(w'\hat{\gamma}_g^j\right)/\Phi\left(w'\hat{\gamma}_g^j\right)$, where $\phi$is the normal density function, Φ is the normal cumulative distribution function, w is a vector of covariates and $\hat{\gamma}_g^j$ are the vector parameters of theprobitmodel. Note that men selection is assumed to be null, therefore $\lambda_g^m = 0$.

[9]In equation (1), $\delta_g^j = \sigma_j^g \rho_j^g$ is the parameter associated with the selection-correction term, where $\rho_j^g$is the error termcorrelation in both the selection and the outcome equations. If $\delta_g^j$is significantly different from zero, the employment status is endogenous, i.e. the error term in the selection and the wage equations are correlated.

penalty/premium is captured by the difference between individual returns, i.e. $\hat{\beta}_g^j$, and nondiscriminatory rewards, i.e. $\hat{\beta}_g^*$. If $\hat{\beta}_g^j > \hat{\beta}_g^* \left(\hat{\beta}_g^j < \hat{\beta}_g^*\right)$ then gender j enjoys (suffers) a wage premium (penalty). Finally, the *selection part*, $\left[-\hat{\delta}_g^f \bar{\lambda}_g^f\right]$, is the share of the raw pay differential due to self-selection of women into employment.

4.2 Explanatory variables in selection and outcome equations

The available information on EU-SILC data is very extensive, both at the household and individual level[10]. The exogenous variables included in the estimation of equation 1 are a) *human capital indicators*, b) *individual and household characteristics*, and c) *workplace characteristics*.

As for *human capital indicators*, we include the highest educational level attained. We distinguish between i) at most lower secondary (reference category), ii) at most upper secondary, and iii) tertiary education. Except for the United Kingdom, information about real labor market experience is also available[11].

The *individual and household characteristics* that we consider are the nationality (dummy variable equal to 1 if the country of birth is the same of residence), the partnership status (dummy equal to 1 if the individual lives in couple, either married or cohabiting, and 0 otherwise), the number of children by age group (we distinguish between children aged 0-2, 3-5, 6-11, and older than 12), the region of residence[12], and the degree of urbanization of the area of residence (dummy variable equal to 1 if living in a densely populated or intermediate area, 0 if living in a low populated area).

Finally, the set of *workplace characteristics* consists of the firm size (dummy variable equal to 1 if the local unit has more than 11 employees, 0 otherwise), the type of contract (dummy variable equal to 1 if she has a permanent contract and 0 otherwise)[13], being in a managerial position (dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual has a supervisory responsibility, 0 otherwise), the occupation (six dummies coded under the ISCO-88 (COM) International standard Classification of Occupations)[14], the sector of economic activity (nine dummies coded according the NACE Rev. 2

[10]Please refer to Tables A1-A2 in the Appendix for a detailed descriptive statistics of our variables of interest.

[11]EU-SILC does not provide data on the tenure with current employer. Nonetheless, job tenure only marginally contributes to the gender wage gap (Blau and Kahn 2000; Meurs and Ponthieux 2006).

[12]This information is not available for the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. For France and Italy we have, respectively, eight and five regional dummies.

[13]The information is not available for the United Kingdom.

[14]Categories: 1 = legislators, senior officials and managers, professionals (reference category); 2 = technicians and associate professionals; 3 = clerks; 4 = service workers, shop and market sellers; 5 = skilled agricultural and fishery workers, craft and related trades workers, plant and machine operators and assemblers; 6 = elementary occupations.

Statistical Classification of Economic)[15], and being employed part-time (dummy variable equal to 1 if part-time, 0 if full-time)[16].

The same set of variables related to *human capital* and *individual and household characteristics* are included also in the female participation equation (the first stage of our analysis). As exclusion restrictions[17], we include the annual amount of non labor income (including income from rental of a property or land, interest, dividends, profits from capital investments in unincorporated business, housing allowances, alimonies) and partner's annual labor (the variable takes zero value for single women). These two income related variables are common exclusion restrictions in the literature (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999; Blundell, MaCurdy, and Meghir, 2007). Furthermore, we control for the presence of elderly people in bad and very bad health conditions because the literature provides evidence that caring for parents, either co-resident or living outside the household, negatively affects female labor supply (Charmicael and Charles, 1998, 2003; Ettner,1996; Heitmueller, 2004; Johnson and Lo Sasso, 2000). Lastly, given that empirical findings suggest that extended families and grandparents' support play a key role in explaining labor force participation of mothers (Baizan, Michielin and Billari, 2002; Chiuri, 2000; Del Boca, 2002), we include among the exclusion restrictions a dummy variable that indicates the availability of non-parental (informal) unpaid childcare for children under 12[18].

5. Results

For each country, we present the results obtained using the entire sample of prime age individuals (model 1) and the age-based subsamples, that is 20-29 (model 2), 30-39 (model 3), 40-49 (model 4) and 50-59 (model 5).

In discussing the decomposition results, we focus on the extent to which the *glass door* and the *glass ceiling* effects matter in explaining the gender difference in pay. From a theoretical perspective, we adopt the definition of *glass ceiling* provided by Albrecht (2003). From an empirical perspective, we interpret the underrepresentation of women - and overrepresentation of

[15]Categories: 1 = agriculture forestry and fishing, mining and quarrying, manufacturing electricity, water supply (reference category); 2 = construction, transport and storage; 3 = wholesale and retail trade; 4 = accommodation and food services activities; 5 = information and communication, financial and insurance activities; 6 = real estate activities, professionals, administrative and support service activities; 7 = public administration and defence, compulsory social security; 8 = education, human health and social work activities; 9 = arts, entertainment and recreation, other service activities, activities of households as employers, activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies.

[16]This variable takes only zero value for men. Indeed, we excluded part-time male workers from our analysis because of the very limited number of men in part-time jobs.

[17]Exclusion restrictions affect the individual reservation wage and therefore the individual participation decision, but not the individual market wage rate (Heckman, 1979). Such exclusion restrictions, together with the normality assumption, allow the identification of the wage equation.

[18]According to EU-SILC Guidelines (2010), unpaid childcare includes childcare by grand-parents, others household members (outside parents), other relatives, friends or neighbors.

men - in managerial positions and in high status occupations as a proxy of the *glass ceiling* effect. As for the *glass door* effect, our definition slightly differs from the one of Hassink and Russo (2010) because we consider only insiders[19]. Specifically, we define the *glass door* as the presence of unfavorable contractual conditions or barriers to wage advancements for women at the very early career stages. We associate the *glass door* with the empirical evidence of an overrepresentation of female workers ages 20-29 into temporary contract jobs and a wage penalty for twenty-years-old women.

5.1 First step: participation equation

For ease of interpretation, the marginal effects on the response probabilities of the probit estimation are presented in Tables A3-A6 in the Appendix.

As expected, in all countries, women's probability of working increases with the level of education. The effect is larger in Italy, where female participation in paid employment is low, especially for women aged over 40. In this country the magnitude of the education effect increases over the age groups, suggesting that participant and non participant women exhibit broad differences in terms of educational level when female employment is low.

The employment status strongly depends on the family structure and composition: with the exception of France, women living in couple are less likely to participate in paid employment than singles, especially for the over 40. Whatever the country, the partnership status does not significantly affect the employment probability of women aged 20-29, suggesting a gradual substitution of the male bread-winner model with the dual-earner family model. The presence of children negatively affects female labor market participation - especially when they are younger the age of 5. The magnitude of the negative effect is larger for women aged 20-29, which reasonably experience their first-birth[20]. When significant, the coefficient associated with the presence of elderly people in bad or very bad health conditions decreases the probability of being in paid employment. This is especially true for Italy, a country with a strong familial tradition (Ebbinghaus 1998; Esping-Andersen 1999; Ferrera 1996; Leibfried 1992). In line with the literature, the availability of unpaid childcare increases female participation (Chiuri, 2000)[21]. Interestingly, the higher is the positive coefficient of unpaid childcare, the lower is the negative effect associated with children. These results indicate that the family network plays a key role as childcare provider and

[19]Unfortunately, the EU-SILC does not provide information on new entrants.

[20]The transition to motherhood is a key life course event that as a higher impact on woman's choices than higher order births (Elder 2003; Rindfuss et al. 1988).

[21]Chiuri (2000) finds that monetary and non monetary grandparents' support positively affects the participation of Italian mothers in the labor market. Similar results are found by Del Boca (2002) and Del Boca et al. (2005) for Italy, France and the United Kingdom.

maternal employment support. Lastly, in line with the literature, the household non labor income and the partner's labor income negatively affect the probability of being employed (Apps et al., 2012; Ashenfelter and Heckman, 1974;Blundell et al., 2007; Heckman and Willis, 1977). As for the exclusion restrictions, we find that the sign of the marginal effects are consistent across countries, although their magnitude differs. This make us confident about the selection equation.

5.2 Second step: wage equation

Tables A7-A10 show the estimation results of male and female wage equations. We find that the male workers' wage is positively affected by the educational level, and the presence of children is associated with a father's pay premium. Similar results have been found by Hersch and Stratton (2000) and Lundberg and Rose (2000, 2002). Interestingly, as in Blackburn and Korenman (1993) and Korenman and Neumark (1991), we verify a married men's premium in all countries, especially in the 20-29 and 50-59 age groups. Holding a managerial position with supervisory responsibility, working in a big firm and having a permanent contract are associated with an increase in male wages. With respect to professional and managerial occupations, when the coefficients are significant, other occupations exhibit lower wage returns, especially those at the bottom of the occupational ladder. The sector of the economic activity provides heterogeneous results: we find higher rewards in sectors related to information, communication, financial and insurance activities rather than in agriculture, water supply, and manufacturing. The rewards are lower in female dominated sectors, such as accommodation and food services, education, health and social activities.

