US trend inflation reinterpreted. The role of fiscal policies and time-varying nominal rigidities.

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Abstract

This paper offers a reinterpretation of the Fed’s time-varying implicit inflation target, based on two considerations. The first one is that the need to alleviate the burden of distortionary taxation may justify the choice of a positive inflation rate. The second one is based on compelling evidence that the degree of price and wage indexation falls with trend inflation. In fact, we find that a proper characterization of the joint evolution of fiscal variables and nominal rigidities has a strong impact on the Ramsey optimal policies, implying optimal inflation dynamics which are consistent with the observed evolution of US trend inflation. By contrast, tax policies have been too lax, especially at the time of the controversial Bush tax cuts.

Jel codes: E52, E58, J51, E24.  
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1 Introduction

The recent years have witnessed increasing interest in the dynamics of US inflation and output volatility, characterized by a post-1981 “Great Moderation” following the “Great Inflation” episode of the 1970s. Several explanations have been put forward to the observed gradual reduction in inflation and in macroeconomic volatility that characterized the US economy up to the 2008 financial crisis. Some researchers pointed at a change in the stochastic processes driving structural supply and demand shocks (Stock and Watson, 2003; Primiceri, 2005; Sims and Zha, 2006; Gambetti *et al.*, 2008; Justiniano and Primiceri, 2008). Others emphasized the Fed’s shift to a rule-based approach, including more
aggressive interest rate feedback on inflation (Carlstrom et al., 2009; Taylor, 2012).

A complementary view pinpoints changes in US trend inflation as a key factor behind the end of the Great Inflation and the outset of the Great Moderation (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2011). Cogley and Sbordone (2009) document a gradual reduction in the underlying core or trend inflation rate. Few macroeconomists would disagree with the statement that trend inflation is determined by the long-run target in the central bank’s policy rule, and the drift in trend inflation is usually attributed to shifts in that target. Ireland (2007) estimates a New Keynesian model accounting for an exogenous, time-varying Fed’s implicit inflation target. His results suggest that the target gradually rose from slightly above 1 percent at the end of the ’50s to over 8% in the second part of the ’70s; then it gradually fell to about 2% in 2004. Interpreting this result has proved difficult. A number of contributions suggest that the Fed opportunistically transferred supply shocks into persistent inflation changes in order to limit output losses in the 70s when shocks were mainly adverse, and to bring down inflation expectations in the ’80s and ’90s when shocks were mainly favorable (see Ireland and references cited therein). Another interpretation sees changes in US trend inflation as a consequence of policymaker’s mis-perceptions and learning about the true structure of the economy.\footnote{See Sargent (2001), Cogley and Sargent (2005), Primiceri (2005), Sargent et al. (2006).} According to evidence provided in Milani (2009) learning accounts for the bulk of observed volatility in US trend inflation, and the implicit Fed’s inflation target has remained in the 2-3% range throughout the whole post-war sample.

Leading macroeconomic models fit uncomfortably with empirical evidence and with these interpretations. According to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2011) theories of monetary non-neutrality (accounting for monetary transaction costs, nominal rigidities, distortionary taxation, the zero lower bound, foreign holdings of domestic currency, the untaxed informal economy) imply that the optimal rate of inflation ranges between the Friedman rule and a number insignificantly above zero. Similarly, the implied optimal policy responses to shocks require minimal inflation volatility and permanent debt adjustment in order to obtain tax-smoothing over the business cycle. In this framework it is clearly impossible to rationalize the “opportunist view” of the Fed’s responses to shocks, which should have allowed large and persistent variations in inflation. Even interpretations based on policymakers’ mis-perceptions and learning imply a relatively large inflation target.