As for female wages, the return to education increases with the level attained. Unlike men, when results are significant, children negatively affect women's earnings, especially in the United Kingdom. Surprisingly, in the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands the number of children aged 0-2 is associated with a wage increase for 20-29 year old women. This result could be related to wage enhancing unobservable characteristics, for which we do not control for, held by young mothers, even more if highly educated, who return to work when children are toddler. It is plausible that women aged 20-29 experience their first birth and if they return quick to their job then they could benefit from a good job match and prior stock of firm-specific capital, other than an almost continuous career profile (Anderson et al., 2003).

Also for female workers, being in a managerial position with supervisory responsibility, working in a big firm, having a permanent contract, and being at the top of the occupational ladder positively impacts the wage. Once again, with respect to agriculture and constructions, the rewards are higher in sectors related to information, communication, finance and insurance. While in Italy those sectors

with a high prevalence of public employment such as public administration, defense, education, human health and social services, show higher wage returns than the reference category, the opposite holds in the other countries. In Italy and the United Kingdom, part-time jobs negatively affects women's wages for the over 40. The negative effect is stronger in Italy, where part-time is still quite atypical because of trade union opposition and some disincentives for employers, such as fixed costs per employee whether the employee works full-time or part-time (Del Boca, 2002). In the United Kingdom a significant selection effect is pointed out since the age of 40. Also Dutch women aged between 30 and 39 are positively selected in the labor market.

5.3 Third step: wage gap decomposition

Tables 2-5 show the results of the wage gap decomposition analysis. Model 1 has been split into Model 1a, which does not account for sample selection, and Model 1b that does. For each country, we present both the *raw* difference between predicted male and female log hourly earnings and the selectivity-corrected *adjusted* difference[22].

Focusing on Models 1a and 1b, we find that sample selection significantly biases the wage gap estimates as in Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008). In Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the adjusted difference is larger than the raw one, suggesting that women are positively selected in the labor market. The opposite pattern is observed in France.

Overall, the most striking evidence is the widening of the gender wage gap over time, observed in all countries. Male and female wages increase with age, but male wages rise faster. Only in Italy we observe a gender gap for the fifty-year-old workers that is lower than the gap for the forty-year-old workers. The nature of these dynamics is country-specific.

In France (Table 2), the average male wage is always significantly larger than the female one, the pay gap increases with age, and a female wage penalty is pointed out across all the age groups. Notably, twenty-years-old men earn about 6% more than their female colleagues, and the observable characteristics between the genders fail to explain the pay difference. Furthermore, women are more educated than men and the wage gap is entirely explained as a wage penalty for women. This evidence suggests the presence of a *glass door* for young women, since they face barriers to wage advancements from the very early stages of the working life, when they are supposed to 'gamble on a pair' with men. For the oldest age groups, at most half of the gap is explained by the individual, household and job related characteristics. The industry and the managerial position matter in explaining the pay differential between genders; the magnitude of the

[22]The *adjusted* difference is computed as the difference between the raw wage gap ($\bar{y}_g^m - \bar{y}_g^f$) and the selection part $\left(-\hat{\delta}_g^f \bar{\lambda}_g^f\right)$ in equation (2).

explained part related to being in managerial position increases with age, suggesting that in France the *glass ceiling* effect arises from the age of 30.

In Italy (Table 3), the explained part of the gender wage gap is negative for women older than 30: women show better characteristics than men and in absence of discrimination they should earn more. This is especially true for those women aged between 30 and 49, who experience a wage

Table 2. *Decomposition analysis for France*

	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Age group	20-59	20-59	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59
Male log hourly wage	2.635***	2.635***	2.386***	2.628***	2.676***	2.734***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Female log hourly wage	2.484***	2.484***	2.324***	2.454***	2.513***	2.550***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Difference	0.151***	0.151***	0.062***	0.174***	0.163***	0.184***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Adjusted difference	-	0.132***	0.074**	0.150***	0.153***	0.279***
		(0.015)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.070)
Explained part:						
Individual characteristics	-0.008***	-0.007***	-0.016***	-0.003	0.002	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.020***	-0.016***	-0.005*	-0.005
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Firm size	0.006***	0.006***	-0.001	0.008***	0.009***	0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Type of contract	0.005***	0.005***	0.004	0.005**	0.011***	0.006**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Managerial position	0.011***	0.011***	0.003	0.008***	0.015***	0.013***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Occupation	0.005	0.004	0.006	-0.013	0.015*	0.016
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Industry	0.038***	0.038***	0.019	0.044***	0.034***	0.039***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Part-time	0.004	0.003	0.014	-0.004	-0.003	0.008
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Total	0.054***	0.053***	0.010	0.031*	0.079***	0.087***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Unexplained part:						
Male wage premium	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female wage penalty	0.097***	0.080***	0.064*	0.119***	0.074**	0.192***
	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.069)
N	6329	6329	906	1510	2054	1705

NOTES - Standard errors in parentheses. * $p< 0.1$, ** $p< 0.05$, *** $p< 0.01$..

penalty. Female workers in the age group 30-39 are positively selected, as shown by the larger magnitude of the *adjusted difference* compared to the *raw* one. Interestingly, Italian women are less likely to hold a managerial position since their early career stage, suggesting the existence of a *glass door*. Notice that the magnitude of the explained part related to the managerial position increases as they grow older, suggesting also the presence of the *glass ceiling* effect. Nonetheless, in Italy there

is a consistent share of women employed in better rewarded occupations (Matteazzi et al., 2013), which reduces the width of the gender wage gap and the *glass ceiling* effect.

Differently from all the other countries, the Italian 20-29 female workers are more likely to be employed with a temporary contract than their male peers, and the magnitude of the effect is particularly large for the youngest age group. Our finding is consistent with Petrongolo (2004). Such a *glass door* at the beginning of the career is likely to delay women' career achievements and

Table 3. *Decomposition analysis for Italy*

	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Age group	20-59	20-59	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59
Male log hourly wage	2.505***	2.505***	2.145***	2.421***	2.579***	2.669***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Female log hourly wage	2.410***	2.410***	2.102***	2.334***	2.452***	2.577***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Difference	0.094***	0.094***	0.043*	0.087***	0.126***	0.091***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.018)
Adjusted difference	-	0.104***	0.114	0.100***	0.121***	0.029
		(0.024)	(0.085)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.093)
Explained part:						
Individual characteristics	-0.006**	-0.006**	-0.011**	-0.015***	-0.012***	0.012***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Education	-0.022***	-0.021***	-0.020***	-0.023***	-0.021***	-0.018***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Firm size	0.006***	0.006***	0.010**	0.002	0.008***	0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Type of contract	0.008***	0.008***	0.017***	0.009***	0.007***	0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Managerial position	0.013***	0.013***	0.007**	0.009***	0.015***	0.017***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Occupation	-0.040***	-0.040***	-0.007	-0.034***	-0.044***	-0.051***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Industry	-0.010***	-0.010***	0.007	-0.001	-0.005	-0.026***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Part-time	0.016***	0.016***	-0.001	0.003	0.022***	0.024***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Total	-0.035***	-0.034***	0.002	-0.049***	-0.030**	-0.031**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Unexplained part:						
Male wage premium	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Female wage penalty	0.129***	0.138***	0.112	0.149***	0.151***	0.059
	(0.008)	(0.023)	(0.086)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.092)
N	10231	10231	1242	2776	3635	2578

NOTES - Standard errors in parentheses. * $p< 0.1$, ** $p< 0.05$, *** $p< 0.01$.

wage advancements, while it does not hamper men's possibilities. As a consequence, we expect that older women will compete with younger men for career advancements, while the youngest female workers are left 'freezed' during the first part of their working life, when they are also expected to be more dynamic and career oriented.

In the Netherlands (Table 4), the pay gap between males and females is not statistically significant for the 20-29 age group, and there is no evidence of wage penalties or premiums. The

decomposition analysis shows that part-time employment explains the negative raw difference, suggesting that part-time jobs give a pay premium for female workers aged 20-29. Empirical findings also point out that young Dutch female workers do not have to cope with the *glass door* effect. As for older age cohorts, the wage gap increases over the age and it is mainly explained by the sector of the economic activity and the managerial position. Indeed, men are more represented in higher rewarded sectors, whereas women are segregated in lower paid branches, like food and accommodation services. As in all other countries, the explained part related to the managerial position increases over the age. This result is suggestive of a *glass ceiling effect* for women, because men experience more success in climbing the occupational ladder. Women aged between 30 and 49 experience a wage penalty. Women in the oldest wage group do no undergo a wage penalty because they result to be negatively selected into the labor market. Indeed, the adjusted difference is lower than the raw difference.

Table 4. *Decomposition analysis for the Netherlands*

	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Age group	20-59	20-59	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59
Male log hourly wage	3.104***	3.104***	2.745***	3.036***	3.165***	3.192***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.027)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.019)
Female log hourly wage	2.964***	2.964***	2.770***	2.953***	2.993***	2.999***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Difference	0.140***	0.140***	-0.026	0.083***	0.172***	0.193***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.037)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Adjusted difference		0.153***	-0.064	0.114***	0.185***	0.131*
		(0.021)	(0.047)	(0.027)	(0.040)	(0.067)
Explained part:						
Individual characteristics	0.004	0.004	-0.005	-0.004	0.004	0.006*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education	-0.010***	-0.009***	-0.023	-0.006	-0.012*	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.016)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Firm size	0.005***	0.005***	-0.001	0.004	0.007***	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Type of contract	0.001	0.001	-0.005	0.000	0.002	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Managerial position	0.015***	0.015***	0.006	0.009***	0.017***	0.020***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Occupation	-0.011**	-0.013**	0.005	-0.007	-0.003	-0.027**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.013)
Industry	0.036***	0.036***	-0.004	0.031***	0.049***	0.044***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Part-time	0.009	0.003	-0.075***	-0.002	0.014	0.011
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.023)
Total	0.048***	0.041***	-0.103***	0.025	0.079**	0.055*
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.029)
Unexplained part:						
Male wage premium	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female wage penalty	0.092***	0.112***	0.039	0.089***	0.107**	0.076
	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.044)	(0.071)
N	3041	3041	239	894	1059	849

NOTES - Standard errors in parentheses. * $p< 0.1$, ** $p< 0.05$, *** $p< 0.01$.

In the United Kingdom (Table 5) women over 30 years old are positively selected in the labor market. The workplace characteristics, i.e. holding a managerial position, the type of occupation, and the sector of the economic activity, explain most of the gender wage gap, pointing out the high degree of segregation that characterizes the British labor market. Indeed, in the United Kingdom the labor market 'labyrinth' for women is much more tangled than the French, Italian and Dutch ones. Women suffer a wage penalty since the early career stage (age group 20-29), which indicates the presence of a *glass door*. More dramatically, the gender wage gap of the youngest workers is not explained by different observable characteristics, but it is entirely due to a wage penalty for females. The magnitude of the wage penalty increases with age. As they grow older, women are increasingly underrepresented in managerial positions and better paid occupations, indicating the presence of a *glass ceiling* effect that emerges from the age of 30.

Table 5. *Decomposition analysis for the United Kingdom*

	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Age group	20-59	20-59	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59
Male log hourly wage	2.644***	2.644***	2.345***	2.656***	2.711***	2.707***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Female log hourly wage	2.373***	2.373***	2.248***	2.440***	2.391***	2.360***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Difference	0.271***	0.271***	0.097***	0.216***	0.319***	0.347***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Adjusted difference	-	0.299***	0.077**	0.235***	0.367***	0.407***
		(0.020)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.036)
Explained part:						
Individual characteristics	0.006**	0.006**	-0.008	0.010*	0.012**	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Education	0.001	0.001	-0.002	-0.006	0.002	0.010
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Firm size	0.000	0.000	0.004	-0.001	-0.001	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Type of contract	-	-	-	-	-	-
Managerial position	0.013***	0.013***	0.002	0.008**	0.016***	0.014***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Occupation	0.035***	0.035***	-0.012	0.044***	0.031**	0.045***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Industry	0.025***	0.025***	0.012	0.017	0.034***	0.030**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Part-time	0.020***	0.022***	0.000	0.017	0.036***	0.015
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Total	0.100***	0.101***	-0.003	0.088***	0.131***	0.121***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Unexplained part:						
Male wage premium	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female wage penalty	0.171***	0.197***	0.080**	0.147***	0.236***	0.286***
	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.036)
N	4285	4285	608	1074	1370	1233

NOTES - Standard errors in parentheses. * $p< 0.1$, ** $p< 0.05$, *** $p< 0.01$.

To conclude, whatever the type of welfare state and the industrial and labor relations system, women experience unfavorable and disadvantage conditions in the labor market compared to their male colleagues. In all selected countries, female workers bump into the *glass ceiling* from the age of 30. In France, Italy and the United Kingdom women have also to cope with a *glass door* that introduce them in a really intricate "career labyrinth" that so often hold them back from joining male colleagues to the C-suite.

6. Robustness analysis

We check the robustness of our results to different specifications of hourly wage equations and sample selection. In doing so, we exploit the available information about the real labor market experience. Since EU-SILC does not provide the required information for the United Kingdom, we limit the sensitivity check to France, Italy and the Netherlands. The results are presented in Tables 6-8. Each table reports eight columns, broadly indexed as *Specification 2* and *Specification 3*. For sake of consistency, we will refer to the decomposition in section 5.3 as *Specification 1*. *Specification 2* controls for real labor market experience in the wage equation, to check the effect of late starters and career interruptions. For all countries the explained and the unexplained parts are comparable in sign, magnitude, and significance with the ones of *Specification 1*. We can conclude that the omission of real labor market experience from covariates in log hourly wage equations does not bias the results for France, Italy and the Netherlands. So, we expect the same holds for the United Kingdom.

Table 6. *Robustness check for France*

	Specification 2				Specification 3			
Age group:	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59
Male log hourly Wage	2.386***	2.628***	2.676***	2.734***	2.386***	2.629***	2.683***	2.736***
	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Female log hourly wage	2.324***	2.454***	2.513***	2.550***	2.324***	2.478***	2.550***	2.591***
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Difference	0.062***	0.174***	0.163***	0.184***	0.062***	0.151***	0.133***	0.145***
	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Adjusted difference	0.074**	0.161***	0.158***	0.284***	0.074**	0.123***	0.143***	0.256***
	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.069)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.084)
Explained part:	0.011	0.037**	0.087***	0.090***	0.010	0.026	0.048***	0.057***
	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Unexplained part:								
Male wage premium	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female wage penalty	0.062*	0.124***	0.071**	0.194***	0.064*	0.098***	0.095***	0.199**
	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.068)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.083)
N	906	1510	2054	1705	906	1455	1868	1495

NOTES -Standard errors in parentheses. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$.

Specification 3 develops the baseline analysis on a subsample of the dataset including those individual who started working between 14 and 29 years old. This check allows us to exclude from the analysis those individuals, especially women older than 40, with few years of labor market experience. This subsample provides us with four groups of workers, represented by the four age groups, which sequentially enter in the labor market. With this structure of the dataset we have male and female workers that entered the labor market at the same time. In addition, we exclude the possibility to have women of really different age holding the same labor market experience. The rationale for this is that the career prospects of a 29 years-old and a 52 years-old woman, both declaring two years of labor market experience, are likely to be really different.

In all countries, the gender wage gap for age groups 40-49 and 50-59 are lower in *Specification 3* than in *Specification 2*. This result is reasonable given that the subsample in *Specification 3* include workers with an almost continuous career path. It is worth noting that while log hourly wages of men only slightly differ between the two specifications, the log hourly earnings of women are considerably higher in *Specification 3* than in *Specification 2*.

For all countries, the results are robust to such a sensitivity analysis. The explained and the unexplained parts of the decomposition are almost equal in sign, magnitude and statistical significance. In France and in Italy the magnitude of the female wage penalty slightly increases. Indeed the inclusion of women older than 50 with a short labor market experience may blurs the results, hiding a larger wage penalty that affects those women, especially older than 40, who started working when they were young and with an almost continuous career path.

Table 7. *Robustness check for Italy*

	Specification 2				Specification 3			
Age group:	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59
Male log hourly wage	2.145***	2.421***	2.579***	2.669***	2.153***	2.418***	2.580***	2.656***
	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Female log hourly wage	2.102***	2.334***	2.452***	2.577***	2.108***	2.328***	2.480***	2.608***
	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Difference	0.043*	0.087***	0.126***	0.091***	0.046*	0.089***	0.100***	0.048**
	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.020)
Adjusted difference	0.112	0.107***	0.119***	0.035	0.108	0.122***	0.074*	0.004
	(0.085)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.091)	(0.084)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.119)
Explained part:	0.004	-0.046***	-0.018	-0.026*	0.008	-0.051***	-0.060***	-0.061***
	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Unexplained part:								
Male wage premium	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Female wage penalty	0.108	0.153***	0.137***	0.061	0.100	0.173***	0.133***	0.064
	(0.086)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.091)	(0.085)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.118)
N	1242	2776	3635	2578	1209	2512	2790	1923

NOTES - Standard errors in parentheses. * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.

We have also conducted a robustness check of decomposition results to different definitions of hourly wage. The robustness analysis is carried out only for those countries with available information on both annual and monthly earnings, i.e. Italy and the United Kingdom. Mean log wages computed using the annual definition of income are slightly higher than mean log wages computed from monthly earnings. This can be plausible given that the definition of annual gross labor earnings includes some payments excluded from the definition of monthly labor income. However, the gross log wage differences computed from the monthly labor income are remarkably consistent, as well as the explained and unexplained parts. This make us confident about the definition of hourly earnings adopted in this study[23].

Table 8. *Robustness check for the Netherlands*

	Specification 2				Specification 3			
Age group:	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59
Male log hourly wage	2.745***	3.036***	3.165***	3.192***	2.745***	3.043***	3.172***	3.203***
	(0.027)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Female log hourly wage	2.770***	2.953***	2.993***	2.999***	2.770***	2.951***	3.010***	3.082***
	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Difference	-0.026	0.083***	0.172***	0.193***	-0.025	0.091***	0.161***	0.121***
	(0.037)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.027)
Adjusted difference	-0.070	0.116***	0.185***	0.154**	-0.064	0.117***	0.173***	0.066
	(0.045)	(0.027)	(0.040)	(0.067)	(0.047)	(0.027)	(0.050)	(0.089)
Explained part:	-0.099***	0.024	0.079**	0.065**	-0.103***	0.027	0.067**	0.022
	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Unexplained part:								
Male wage premium	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female wage penalty	0.029	0.092***	0.106**	0.089	0.039	0.090***	0.105*	0.044
	(0.040)	(0.030)	(0.044)	(0.070)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.054)	(0.094)
N	239	894	1059	849	238	857	868	638

NOTES - Standard errors in parentheses. * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.

Lastly, for all countries, we have performed the baseline analysis including, at the first stage of the analysis, also those women who self-declare to be unemployed but not searching for a job[24]. Clearly, this different design of the sample does not affect the size of the raw gender difference in pay because the sample of working men and women remains the same. However, it should affect the decomposition results though the selection effect of female workers into employment. We find

[23]The decomposition results are available from authors upon request.

[24] The subsample of non working women slightly increases in the Netherlands and in the United Kingdom, by 3% and 6%, respectively. In Italy the share of women without a paid job increases by 10% and especially among women belonging to the youngest age group. In France the percentage of non working women raises by 22%, especially among women aged 20-29 and women aged 50-59. Compared to the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, in France and in Italy female unemployment rates are higher, especially among young women. This evidence may explain why much more people in Italy and France have stopped looking for work because economic conditions may make them believe that no work is available for them.

that the magnitude of the selection effect, the explained and unexplained parts are almost comparable, whatever unemployed women not looking for a job are included or not among inactive women[25].

7. Concluding remarks and policy suggestions

This work provides an empirical assessment of the shape of the labor market 'labyrinth' defined by Eagly and Carli (2007). We describe the barriers that women face along their career path from the bottom to the top, that is from what we call the *glass door* to the *glass ceiling*.