This paper offers a reinterpretation of the Fed’s time-varying implicit inflation target, based on two key factors. The first is a recent theoretical finding that the need to alleviate the burden of distortionary taxation may justify the choice of a positive inflation rate (and a substantially larger inflation volatility) when total fiscal outlays include a substantial amount of transfers in addition to the public consumption expenditures typically considered in macroeconomic models (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2013). The underlying intuition is relatively simple. Coeteris paribus, a permanent change in public consumption causes a fall in private consumption and in real money balances, eroding the inflation tax base. By contrast, an equivalent increase in public transfers has no effect on public consumption and real money balances. As a result, the optimal financing mix gradually tilts towards stronger reliance on inflation when transfers become...
relatively large. The second factor behind our interpretation is compelling evidence of a time-varying pattern in the parameters characterizing the pricing behavior of firms and wage setters, where the degree of indexation typically falls together with trend inflation (Benati, 2008; 2009; Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez, 2008). In fact, we find that a proper characterization of the joint evolution of fiscal variables and nominal rigidities has a strong impact on the Ramsey optimal policies, implying optimal inflation dynamics which are consistent with the observed evolution of US trend inflation.

In a nutshell, our results are summarized as follows. We see a complementarity between our results and previous interpretations of US inflation that emphasized the role of shocks and learning about the true structure of the economy. Up until the mid-60s the optimal inflation rate was virtually nil, then the contemporaneous increase in public transfers and in the degree of inflation indexation caused a strong increase in the optimal inflation target, 6% by the mid-70s. Finally, in the last part of the sample the reduction in inflation indexation and the stabilization in the level of public transfers cause a fall in the optimal inflation rate. We also determine the pattern of optimal tax policies. Our predicted fiscal revenues track the increase in observed revenues fairly closely up to the end of the 70s, but they are systematically larger during the rest of the sample. This result is consistent with observed debt dynamics, characterized by a reduction until 1980 and a large increase thereafter. This is puzzling in the light of received interpretations of the observed patterns of inflation and output volatility. In fact, debt dynamics should have been consistent with the changes in the stochastic processes driving structural shocks. This implies that a debt increase should have been observed in the adverse economic environment of the 1970s, and a contraction should have occurred during the Great Moderation.

Our results also contribute to the ongoing debate about the “Great Deviation” of US monetary policy in the years preceding the 2007 financial crisis (Taylor, 2010, 2012). In fact our predicted optimal inflation rate is very close to observed inflation. By contrast tax policies appear considerably lax, exactly at the time when the controversial Bush tax cuts.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces our theoretical model. We consider a remarkably simple model, which abstracts from capital accumulation but takes into account monetary transactions costs, monopolistic competition in goods and labor markets, price and wage stickiness and inflation indexation. Section 3 presents the results. The final section concludes.

2 The model

We set up a simple DSGE model characterized by standard nominal and real frictions. The nominal frictions include sluggish price and wage adjustments with indexation to past inflation. The real rigidities originate from monopolistic competition in both goods and labor markets. In addition, a transaction technology where money facilitates transactions allows to motivate a money demand function. Exogenous government expenditures (public consumption, transfers and interest payments on debt) are financed by a distortionary labor-income tax, money creation (inflation tax), and issuance of one-period, nominally risk
free bonds.

2.1 Households

The economy is populated by a continuum of households of measure 1. Household $i$’s preferences are:

$$U_i = E_t \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u (C_{t,i}, l_{t,i})$$

(1)

where $\beta \in (0, 1)$ is the discount factor, $C_{t,i} = (\int_0^1 c_{t,i}(j)^{\rho} dj)^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$ is a consumption bundle, $l_{t,i}$ is a differentiated labor type that is supplied to all firms.

The household’s flow budget constraint is

$$C_{t,i} (1 + S_{t,i}) + \frac{M_{t,i}}{P_t} + \frac{B_{t,i}}{P_t} = (1 - \tau_t) \frac{W_{t,i}l_{t,i}}{P_t} + \frac{M_{t-1,i}}{P_t} + \theta_t + T_t + \frac{R_{t-1}B_{t-1,i}}{P_t}$$

(2)

where $W_{t,i}$ is the nominal wage; $\tau_t$ is the labor income tax rate; $T_t$ denotes real fiscal transfers; $\theta_t$ are firms profits; $R_t$ is the gross nominal interest rate; $B_{t,i}$ is a nominally riskless bond that pays one unit of currency in period $t+1$. $M_{t,i}$ defines nominal money holdings to be used in period $t+1$ in order to facilitate consumption purchases. Consumption purchases are subject to a transaction cost, $S_{t,i} = s(v_{t,i})$, where $v_{t,i} = P_{t,i}C_{t,i}/M_{t,i}$ is the household’s consumption-based money velocity. The features of $s(v_{t,i})$ are such that a satiation level of money velocity ($v^* > 0$) exists where the transaction cost vanishes and, simultaneously, a finite demand for money is associated to a zero nominal interest rate. We assume that $s(v_{t,i})$ is twice continuously differentiable and $(v_{t,i} - v^*)s'(v_{t,i}) > 0$.