We present a cross country analysis of the gender wage gap by age groups for France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. We challenge the standard quantile regression by proposing an age group approach. Nonetheless, we keep the empirical methodology commonly used in the literature, and apply the Neuman-Oaxaca (2004) wage gap decomposition analysis both to the entire sample of prime age workers and, separately, to each age group.

The results, robust to a set of checks, show that both the raw gender wage gap and its unexplained part tends to increase with age. In France, Italy, and the UK, young women have to cope with a *glass door*. All other things being equal, they earn significantly less than their male peers and they face less favorable contractual terms and conditions of employment. In all countries, from the age of 30 women start bumping into the *glass ceiling*, which prevents them from moving up the career ladder to the top level. Empirical findings suggest that the thickness of the *glass ceiling* increases as women age and inequalities encountered by women in their working lives increase the higher up the pay scale they go.

From a policy perspective, the evidence of a substantial unexplained gender wage gap, together with the clear-cut presence of the *glass door* and *glass ceiling* effects, represents a concrete threat of female old age poverty, especially risky in those countries applying a contributive pension scheme. The policy suggestions to tackle the gender wage gap usually deal with a combination of interventions that favor the effective implementation of anti-discrimination laws and the respect of equal pay and opportunities, especially in low paid and/or highly feminized sectors. These policies, albeit they aim at the core of the problem, might prove ineffective if they are not addressed to tear down the specific barriers faced by female workers along their career path. In the light of its results, our work suggests that policy makers require a set of age-specific tools to tackle the age-specific drivers of the gender inequality in earnings. For instance, the diffusion of flexible working arrangements, like 'smart' working jobs, may help young women in managing the trade-off between family and working responsibilities, other than ensuring job continuity and a more efficient use of

[25]The decomposition results are available from authors upon request.

time. Notice that, smart working type schedules that allow more job flexibility in time and space might be helpful also for older female workers that choose to take care of elderly parents. However, to avoid the exclusion of women from the office dynamics, the flexibility should be limited to a share of the weekly working hours. In addition, performance evaluation based on objectives rather than timecards would assure equality of opportunities. Also the extension and quality improvement of childcare, out-of-school, and elderly care services may represent an effective policy option. With the objective to help families to find a conciliation between work and childcare commitments and, at the same time, to close the gender wage gap, it might be useful the promotion of a more balanced sharing of parental leave entitlements and unpaid work. Effective policy options may be the introduction of non-transferable leave entitlements for exclusive use by fathers on "use it or lose it" basis, as already experimented in Northern European countries, or the supply of "bonus periods" to fathers taking a parental leave, as happens in Germany.

To overcome the issue related to contract discrimination for the youngest age group (Petrongolo, 2004), as found in Italy, it might be useful to introduce a single job agreement valid for all the new entrants. This arrangement is usually invoked to fight youth unemployment, but we claim that it would also be helpful in removing barriers to female career progressions from the beginning. Indeed, the transition from education to paid work is crucial because lays the foundations for many of the inequalities encountered by women along their career path.

There is evidence that female workers receive less on-the-job training than men (Barron et al., 1993) with negative consequences on promotions and wage advancements (Gronau, 1988). As for women of the oldest age groups, and especially women employed in part-time jobs, an increasing participation in the on-the-job-training may contribute to enhance their skills, and consequently their earnings, filling the gap with their male colleagues.

To tackle the issue of the underrepresentation of women on corporate boards and at more senior job levels, some effective policy initiatives might be the introduction of corporate governance codes and mandatory legal quotas. Corporate governance codes, which aim at promoting gender-balanced company boards, have been implemented in France, while gender-board quotas for publicly listed companies have been established in France and Italy (OECD, 2012).

Whatever the age groups, in order to ensure an effective monitoring of the effectiveness of gender equality initiatives and laws, it might be useful the establishment of a compulsory requirement for companies to publish equal pay reports and plans to close the gender wage gap, as happens in France. The goal is to introduce corporate obligations for professional equality between women and men, to create income transparency and take firm-specific measures to reduce gender pay gaps.

To the best of our knowledge, the present work represents the first systematic analysis of the gender wage gap by age groups. Hence, our results call for further research. A natural development is represented by a quantile analysis by age groups, which at the moment encounters problems related to the small sample size of age groups quantiles. Larger datasets, possibly including a longitudinal dimension, would also allow the assessment of age-specific impacts of external shocks (e.g. the Great Recession) or policy interventions (e.g. the increase of retirement age, job flexibility) over the gender wage gap.

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Appendix

Table A1. *Descriptive statistics for France and Italy (%)*

	France								Italy							
Age group	20-29		20-29		20-29		20-29		20-29		20-29		20-29		20-29	
	Men	Men	Men	Men	Men	Men	Men	Men	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Education 1	0.11	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.09	0.11	0.09	0.19	0.19	0.27	0.3
Education 2	0.53	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.43	0.48	0.38	0.53	0.48	0.52	0.45
Education 3	0.35	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.49	0.41	0.53	0.28	0.33	0.21	0.25
Part-time	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.21	-	0.26	-	0.33	-	0.27
Firm with more than 10 employees	0.73	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.75	0.85	0.79	0.84	0.78	0.85	0.78
Permanent contract	0.78	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.73	0.94	0.91	0.96	0.91	0.97	0.94
Managerial position	0.31	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.25	0.44	0.33	0.45	0.28	0.39	0.25
Occupation 1	0.15	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.14	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.17	0.24	0.16
Occupation 2	0.2	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.28	0.25	0.26	0.20	0.21	0.20	0.22
Occupation 3	0.06	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.19	0.06	0.21	0.07	0.22	0.06	0.24
Occupation 4	0.07	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.26	0.06	0.17	0.05	0.19	0.04	0.13
Occupation 5	0.43	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.05	0.35	0.05	0.39	0.06	0.38	0.06
Occupation 6	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.15	0.08	0.18
Activity sector 1	0.26	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.09	0.27	0.11	0.34	0.12	0.31	0.12
Activity sector 2	0.24	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.05	0.23	0.07	0.19	0.05	0.20	0.04
Activity sector 3	0.21	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.14	0.13	0.15	0.13	0.10	0.09
Activity sector 4	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.01
Activity sector 5	0.09	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.06	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.05
Activity sector 6	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05
Activity sector 7	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.11	0.10	0.17	0.12	0.17	0.16	0.21
Activity sector 8	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.26	0.08	0.31	0.08	0.31	0.09	0.32
Activity sector 9	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.12	0.03	0.08	0.04	0.09	0.04	0.11

NOTES - Categories for education: 1 = at most lower secondary education; 2 = at most upper secondary education; 3 = tertiary education. Categories: 1 = legislators, senior officials and managers, professionals (reference category); 2 = technicians and associate professionals; 3 = clerks; 4 = service workers, shop and market sellers; 5 = skilled agricultural and fishery workers, craft and related trades workers, plant and machine operators and assemblers; 6 = elementary occupations. Categories: 1 = agriculture forestry and fishing; mining and quarrying; manufacturing (reference category); electricity, etc.; water supply, etc. 2 = construction; transport and storage. 3 = wholesale and retail trade, etc. 4 = accommodation and food services activities. 5 = information and communication; financial and insurance activities. 6 = real estate activities; professionals, etc.; administrative and support service activities. 7 = public administration and defense; compulsory social security. 8 = education; human health and social work activities. 9 = arts, entertainment and recreation; other service activities; activities of households as employers, etc.; activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies.

Table A2. *Descriptive statistics for the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (%)*

	The Netherlands								United Kingdom							
Age group	20-29		30-39		40-49		50-59		20-29		30-39		40-49		50-59	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Education 1	0.11	0.07	0.15	0.06	0.17	0.14	0.22	0.21	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.10	0.09	0.15	0.17
Education 2	0.55	0.5	0.41	0.47	0.48	0.47	0.43	0.42	0.58	0.57	0.53	0.51	0.56	0.58	0.52	0.53
Education 3	0.34	0.44	0.45	0.47	0.34	0.39	0.35	0.37	0.34	0.37	0.42	0.45	0.34	0.33	0.33	0.30
Part-time	-	0.48	-	0.75	-	0.82	-	0.76	-	0.22	-	0.40	-	0.41	-	0.36
Firm with more than 10 employees	0.81	0.82	0.89	0.86	0.93	0.87	0.93	0.9	0.85	0.82	0.81	0.83	0.82	0.83	0.83	0.82
Permanent contract	0.84	0.88	0.92	0.92	0.97	0.93	0.98	0.98	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Managerial position	0.29	0.21	0.36	0.22	0.4	0.22	0.42	0.23	0.27	0.26	0.48	0.38	0.51	0.34	0.47	0.33
Occupation 1	0.28	0.33	0.38	0.34	0.37	0.31	0.39	0.35	0.22	0.21	0.44	0.34	0.4	0.24	0.42	0.26
Occupation 2	0.24	0.27	0.22	0.28	0.23	0.28	0.2	0.22	0.16	0.16	0.12	0.15	0.14	0.18	0.11	0.13
Occupation 3	0.05	0.17	0.08	0.21	0.11	0.24	0.07	0.23	0.10	0.25	0.04	0.21	0.04	0.25	0.06	0.27
Occupation 4	0.11	0.21	0.04	0.13	0.05	0.13	0.05	0.13	0.16	0.31	0.07	0.21	0.06	0.25	0.05	0.20
Occupation 5	0.3	0.02	0.26	0.03	0.2	0.01	0.26	0.03	0.24	0.01	0.23	0.03	0.25	0.03	0.27	0.04
Occupation 6	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.11	0.06	0.10	0.06	0.11	0.06	0.08	0.11
Activity sector 1	0.09	0.07	0.22	0.07	0.26	0.08	0.26	0.07	0.19	0.11	0.23	0.06	0.26	0.06	0.30	0.07
Activity sector 2	0.21	0.05	0.18	0.05	0.18	0.03	0.18	0.04	0.15	0.04	0.14	0.04	0.22	0.04	0.17	0.04
Activity sector 3	0.25	0.15	0.14	0.1	0.09	0.09	0.1	0.07	0.18	0.13	0.15	0.12	0.08	0.14	0.09	0.13
Activity sector 4	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.02
Activity sector 5	0.12	0.06	0.15	0.08	0.12	0.07	0.08	0.04	0.13	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.06	0.08	0.06
Activity sector 6	0.16	0.09	0.13	0.15	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.11	0.08	0.07	0.09	0.07
Activity sector 7	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.09	0.13	0.11	0.13	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.11
Activity sector 8	0.07	0.5	0.09	0.42	0.1	0.49	0.14	0.58	0.06	0.31	0.12	0.40	0.12	0.45	0.15	0.45
Activity sector 9	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.04

NOTES - Categories for education: 1 = at most lower secondary education; 2 = at most upper secondary education; 3 = tertiary education. Categories: 1 = legislators, senior officials and managers, professionals (reference category); 2 = technicians and associate professionals; 3 = clerks; 4 = service workers, shop and market sellers; 5 = skilled agricultural and fishery workers, craft and related trades workers, plant and machine operators and assemblers; 6 = elementary occupations. Categories: 1 = agriculture forestry and fishing; mining and quarrying; manufacturing (reference category); electricity, etc.; water supply, etc. 2 = construction; transport and storage. 3 = wholesale and retail trade, etc. 4 = accommodation and food services activities. 5 = information and communication; financial and insurance activities. 6 = real estate activities; professionals, etc.; administrative and support service activities. 7 = public administration and defense; compulsory social security. 8 = education; human health and social work activities. 9 = arts, entertainment and recreation; other service activities; activities of households as employers, etc.; activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies.

Table A3.*Probit estimates for France - marginal effects*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Age group	20-59	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59
Nationality	0.601***	1.530***	0.692***	0.527***	0.553***
	(0.088)	(0.365)	(0.203)	(0.157)	(0.142)
Age	0.226***	-	-	-	-
	(0.027)				
Age squared	-0.003***	-	-	-	-
	(0.000)				
Education 2	0.517***	0.722***	0.570***	0.524***	0.500***
	(0.069)	(0.222)	(0.177)	(0.124)	(0.108)
Education 3	1.154***	1.468***	1.506***	1.022***	0.940***
	(0.091)	(0.286)	(0.218)	(0.163)	(0.158)
# children aged 0-2	-0.734***	-1.150***	-0.834***	-0.793***	-
	(0.098)	(0.222)	(0.161)	(0.296)	
# children aged 3-5	-0.763***	-0.820***	-0.952***	-0.718***	-
	(0.083)	(0.203)	(0.131)	(0.181)	
# children aged 6-11	-0.498***	-0.510**	-0.546***	-0.413***	0.121
	(0.053)	(0.254)	(0.090)	(0.083)	(0.287)
# children older than 12	-0.207***	0.152	0.037	-0.515***	-0.660***
	(0.036)	(0.314)	(0.215)	(0.157)	(0.123)
Partnership status	0.087	0.275	0.011	0.163	-0.177
	(0.085)	(0.357)	(0.237)	(0.162)	(0.134)
Presence of older people in bad health	0.314	-0.756	-	0.087	0.354
	(0.291)	(0.851)		(0.496)	(0.389)
Annual non labor income	-0.000***	-0.000	-0.002**	-0.001**	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Partner's labor income	-0.000***	0.002	-0.000	-0.001**	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Availability of informal childcare	1.492***	1.579***	-	0.915***	-
	(0.233)	(0.545)		(0.335)	
Degree of urbanization	0.013	-0.455	-0.086	0.026	0.149
	(0.083)	(0.300)	(0.192)	(0.153)	(0.134)
Region 1	0.349***	0.364	0.070	0.284	0.472***
	(0.113)	(0.366)	(0.262)	(0.208)	(0.182)
Region 2	0.118	0.310	-0.128	-0.164	0.381**
	(0.111)	(0.349)	(0.271)	(0.201)	(0.180)
Region 3	-0.223*	0.157	-0.437	-0.399*	-0.028
	(0.129)	(0.445)	(0.283)	(0.236)	(0.213)
Region 4	-0.044	0.257	-0.355	-0.208	0.125
	(0.123)	(0.417)	(0.290)	(0.227)	(0.193)
Region 5	0.496***	0.154	0.847**	0.334	0.540***
	(0.126)	(0.366)	(0.336)	(0.232)	(0.198)
Region 6	0.101	0.976*	-0.039	-0.140	0.259
	(0.125)	(0.551)	(0.292)	(0.229)	(0.199)
Region 7	0.340***	0.146	0.066	0.260	0.546**
	(0.132)	(0.407)	(0.302)	(0.247)	(0.214)
Constant	-3.764***	-0.830	0.889**	0.733**	-0.045
	(0.541)	(0.589)	(0.368)	(0.286)	(0.248)
N	3640	511	742	1180	1053

NOTES - Standard errors in parentheses. * $p< 0.1$, ** $p< 0.05$, *** $p< 0.01$. - means not controlled for.

Table A4.*Probit estimates for Italy - marginal effects*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Age group	20-59	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59
Nationality	0.296***	0.289*	0.512***	0.254**	0.232*
	(0.055)	(0.162)	(0.098)	(0.100)	(0.121)
Age	0.129***	-	-	-	-
	(0.015)				
Age squared	-0.002***	-	-	-	-
	(0.000)				
Education 2	0.779***	0.422***	0.626***	0.678***	0.994***
	(0.035)	(0.131)	(0.077)	(0.059)	(0.062)
Education 3	1.323***	0.472**	0.970***	1.381***	1.754***
	(0.057)	(0.186)	(0.107)	(0.104)	(0.118)
# children aged 0-2	-0.586***	-1.288***	-0.595***	-0.465***	
	(0.062)	(0.184)	(0.081)	(0.172)	
# children aged 3-5	-0.485***	-1.149***	-0.647***	-0.161*	
	(0.052)	(0.202)	(0.073)	(0.096)	
# children aged 6-11	-0.381***	-0.953***	-0.506***	-0.305***	-0.214
	(0.035)	(0.222)	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.238)
# children older than 12	-0.130***	1.326	-0.244***	-0.139***	-0.045
	(0.021)	(0.876)	(0.068)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Partnership status	-0.485***	-0.025	-0.318***	-0.561***	-0.541***
	(0.046)	(0.215)	(0.096)	(0.088)	(0.077)
Presence of older people in bad health	-0.225***	0.120	-0.329**	-0.398***	-0.056
	(0.076)	(0.290)	(0.157)	(0.133)	(0.130)
Annual non labor income	-0.000	-0.002	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Partner's labor income	-0.000**	0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Availability of informal childcare	0.806***	0.723***	0.773***	0.912***	0.376
	(0.066)	(0.242)	(0.091)	(0.114)	(0.610)
Degree of urbanization	-0.021	-0.060	-0.001	-0.068	-0.004
	(0.039)	(0.127)	(0.082)	(0.067)	(0.070)
Region 1	0.700***	1.092***	0.910***	0.692***	0.548***
	(0.062)	(0.214)	(0.129)	(0.105)	(0.109)
Region 2	0.898***	1.342***	1.157***	0.887***	0.730***
	(0.062)	(0.230)	(0.131)	(0.106)	(0.109)
Region 3	0.554***	0.516**	0.765***	0.537***	0.497***
	(0.060)	(0.200)	(0.125)	(0.103)	(0.107)
Region 4	-0.031	0.040	-0.031	-0.117	0.076
	(0.060)	(0.200)	(0.123)	(0.103)	(0.105)
Constant	-2.731***	-0.321	-0.471***	-0.090	-0.656***
	(0.305)	(0.256)	(0.174)	(0.155)	(0.167)
N	7818	790	2006	2715	2307

NOTES -Standard errors in parentheses. * $p< 0.1$, ** $p< 0.05$, *** $p< 0.01$. - means not controlled for.

Table A5.*Probit estimates for the Netherlands - marginal effects*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Age group	20-59	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59
Nationality	0.477***	1.058*	0.481	0.592***	0.134
	(0.135)	(0.600)	(0.307)	(0.217)	(0.224)
Age	0.265***	-	-	-	-
	(0.039)				
Age squared	-0.004***	-	-	-	-
	(0.000)				
Education 2	0.626***	1.158**	0.717***	0.550***	0.564***
	(0.080)	(0.451)	(0.217)	(0.141)	(0.116)
Education 3	1.260***	1.096**	1.589***	1.240***	1.063***
	(0.095)	(0.454)	(0.257)	(0.174)	(0.137)
# children aged 0-2	-0.370***	-0.683*	-0.567***	-0.060	-
	(0.117)	(0.370)	(0.159)	(0.354)	
# children aged 3-5	-0.566***	-1.286***	-0.631***	-0.424**	-
	(0.092)	(0.367)	(0.137)	(0.176)	
# children aged 6-11	-0.548***	-1.000**	-0.762***	-0.358***	0.178
	(0.057)	(0.460)	(0.105)	(0.084)	(0.314)
# children older than 12	-0.292***	-	-0.378**	-0.261***	-0.118*
	(0.044)		(0.175)	(0.062)	(0.069)
Partnership status	-0.494***	0.200	-0.342	-0.463**	-0.765***
	(0.105)	(0.821)	(0.328)	(0.181)	(0.152)
Presence of older people in bad health	n.i.	n.i.	n.i.	n.i.	n.i.
Annual nonlabor income	-0.000*	-0.033*	0.000	-0.000	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.019)	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Partner's labor income	-0.000***	0.001	-0.001**	-0.000	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Availability of informal childcare	0.638***	0.825	0.654***	0.578***	-0.093
	(0.111)	(0.516)	(0.157)	(0.188)	(0.845)
Degree of urbanization	n.i.	n.i.	n.i.	n.i.	n.i.
Constant	-3.977***	-0.331	1.036***	0.494*	0.406
	(0.825)	(0.675)	(0.395)	(0.254)	(0.254)
N	2189	151	587	722	729

NOTES - Standard errors in parentheses. * $p< 0.1$, ** $p< 0.05$, *** $p< 0.01$. - means not controlled for. (n.i.) means not included because missing information.