Households also set wages. We assume that the labor market is characterized by monopolistic competition and a sluggish wage adjustment. We model nominal wage stickiness as in Rotemberg (1982). Each household maximizes the expected value of (1) subject to the labor demand (described below) facing a quadratic adjustment cost

$$\frac{\xi_w}{2} \left( \frac{W_t(i)/W_{t-1}(i)}{\pi_{t-1}^{\delta_w}} - 1 \right)^2$$

(3)

where $\xi_w > 0$ is a measure of wage stickiness and $\delta_w \in [0, 1]$ is the degree of wage indexation to past inflation.

2.2 Firms

Each firm $(j)$ produces a differentiated good in a monopolistically competitive environment using labor services. The production technology is given by:

$$y_t(j) = z_t l_{t,j}$$

(4)

\footnote{See e.g. Sims (1994), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a, 2011), Guerron-Quintana (2009), Altig et al. (2011).}
where \( z_t \) denotes a productivity shock and \( l_{t,j} = \left[ \int_0^1 l_{t,j}(i) \frac{e^{-\sigma}}{\sigma} dt \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma}} \) is a standard labor bundle. Firm \((j)\) demand for labor type \((i)\) is

\[
l_{t,j}(i) = \left( \frac{w_{t,i}}{W_t} \right)^{-\sigma} l_{t,j}
\]

where \( W_t = \left[ \int_0^1 w_{t,i}^{-\sigma} di \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \) is the wage index. We assume a sticky price specification based on Rotemberg (1982) quadratic cost of nominal price adjustment:

\[
\frac{\xi_p}{2} \left( \frac{P_t(j)/P_{t-1}(j)}{\pi_{t-1} \delta_p} - 1 \right)^2
\]

where \( \xi_p > 0 \) is a measure of price stickiness and \( \pi_t = P_t/P_{t-1} \) denotes the gross inflation rate and \( \delta_p \in [0, 1] \) is the degree of price indexation to past inflation.

### 2.3 Fiscal sector

The consolidated government supplies an exogenous, stochastic and unproductive amount of public good \( G_t \) and implements exogenous transfers \( T_t \). Government financing is obtained through a labor-income tax, money creation and issuance of one-period, nominally risk free bonds. Its period-by-period budget constraint is

\[
R_{t-1} \frac{B_{t-1}}{P_t} + G_t + T_t = \tau_t \frac{W_t}{P_t} + M_t - M_{t-1} + B_t
\]

As in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a), \( \ln g_t \), where \( g_t = \frac{G_t}{Y_t} \), is subject to shocks following an independent \( AR(1) \) process.

### 2.4 Competitive equilibrium

The competitive equilibrium is obtained by solving the representative household’s and firm’s problems.

The household’s first-order conditions are:

\[
\lambda_t = \frac{u_c(C_t, l_t)}{1 + s(v_t) + v_t s'(v_t)}
\]

\[
\frac{\lambda_t}{\lambda_{t+1}} = \beta R_t
\]

\[
\frac{R_t - 1}{R_t} = s'(v_t) \epsilon_t^2
\]

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3 We assume that \( \ln z_t \) follows an \( AR(1) \) process.

4 Note that the focus of the paper is the identification of the optimal financing mix, where optimality is driven by efficiency considerations. Justifying the existence of government transfers as an optimal outcome would require some form of heterogeneity across households. This is beyond the scope of the paper.