Table A6.*Probit estimates for the United Kingdom- marginal effects*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Age group	20-59	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59
Nationality	0.228**	0.682**	0.179	0.318*	0.235
	(0.095)	(0.268)	(0.171)	(0.174)	(0.210)
Age	0.118***	-	-	-	-
	(0.028)				
Age squared	-0.001***	-	-	-	-
	(0.000)				
Education 2	0.739***	0.547**	0.680***	0.676***	0.852***
	(0.086)	(0.262)	(0.204)	(0.153)	(0.153)
Education 3	1.150***	1.934***	1.093***	1.179***	0.878***
	(0.103)	(0.468)	(0.229)	(0.187)	(0.181)
# children aged 0-2	-0.939***	-1.160***	-0.897***	-1.081***	
	(0.088)	(0.192)	(0.123)	(0.289)	
# children aged 3-5	-0.979***	-1.183***	-1.015***	-0.803***	
	(0.078)	(0.198)	(0.113)	(0.170)	
# children aged 6-11	-0.610***	-0.419**	-0.614***	-0.553***	-0.883***
	(0.055)	(0.165)	(0.087)	(0.092)	(0.296)
# children older than 12	-0.276***	-0.291	-0.394***	-0.241***	-0.090
	(0.039)	(0.760)	(0.092)	(0.059)	(0.073)
Partnership status	-0.062	-0.037	0.014	-0.122	-0.607***
	(0.082)	(0.265)	(0.164)	(0.155)	(0.202)
Presence of older people in bad health	-0.789**	-	-	-	-1.540***
	(0.385)				(0.506)
Annual nonlabor income	-0.006***	-0.021***	-0.014***	-0.005***	-0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Partner's labor income	-0.000**	0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Availability of informal childcare	0.448***	0.173	0.625***	0.462**	-
	(0.096)	(0.229)	(0.142)	(0.193)	
Degree of urbanization	0.151	-0.419	0.442	0.325	-0.223
	(0.168)	(0.939)	(0.385)	(0.265)	(0.308)
Constant	-1.617***	1.019	0.598	0.554	1.337***
	(0.553)	(1.015)	(0.474)	(0.365)	(0.416)
N	2903	446	749	930	778

NOTES -Standard errors in parentheses. * $p< 0.1$, ** $p< 0.05$, *** $p< 0.01$. - means not controlled for.

Table A7. *Log-hourly wage regressions for France*

	Model 1: 20-59		Model 2: 20-29		Model 3: 30-39		Model 4: 40-49		Model 5: 50-59	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Nationality	0.093***	0.028	-0.148	0.061	0.125***	0.075	0.067**	-0.040	0.103***	0.134**
	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.121)	(0.137)	(0.041)	(0.062)	(0.031)	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.061)
Age	0.016***	0.013**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(0.005)	(0.006)								
Age squared	-0.000	-0.000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(0.000)	(0.000)								
Education 2	0.072***	0.048**	0.071	0.008	0.074**	0.107*	0.077***	0.031	0.029	0.100**
	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.049)	(0.077)	(0.031)	(0.058)	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.050)
Education 3	0.171***	0.139***	0.182***	0.210**	0.160***	0.219***	0.195***	0.087*	0.167***	0.259***
	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.061)	(0.091)	(0.038)	(0.073)	(0.033)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.076)
# children 0-2	0.040**	-0.025	0.043	-0.089*	0.011	-0.014	0.065	-0.045		
	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.046)	(0.054)	(0.020)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.075)		
# children 3-5	0.013	0.034*	-0.048	0.020	0.003	0.034	-0.008	0.057		
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.018)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.047)		
# children 6-11	0.027***	0.005	0.075	0.004	0.053***	0.008	-0.003	-0.016	0.032	-0.002
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.130)	(0.083)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.064)
# children older than 12	0.023***	0.010			0.035	-0.006	0.024**	0.008	0.022*	0.002
	(0.007)	(0.008)			(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Partnership status	0.034**	-0.002	0.050	0.036	0.022	-0.002	0.101***	-0.040*	0.019	-0.002
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.032)
Degree of urbanization	0.029**	0.043***	0.035	0.088*	0.017	0.029	0.037	0.002	0.025	0.100***
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.025)	(0.040)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.033)
Firm size	0.104***	0.116***	0.081**	0.007	0.119***	0.108***	0.143***	0.134***	0.074**	0.162***
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.028)
Type of contract	0.097***	0.158***	0.081**	0.045	0.077**	0.193***	0.179***	0.251***	0.208***	0.149***
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.034)	(0.066)	(0.046)
Managerial position	0.091***	0.066***	0.027	0.088**	0.079***	0.051*	0.114***	0.052**	0.123***	0.064**
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.026)
Occupation 2	-0.180***	-0.068***	-0.119**	0.031	-0.160***	-0.077**	-0.178***	-0.065**	-0.205***	-0.105***
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.036)
Occupation 3	-0.288***	-0.194***	-0.177**	0.001	-0.207***	-0.197***	-0.340***	-0.265***	-0.286***	-0.210***
	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.036)	(0.050)	(0.041)
Occupation 4	-0.240***	-0.232***	-0.126	0.057	-0.171***	-0.179***	-0.235***	-0.324***	-0.359***	-0.337***
	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.078)	(0.069)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.058)	(0.047)
Occupation 5	-0.271***	-0.361***	-0.078	-0.109	-0.237***	-0.290***	-0.288***	-0.429***	-0.332***	-0.401***
	(0.019)	(0.033)	(0.064)	(0.102)	(0.036)	(0.076)	(0.032)	(0.054)	(0.035)	(0.062)
Occupation 6	-0.357***	-0.338***	-0.163**	-0.123	-0.315***	-0.209***	-0.376***	-0.412***	-0.442***	-0.398***
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.077)	(0.089)	(0.053)	(0.067)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.048)

Activity sector 2	-0.050***	-0.008	-0.025	-0.052	-0.110***	-0.071	-0.018	0.036	-0.042	0.015
	(0.015)	(0.031)	(0.042)	(0.103)	(0.026)	(0.071)	(0.026)	(0.051)	(0.029)	(0.063)
Activity sector 3	-0.112***	-0.104***	-0.040	-0.006	-0.146***	-0.082	-0.101***	-0.075*	-0.167***	-0.178***
	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.045)	(0.080)	(0.031)	(0.061)	(0.029)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.052)
Activity sector 4	-0.224***	-0.103**	-0.162	-0.084	-0.192***	-0.118	-0.203*	-0.092	-0.413***	-0.081
	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.071)	(0.109)	(0.110)	(0.069)	(0.117)	(0.103)
Activity sector 5	-0.043*	0.046	0.001	-0.037	-0.015	0.065	-0.064	0.063	-0.066	0.136**
	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.064)	(0.095)	(0.039)	(0.073)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.059)
Activity sector 6	-0.087***	-0.060*	-0.086	-0.008	-0.134***	-0.067	-0.044	-0.008	-0.027	-0.079
	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.081)	(0.097)	(0.047)	(0.079)	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.059)	(0.061)
Activity sector 7	-0.100***	-0.082***	-0.012	-0.057	-0.197***	-0.153***	-0.090***	-0.043	-0.083**	-0.056
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.067)	(0.086)	(0.036)	(0.057)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.044)
Activity sector 8	-0.163***	-0.109***	-0.210**	-0.022	-0.173***	-0.164***	-0.170***	-0.064*	-0.148***	-0.110**
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.089)	(0.075)	(0.037)	(0.052)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Activity sector 9	-0.132***	-0.152***	-0.045	-0.074	-0.134**	-0.191***	-0.115**	-0.113**	-0.213***	-0.138***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.054)	(0.066)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.055)	(0.053)
Part-time	-	-0.009	-	-0.074	-	0.022	-	0.008	-	-0.031
		(0.014)		(0.046)		(0.035)		(0.022)		(0.025)
Inverse Mills ratio	-	-0.095*	-	0.080	-	-0.123	-	-0.056	-	0.353
		(0.053)		(0.131)		(0.109)		(0.121)		(0.224)
Region 1	0.080***	0.076***	0.009	0.126*	0.154***	0.114**	0.143***	0.144***	0.006	0.029
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.039)	(0.055)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.055)
Region 2	-0.011	0.014	0.014	0.078	-0.003	0.042	0.021	0.063*	-0.073*	-0.011
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.065)	(0.073)	(0.038)	(0.056)	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.052)
Region 3	-0.012	0.003	-0.033	0.036	0.008	0.026	0.045	0.098**	-0.074	-0.141***
	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.081)	(0.090)	(0.044)	(0.075)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Region 4	0.044*	0.016	-0.050	0.027	0.045	0.011	0.099**	0.123***	0.027	-0.062
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.068)	(0.078)	(0.041)	(0.063)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.050)
Region 5	-0.074***	-0.013	-0.141**	-0.005	-0.055	-0.036	-0.007	0.080**	-0.139***	-0.004
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.063)	(0.076)	(0.039)	(0.059)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.058)
Region 6	-0.044*	0.019	-0.109	0.095	0.003	-0.003	0.003	0.098**	-0.104**	-0.007
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.070)	(0.083)	(0.042)	(0.060)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.050)
Region 7	0.033	0.020	-0.046	0.010	0.101**	0.033	0.055	0.109***	-0.022	-0.003
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.071)	(0.084)	(0.040)	(0.061)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.060)
Constant	1.906***	1.896***	2.413***	1.990***	2.356***	2.136***	2.244***	2.364***	2.579***	2.169***
	(0.099)	(0.145)	(0.164)	(0.211)	(0.086)	(0.129)	(0.084)	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.183)
N	3209	3120	466	440	899	611	1015	1039	829	876
R^2	0.413	0.351	0.194	0.196	0.397	0.314	0.418	0.412	0.429	0.428

NOTES -Standard errors in parentheses. * $p< 0.1$, ** $p< 0.05$, *** $p< 0.01$. - means not controlled for.

Table A8. *Log-hourly wage regressions for Italy*

	Model 1: 20-59		Model 2: 20-29		Model 3: 30-39		Model 4: 40-49		Model 5: 50-59	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Nationality	0.132***	0.097***	0.097**	0.099	0.107***	0.134***	0.185***	0.119***	0.231***	0.105**
	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.043)	(0.067)	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.047)	(0.042)
Age	0.035***	0.017***	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(0.004)	(0.005)								
Age squared	-0.000***	-0.000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(0.000)	(0.000)								
Education 2	0.090***	0.113***	0.028	0.070	0.075***	0.091**	0.094***	0.094***	0.113***	0.053
	(0.010)	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.068)	(0.020)	(0.036)	(0.018)	(0.031)	(0.020)	(0.090)
Education 3	0.180***	0.190***	0.096	0.206**	0.192***	0.197***	0.173***	0.197***	0.241***	0.033
	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.070)	(0.086)	(0.034)	(0.046)	(0.031)	(0.048)	(0.038)	(0.134)
# children 0-2	0.004	0.032	0.008	-0.119	0.010	0.037	-0.015	-0.009		
	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.061)	(0.137)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.051)		
# children 3-5	0.013	0.017	0.023	-0.085	0.021	0.034	0.001	-0.020		
	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.081)	(0.117)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.027)		
# children 6-11	0.008	0.025*	0.017	0.014	0.010	0.023	0.003	0.024	-0.001	0.014
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.101)	(0.146)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.026)	(0.072)
# children older than 12	0.029***	0.002	0.000	-0.289	0.068**	0.024	0.035***	0.013	0.023**	-0.014
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.000)	(0.435)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Partnership status	0.032**	-0.015	0.081*	0.069	0.034	-0.034	0.025	-0.030	0.049*	0.055
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.043)	(0.051)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.047)
Degree of urbanization	0.002	-0.026**	-0.009	-0.014	0.028	-0.026	-0.019	-0.054***	-0.010	-0.022
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.031)	(0.043)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.025)
Firm size	0.137***	0.142***	0.171***	0.103**	0.128***	0.146***	0.138***	0.159***	0.127***	0.108***
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.027)	(0.041)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Type of contract	0.186***	0.203***	0.163***	0.208***	0.197***	0.178***	0.174***	0.232***	0.207***	0.189***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.043)	(0.040)
Managerial position	0.133***	0.090***	0.141***	0.092	0.101***	0.111***	0.142***	0.080***	0.148***	0.071***
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.040)	(0.063)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.026)
Occupation 2	-0.128***	-0.102***	0.046	-0.030	-0.025	-0.128***	-0.185***	-0.071**	-0.139***	-0.127***
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.083)	(0.090)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Occupation 3	-0.198***	-0.158***	-0.037	-0.075	-0.102**	-0.180***	-0.257***	-0.115***	-0.205***	-0.205***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.090)	(0.094)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Occupation 4	-0.223***	-0.284***	-0.025	-0.129	-0.128***	-0.280***	-0.293***	-0.264***	-0.245***	-0.420***
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.094)	(0.098)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.047)
Occupation 5	-0.275***	-0.354***	-0.025	-0.095	-0.159***	-0.348***	-0.364***	-0.372***	-0.316***	-0.507***
	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.084)	(0.111)	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.057)
Occupation 6	-0.336***	-0.441***	-0.100	-0.173	-0.219***	-0.379***	-0.417***	-0.429***	-0.371***	-0.559***

	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.099)	(0.135)	(0.048)	(0.062)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.047)
Activity sector 2	0.016	0.049*	0.042	-0.071	0.009	0.123**	-0.004	0.038	0.020	0.088
	(0.013)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.086)	(0.024)	(0.054)	(0.022)	(0.045)	(0.026)	(0.057)
Activity sector 3	-0.073***	0.029	-0.029	0.048	-0.094***	0.006	-0.094***	0.012	-0.013	0.059
	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.042)	(0.064)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.048)
Activity sector 4	-0.133***	-0.085***	-0.102	-0.071	-0.111*	-0.199***	-0.152***	-0.079	-0.148**	-0.054
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.075)	(0.082)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.070)	(0.065)
Activity sector 5	0.203***	0.216***	0.060	0.194**	0.118***	0.175***	0.228***	0.269***	0.299***	0.259***
	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.066)	(0.081)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.031)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.054)
Activity sector 6	-0.034*	-0.009	0.065	-0.048	-0.030	-0.083**	-0.031	0.032	-0.052	0.110**
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.061)	(0.074)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.048)
Activity sector 7	0.144***	0.131***	0.047	-0.181	0.191***	0.187***	0.157***	0.115***	0.101***	0.155***
	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.112)	(0.170)	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.042)
Activity sector 8	0.073***	0.098***	0.063	0.008	0.036	0.086**	0.055*	0.074**	0.084***	0.177***
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.095)	(0.068)	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.036)
Activity sector 9	0.014	-0.055**	0.002	-0.174**	-0.045	-0.003	0.002	-0.035	0.096*	-0.048
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.052)	(0.048)
Part-time	-	-0.068***	-	0.020	-	-0.006	-	-0.094***	-	-0.140***
		(0.014)		(0.054)		(0.027)		(0.021)		(0.028)
Inverse Mills ratio	-	0.019	-	0.192	-	0.030	-	-0.011	-	-0.096
		(0.040)		(0.209)		(0.064)		(0.057)		(0.143)
Region 1	0.111***	0.088***	0.130**	0.360***	0.142***	0.122**	0.117***	0.048	0.069**	0.003
	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.063)	(0.130)	(0.037)	(0.058)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.057)
Region 2	0.122***	0.062**	0.130**	0.282**	0.165***	0.105*	0.132***	0.040	0.066*	0.005
	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.063)	(0.140)	(0.037)	(0.060)	(0.030)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.068)
Region 3	0.051***	0.043*	0.029	0.298***	0.089**	0.062	0.060**	0.020	0.004	-0.024
	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.064)	(0.102)	(0.037)	(0.055)	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.055)
Region 4	-0.042**	-0.034	-0.056	0.188**	-0.019	-0.093*	-0.040	-0.058	-0.050	-0.033
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.066)	(0.090)	(0.038)	(0.052)	(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.041)
Constant	1.182***	1.437***	1.729***	1.470***	1.919***	1.942***	2.189***	2.094***	2.126***	2.395***
	(0.083)	(0.135)	(0.117)	(0.256)	(0.066)	(0.111)	(0.061)	(0.087)	(0.082)	(0.195)
N	5662	4569	717	525	1521	1255	1965	1670	1459	1119
R^2	0.459	0.456	0.211	0.209	0.325	0.340	0.432	0.465	0.441	0.542

NOTES - Standard errors in parentheses. * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. - means not controlled for.

Table A9. *Log-hourly wage regressions for the Netherlands*

	Model 1: 20-59		Model 2: 20-29		Model 3: 30-39		Model 4: 40-49		Model 5: 50-59	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Nationality	0.071**	0.024	0.267*	-0.021	0.032	-0.085*	0.153**	0.057	-0.089	0.073
	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.143)	(0.146)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.060)	(0.055)	(0.085)	(0.053)
Age	0.054***	0.048***	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(0.008)	(0.008)								
Age squared	-0.001***	-0.000***	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(0.000)	(0.000)								
Education 2	0.095***	0.070***	0.038	-0.065	0.032	0.048	0.135***	0.080*	0.075**	0.026
	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.077)	(0.126)	(0.038)	(0.055)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.060)
Education 3	0.303***	0.232***	0.272***	0.184	0.226***	0.207***	0.357***	0.265***	0.314***	0.123
	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.098)	(0.126)	(0.045)	(0.065)	(0.045)	(0.062)	(0.045)	(0.089)
# children 0-2	-0.001	0.070***	0.036	0.125**	-0.012	-0.010	0.041	0.130**	-	-
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.080)	(0.059)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.046)	(0.061)		
# children 3-5	0.038*	0.012	-0.031	-0.020	0.059**	-0.003	0.039	0.023	-	-
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.038)		
# children 6-11	0.017	0.001	0.000	-0.132	0.040**	-0.035	0.034*	0.012	-0.048	0.079
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.000)	(0.095)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.043)	(0.051)
# children older than 12	0.018*	-0.029***	-	-	0.001	-0.103***	0.048***	-0.020	0.000	0.006
	(0.010)	(0.011)			(0.051)	(0.039)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.021)
Partnership status	0.060***	-0.033*	0.097*	0.001	0.029	-0.026	0.033	-0.039	0.117***	0.005
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.063)
Degree of urbanization	n.i.	n.i.	n.i.	n.i.	n.i.	n.i.	n.i.	n.i.	n.i.	n.i.
Firm size	0.152***	0.089***	0.214***	0.081	0.129***	0.097***	0.226***	0.045	0.072	0.157***
	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.048)	(0.035)	(0.053)	(0.045)
Type of contract	0.064**	0.077***	0.106	0.240***	0.109**	0.051	0.022	0.095**	-0.067	0.121
	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.072)	(0.043)	(0.108)	(0.087)
Managerial position	0.104***	0.062***	0.078	0.023	0.081***	0.048*	0.119***	0.070**	0.114***	0.072**
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Occupation 2	-0.051***	-0.041**	-0.032	0.020	-0.028	-0.068**	-0.092***	-0.030	-0.010	-0.072*
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.071)	(0.058)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.037)
Occupation 3	-0.166***	-0.235***	0.017	0.043	-0.174***	-0.303***	-0.133***	-0.253***	-0.236***	-0.184***
	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.112)	(0.083)	(0.050)	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.036)	(0.058)	(0.039)
Occupation 4	-0.166***	-0.261***	0.029	-0.050	-0.129*	-0.303***	-0.141**	-0.316***	-0.230***	-0.225***
	(0.035)	(0.025)	(0.094)	(0.077)	(0.071)	(0.048)	(0.064)	(0.044)	(0.067)	(0.046)
Occupation 5	-0.225***	-0.363***	0.004	0.113	-0.198***	-0.408***	-0.196***	-0.456***	-0.326***	-0.364***
	(0.024)	(0.047)	(0.086)	(0.178)	(0.041)	(0.080)	(0.045)	(0.112)	(0.045)	(0.081)
Occupation 6	-0.283***	-0.444***	-0.130	0.034	-0.206**	-0.586***	-0.234***	-0.422***	-0.438***	-0.424***
	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.167)	(0.280)	(0.083)	(0.105)	(0.079)	(0.075)	(0.088)	(0.067)