5 In the following we assume the symmetrical equilibrium and subindexes \( i,j \) are therefore dropped. In addition, we rule out Ponzi schemes.
\[ c_{t,i}(j) = C_{t,i} \left( \frac{p_t(j)}{P_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \]  

\[
\left[ \frac{W_t}{P_t} + \mu^w \Omega_t \frac{u_t(C_t, l_t)}{u_c(C_t, l_t)} \right] l_t (1 - \tau_t) + \xi_w \omega_t \pi_{t-1}^{-\delta_w} (\omega_t \pi_{t-1}^{-\delta_w} - 1) = \\
= E_t \beta \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \xi_w \omega_t \pi_t^{-\delta_w} (\omega_{t+1} \pi_{t}^{-\delta_w} - 1)
\]  

Condition (8) states that the transaction cost introduces a wedge between the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal utility of wealth that vanishes only if \( v = v^* \). Equation (9) is a standard Euler condition. Equation (10) implicitly defines the household’s money demand function. Equation (11) defines consumer demand for product \( j \). Correspondingly, the consumption price index is \( P_t = \left( \int_0^1 p_t(i) \pi_t^{-\delta} di \right)^{\frac{1}{\delta}} \). Equation (12) defines the wage adjustment rule, where \( \mu^w = \sigma (\sigma - 1)^{-1} \) is the gross wage markup; \( \omega_t = W_t/W_{t-1} \) is the gross wage inflation rate; \( \mu^w = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \) defines the markup generated by monopolistic competition under flexible nominal wages; \( \Omega_t = \frac{1 + \sigma (\nu_t + \nu_t \pi_t)}{1 - \tau_t} \) defines the policy wedge, which depends on both tax and inflation distortions.

The firm’s price adjustment rule is:

\[
\frac{p_t \mu^p}{\mu^p - 1} \left( \frac{1}{\mu^p} - \frac{W_t}{P_t} \right) + \xi_w \pi_t \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\pi_{t-1}} - 1 \right) = E_t \beta \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \xi_w \pi_{t+1} \left( \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{\pi_t} - 1 \right)
\]

where \( \mu^p = \frac{1}{p} \) defines the flex-price markup. Equation (13) is a conventional New Keynesian Phillips curve, which simply states that the presence of price-adjustment costs prevents firms in the short run from setting their prices so as to equate marginal revenue to marginal cost.

Finally, the aggregate resource constraint is

\[
Y_t = C_t (1 + S_t) + G_t + \frac{\xi_p}{2} \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\pi_{t-1}} - 1 \right)^2 + \frac{\xi_w}{2} \left( \frac{\omega_t}{\omega_{t-1}} - 1 \right)^2
\]

The competitive equilibrium is thus a set of plans \( \{C_{t,i}, l_{t,i}, m_{c,t}, \pi_t, v_t\}^{+\infty}_{t=0} \) that, given the policies \( \{R_t, \tau_t\}^{+\infty}_{t=0} \), the exogenous processes \( \{z_t, g_t\}^{+\infty}_{t=0} \), and the initial conditions, satisfies the above first order conditions (8)-(14).

### 2.5 Ramsey solution

The Ramsey solution is a set of plans \( \{R_t, \tau_t\}^{+\infty}_{t=0} \) that maximizes the expected value of (1) subject to the competitive equilibrium conditions (8)-(14), the government budget constraint (7) and the exogenous stochastic processes driving the fiscal and technology shocks.

### 3 Functional forms and calibration

We assume that the instantaneous utility for the representative household \((i)\) takes the form of a simple log-log function:

\[
u(C_{t,i}, l_{t,i}) = \ln C_{t,i} + \eta \ln (1 - l_{t,i})
\]
and we formalize $s(v_{t,i})$ as

$$s(v_{t,i}) = \left( A v_{t,i} + \frac{B}{v_{t,i}} - 2\sqrt{AB} \right) C_t^{-\theta} \tag{16}$$

When $\theta = 0$, equation (16) is as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a). In this case, as $B$ approaches zero, (16) becomes linear in velocity and the implicit demand for money has the Baumol-Tobin square-root form with respect to the opportunity cost of holding money. When $0 < \theta < 1$, monetary transaction costs exhibit decreasing returns to scale and the consumption elasticity of the implicit money demand function is smaller than 1.