Activity sector 2	-0.017	-0.008	0.102	0.080	-0.043	0.038	-0.011	0.072	-0.049	-0.150**
	(0.021)	(0.038)	(0.094)	(0.144)	(0.038)	(0.062)	(0.037)	(0.078)	(0.041)	(0.074)
Activity sector 3	-0.061**	-0.137***	-0.074	0.109	-0.063	-0.120**	-0.020	-0.125**	-0.116**	-0.256***
	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.100)	(0.121)	(0.043)	(0.058)	(0.047)	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.068)
Activity sector 4	-0.176***	-0.278***	-0.097	0.139	-0.094	-0.155	-0.130	-0.300***	-0.421***	-0.330***
	(0.064)	(0.055)	(0.203)	(0.248)	(0.095)	(0.103)	(0.141)	(0.090)	(0.141)	(0.113)
Activity sector 5	0.055**	0.095***	0.048	0.237*	0.015	0.146**	0.127***	0.061	0.036	0.047
	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.107)	(0.134)	(0.042)	(0.058)	(0.045)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.073)
Activity sector 6	-0.022	-0.001	0.206**	0.254**	-0.025	0.025	-0.057	-0.047	-0.040	-0.012
	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.103)	(0.123)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.057)	(0.066)
Activity sector 7	0.050*	0.094***	0.198	0.460***	0.033	0.091	0.075*	0.059	0.006	0.055
	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.043)	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.061)
Activity sector 8	-0.126***	-0.076***	0.016	0.203*	-0.118**	-0.085*	-0.146***	-0.099**	-0.180***	-0.096*
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.126)	(0.109)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.053)
Activity sector 9	-0.108*	-0.133***	0.038	-0.058	-0.059	-0.098	-0.077	-0.189***	-0.222*	-0.113
	(0.056)	(0.043)	(0.151)	(0.161)	(0.144)	(0.090)	(0.085)	(0.071)	(0.117)	(0.085)
Part-time	-	0.010	-	0.133**	-	0.047	-	-0.012	-	-0.018
		(0.016)		(0.051)		(0.031)		(0.031)		(0.030)
Inverse Mills ratio	-	0.041	-	-0.277	-	0.148*	-	0.042	-	-0.111
		(0.047)		(0.209)		(0.078)		(0.104)		(0.144)
Constant	1.347***	1.656***	1.997***	2.228***	2.707***	2.919***	2.564***	2.871***	3.183***	2.859***
	(0.165)	(0.179)	(0.207)	(0.293)	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.122)	(0.108)	(0.152)	(0.161)
N	1450	1591	108	131	420	474	502	557	420	429
R^2	0.512	0.494	0.512	0.549	0.419	0.497	0.484	0.506	0.519	0.485

NOTES -Standard errors in parentheses. * $p< 0.1$, ** $p< 0.05$, *** $p< 0.01$. - means not controlled for. (n.i.) means not included because missing information.

Table A10. *Log-hourly wage regressions for the United Kingdom*

	Model 1: 20-59		Model 2: 20-29		Model 3: 30-39		Model 4: 40-49		Model 5: 50-59	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Nationality	0.022	0.022	0.069	-0.133**	0.062	-0.000	-0.013	0.047	-0.004	-0.044
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.050)	(0.059)	(0.049)
Age	0.045***	0.045***	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(0.007)	(0.007)								
Age squared	-0.000***	-0.000***	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(0.000)	(0.000)								
Education 2	0.059**	0.059**	-0.094	-0.050	0.131*	0.127	0.004	0.060	0.140***	0.172***
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.078)	(0.082)	(0.076)	(0.084)	(0.053)	(0.062)	(0.048)	(0.057)
Education 3	0.251***	0.251***	0.069	-0.021	0.285***	0.334***	0.200***	0.351***	0.350***	0.432***
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.085)	(0.095)	(0.079)	(0.091)	(0.062)	(0.078)	(0.058)	(0.065)
# children 0-2	-0.010	-0.010	-0.064	0.147**	-0.004	0.000	-0.030	-0.073		
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.065)	(0.059)	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.071)	(0.111)		
# children 3-5	0.029	0.029	0.015	0.052	0.044	-0.002	0.067*	0.005		
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.079)	(0.068)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.058)		
# children 6-11	0.044***	0.044***	-0.057	-0.001	0.035	-0.020	0.061**	-0.011	0.074	-0.130
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.093)	(0.058)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.046)	(0.116)
# children older than 12	-0.009	-0.009	0.020	-0.199	-0.021	-0.099***	-0.007	-0.008	0.003	-0.041**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.412)	(0.202)	(0.040)	(0.030)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Partnership status	0.056**	0.056**	0.116***	0.035	0.019	0.019	0.045	0.012	0.095*	-0.054
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.031)	(0.051)	(0.038)
Degree of urbanization	-0.009	-0.034***	-0.117	0.034	-0.057	0.037	-0.063	-0.013	-0.038	0.017
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.118)	(0.116)	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.083)	(0.075)	(0.069)	(0.059)
Firm size	0.056**	0.003	0.158***	0.099**	0.094**	0.024	0.187***	0.109***	0.230***	0.174***
	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.045)	(0.036)
Type of contract	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Managerial position	0.111***	0.089***	0.172***	0.054	0.009	0.160***	0.098***	0.070**	0.178***	0.039
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.030)
Occupation 2	-0.121***	-0.111***	-0.105	-0.042	-0.100*	-0.167***	-0.061	-0.102**	-0.180***	-0.101**
	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.041)	(0.055)	(0.045)
Occupation 3	-0.310***	-0.253***	-0.297***	-0.203***	-0.461***	-0.318***	-0.279***	-0.254***	-0.197***	-0.236***
	(0.039)	(0.023)	(0.073)	(0.061)	(0.090)	(0.048)	(0.079)	(0.042)	(0.074)	(0.042)
Occupation 4	-0.290***	-0.363***	-0.174**	-0.274***	-0.444***	-0.415***	-0.158**	-0.387***	-0.330***	-0.325***
	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.074)	(0.061)	(0.076)	(0.053)	(0.076)	(0.044)	(0.081)	(0.045)
Occupation 5	-0.278***	-0.451***	-0.207***	-0.430**	-0.309***	-0.645***	-0.320***	-0.387***	-0.227***	-0.438***
	(0.026)	(0.050)	(0.066)	(0.179)	(0.052)	(0.110)	(0.050)	(0.090)	(0.050)	(0.081)
Occupation 6	-0.432***	-0.362***	-0.304***	-0.333***	-0.499***	-0.409***	-0.451***	-0.378***	-0.369***	-0.318***
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.075)	(0.094)	(0.066)	(0.080)	(0.060)	(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.058)

Activity sector 2	0.076***	-0.042	0.167**	0.141	0.010	-0.102	0.083*	-0.071	0.089*	-0.103
	(0.026)	(0.046)	(0.066)	(0.106)	(0.057)	(0.100)	(0.044)	(0.085)	(0.049)	(0.085)
Activity sector 3	-0.042	-0.230***	-0.042	-0.190**	-0.064	-0.242***	0.013	-0.249***	-0.039	-0.246***
	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.068)	(0.083)	(0.057)	(0.081)	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.068)
Activity sector 4	-0.297***	-0.303***	-0.372***	-0.342***	-0.208*	-0.395***	-0.406***	-0.343***	-0.192	-0.180*
	(0.063)	(0.052)	(0.103)	(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.111)	(0.144)	(0.100)	(0.190)	(0.101)
Activity sector 5	0.205***	0.118***	0.186**	0.130	0.194***	0.058	0.295***	0.167**	0.141**	0.070
	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.074)	(0.083)	(0.066)	(0.083)	(0.061)	(0.076)	(0.067)	(0.077)
Activity sector 6	0.019	-0.077**	0.178**	0.005	-0.020	-0.155*	-0.024	-0.096	0.054	-0.049
	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.060)	(0.081)	(0.064)	(0.073)	(0.063)	(0.074)
Activity sector 7	0.149***	0.023	0.213**	0.116	0.182**	-0.072	0.093	0.039	0.134*	0.015
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.077)	(0.084)	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.069)
Activity sector 8	-0.069**	-0.086***	-0.047	-0.016	-0.031	-0.199***	-0.120**	-0.080	-0.085	-0.097
	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.091)	(0.071)	(0.063)	(0.073)	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.060)
Activity sector 9	-0.025	-0.149***	0.200*	-0.134	-0.023	-0.211**	-0.000	-0.169**	-0.123	-0.145*
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.113)	(0.098)	(0.096)	(0.104)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.094)	(0.086)
Part-time	-	-0.044**	-	-0.011	-	-0.018	-	-0.082***	-	-0.052*
		(0.017)		(0.056)		(0.039)		(0.030)		(0.030)
Inverse Mills ratio	-	0.117**	-	-0.109	-	0.068	-	0.214*	-	0.318**
		(0.059)		(0.092)		(0.084)		(0.124)		(0.158)
Constant	1.416***	1.568***	2.301***	2.441***	2.524***	2.496***	2.570***	2.375***	2.312***	2.314***
	(0.152)	(0.151)	(0.157)	(0.184)	(0.148)	(0.167)	(0.127)	(0.144)	(0.124)	(0.118)
N	1922	2363	267	341	525	549	583	787	547	686
R^2	0.421	0.431	0.476	0.335	0.371	0.506	0.423	0.437	0.387	0.439

NOTES - Standard errors in parentheses. * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. - means not controlled for.