By combining (10) and (16), we can now derive an explicit money demand function:

$$\frac{M_t}{P_t} = \frac{C_t^{1-\theta}}{\sqrt{\frac{2}{\theta} + (R_t - 1) \frac{2}{\theta}}} \tag{17}$$

The solution of the Ramsey plan requires numerical simulations. We set the subjective discount factor $\beta$ at 0.96, consistent with a steady-state 4% real interest rate (the time unit is meant to be a year). Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a) transaction cost parameters $A$ and $B$ are set at 0.011 and 0.075, respectively, and the consumption scale parameter $\theta$ is set at 0. The price markups, $\mu^p$ is set at 1.2, as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a). We choose 1.05 for $\mu^w$. The annualized Rotemberg price and nominal wage adjustment costs ($\xi_p$, $\xi_w$) are set at 4.375, in line with Hofmann et al. (2012), who also report that these parameters are rather stable during the post-war period.

We allow for time variation in the degree of inflation indexation and in the fiscal ratios $B/Y$, $G/Y$, $T/Y$ (Table 1). The inflation indexation parameters are taken from Hofmann et al. (2012), the fiscal variables are obtained from the National Accounts (NIPA) data and from the Economic Report of the President.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample period</th>
<th>$B/Y$</th>
<th>$G/Y$</th>
<th>$T/Y$</th>
<th>$\delta_p$</th>
<th>$\delta_w$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-2005</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1969</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1984</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-2005</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 reflects the dynamics of fiscal variables and price and wage indexation. Public debt as a percentage of GDP fell rapidly in the post-World War II period. It reached a low in 1973 under Nixon Administration. The debt burden has then fairly increased since the presidency of Bill Clinton. In the early 2000s, sharp increases in deficits have implied a new inversion in the debt dynamics. Government consumption remains fairly constant in all the sample at

Moreover, it would be easy to parameterize (16) so as to replicate a Cagan demand function (proof available upon request). These are obtained implementing Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b) second order approximation routines. Results are robust with respect to different assumptions on the interest rate. A change of 1% in the state steady-state real interest rate has second order quantitative effects on our results. Results are available upon request. This implies that contracts are re-optimized every 9 months on average.
about the 15%. During the Kennedy and Johnson years, the budget share going to transfers was constant. During the Nixon\textsuperscript{10} and successive administrations, transfer payments increases from 5% to 10%. Microeconomics data on indexation show that, from the late 1960s onwards, the coverage of private sector workers by cost-of-living adjustment clauses steadily increased to levels around 60% in the mid 1980s, after which there was again a decline towards 20% in the mid 1990s, when the reporting of coverage has been discontinued. The estimation of Hofmann et al. (2012) supports the idea of time variation in price and wage indexation.\textsuperscript{11} In particular, they show that lagged price inflation had a significant impact on wage inflation until the early 1980s, but they do not find a significant effect afterwards. Theodoridis et al. (2012) find a similar path for both price and wage time-varying indexation by a time-varying parameter VAR in the seven US variables used to estimate the model of Smets and Wouters (2007).

4 Results

In Table 2 we report the Ramsey optimal inflation rate, $\pi^{R}_{av}$, its corresponding value obtained when transfers are neglected as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a), $\pi^{SGU}_{av}$, and observed average-inflation values, $\pi_{av}$, for the whole sample period (1960-2005) and for the subsamples 1960-1969, 1970-1984, 1985-2005. In addition, to get more insights on how the dynamic pattern of fiscal expenditure variables affect optimal inflation rates, in Figure 1 we plot $\pi$, $\pi^{R}$ and $\pi^{SGU}$ where the latter two variables are obtained assuming that, in the absence of shocks, the policymaker reacts to the contemporaneous values of public expenditures (described in Figure 2 and 3) as if they were at their steady state values.\textsuperscript{12} This is an admittedly rough-and-ready method for capturing the shifting government targets for these variables, but the alternative of filtering actual public expenditure variables to obtain implicit time-varying targets would not produce substantially different results.

The pattern of $\pi^{SGU}$ is clearly unrelated to observed inflation. It is interesting to note that during the great inflation the relatively large degree of inflation indexation induces the policymaker to choose an inflation rate that is even closer to the Friedman rule! A theoretical interpretation of this result is provided in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2011), who show that inflation indexation tilts the optimal inflation rate towards the Friedman rule when the public finance motive does not matter. By contrast, Di Bartolomeo et al. (2011) show that indexation causes a substantial increase in the optimal inflation rate when public transfers are sufficiently large. In fact, $\pi^{R}$ is characterized by a strong increase in the 70s and tracks actual inflation fairly closely since the beginning of the 1990s.

\textsuperscript{10}Between Nixon’s inauguration and his resignation, transfer payments by the national government rose from 24% to 43% of the US budget.

\textsuperscript{11}Microeconomics data also these results. From the late 1960s onwards, the coverage of private sector workers by cost-of-living adjustment clauses steadily increased to levels around 60% in the mid 1980s, after which there was again a decline towards 20% in the mid 1990s, when the reporting of coverage has been discontinued.

\textsuperscript{12}Note that public expenditure components include interest payments on previous-period government debt. We also allow for time-varying price and wage indexation parameters, as in Hofmann et al. (2012). More specifically, we use averages for the pre-Great Inflation, Great inflation and Great Moderation periods (see Table 1) and smooth the transition between one sample period and the subsequent one by using a four-point linear interpolation.
Note that $\pi^R$ is very small in the ‘60s and its increase follows the surge in the level and persistence in actual inflation that we observe since the mid-‘60s. In a sense, we see a complementarity between our results and previous interpretations of US inflation that emphasized the role of shocks and learning about the true structure of the economy. Up until the mid-‘60s the optimal inflation rate was virtually nil. Then the contemporaneous increase in public transfers and in the degree of inflation indexation caused a strong increase in the optimal inflation target, 6% by the mid-‘70s. In the last part of the sample the reduction in inflation indexation and the stabilization in the level of public transfers cause a fall in the optimal inflation rate.

To complete our analysis we discuss the dynamics of tax variables. In Figure 4 we plot observed taxes as a ratio of GDP and the predicted tax revenue ratios associated to the $\pi^R$, $\pi^{SGU}$ tax rates obtained when computing $\pi^R$, $\pi^{SGU}$. It is easy to see that fiscal revenues under $\pi^{SGU}$ simply follow the dynamics of public consumption expenditures. Under $\pi^R$ predicted fiscal revenues track the increase in actual revenues fairly closely up to the end of the ‘70s, but they are systematically larger than actual revenues during the rest of the sample. This result is obviously related to the pattern of debt dynamics reported in Figure 3, where the end of the ‘70s marks a clear turning point. In the first part of the sample the policy mix allowed a large reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio. Since then, tax policies caused a complete reversal in debt dynamics, and particularly so between 2000 and 2007. This result is puzzling in the light of received interpretations of the observed patterns of inflation and output volatility during the Great Inflation and Great Moderation episodes. In fact, a debt increase should have been observed at a time of adverse shocks and uncertainty – the Great Inflation episode – and such accumulation should have been reversed during the more favorable Great Moderation period (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004; Di Bartolomeo et al., 2013).

Table 2 – Predicted and observed inflation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample period</th>
<th>$\pi_{av}$</th>
<th>$\pi^R_{av}$</th>
<th>$\pi^{SGU}_{av}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-2005</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1969</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1984</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-2005</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13We found that Granger-causality runs from observed to predicted inflation and not vice-versa. Results are available upon request.
Figure 1 – Fiscal outlays

Figure 2 – Real debt dynamics
5 Conclusions

This paper reconsiders the issue of Ramsey-optimal inflation and tax policies in the context of the US economy. We are able to rationalize the existence
of a positive, time-varying optimal inflation rate, whose dynamics are driven by the public finance motive put forward in Phelps (1973) and by changing degrees of price and nominal wage indexation. Our interpretation is broadly consistent with interpretations that see a combination of learning and changes in the stochastic processes driving structural shocks as the key factors behind the Great Inflation and the Great Moderation episodes.

We uncover a puzzling pattern of tax policies, which, in contrast with theoretical macro-models, generated the reduction of public debt at a time of great uncertainty and of adverse shocks, and its accumulation later on, when the economic context was relatively favorable. Interpretations of the Great Moderation typically overlooked the role of fiscal policies. Our contribution calls for further research about the (temporary) effect of these policies in dampening macroeconomic fluctuations.

References


