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Abstract

Waste management / disposal performances and a desirable delinking between income and waste trends are influenced by socio economic, institutional and policy factors. In highly regionalised settings many idiosyncratic factors of local interest influence waste management and disposal. Through an impact on policy enforcement costs, crime activities in a defined area and their geographical spillovers, may negatively affect legal forms of waste management and disposal. Given its high regional heterogeneity and known plague of Mafia in areas affected by recent ‘waste crisis’, Italy is a compelling case study: in full consistence to a theoretical model that analyzes how legal disposal (landfill), illegal disposal and recyclable waste levels are influenced by waste tariff and crime; econometric analysis on Italian provinces, shows that separated collection and legal forms of waste disposal are lower when crime spills are present. Crime activities erode and slow down the enhancement of waste management and disposal brought about by socio economic and structural factors enhanced by the introduction of newly crafted economic minded tariffs.

keywords: waste tariffs, crime, mafia, waste management and disposal, enforcement costs, recycling.

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1. Introduction

The waste crisis that has primarily affected some southern regions of Italy in the last decade (D’Alisa, 2010), together with strikingly different environmental and economic performances between areas within the country, has created problems both regarding the management of local ‘hot spots’ (Naples, see Pasotti (2010, 2009) for an institutional analysis of ‘state failures’ and of the Bassolino mayor era in Naples) and for siting allocation and compensations (Jenkins et al., 2004). State and market failures were both present as pre-conditions of such ongoing crises. The unresolved situation⁴ is a useful case study from which to depart for various analyses in environmental and regional sciences in relation to market and state failures. It calls for a deep investigation of the drivers of waste production and management choices, as well as for a closer look at how (waste related) crime affects waste performances. Indeed, as suggested by Legambiente, the illegal waste business in Italy has tremendously enlarged over the years, reaching a turnover of approximately 7 billion Euros in 2009 (Legambiente [League for the Environment, the major Italian NGO in the field], 2010), while millions’ of tonnes of hazardous waste yearly find their way outside legal circuits.

Despite the potential relevance of various crime activities in the Italian waste management system, very few empirical studies have addressed the issue. Past evidence and attention were placed on core drivers of regional waste performances, where important light was shed on many issues; For example, Mazzanti et al. (2008, 2010) in analyses covering waste generation and landfilling have shown the relevance of drivers such as population density, tourism and tariff implementation. A weak spatial correlation regarding waste performances (a potential sign of highly decentralized policy implementation), and a weak convergence of performances between North and South were also highlighted. Nevertheless, other local idiosyncratic and spatial effects could have been omitted from such analyses. Notwithstanding the role of landfill taxes that are present in Italy, and witnessing a slow and non-transparent implementation at

⁴ The municipal election in Naples in may 2011 were centred on the waste crisis which was not worked out by the centre right government that applied as other past governments a top down approach that relies on central fiscal intervention and the use of the army as well. The new mayor is a former public prosecutor that highlighted the role of bottom up approaches and social capital factors as a solution for increasing separated collection as key aim.
comparatively low levels (around 10-20€ per ton), the role of criminal activities that look for profits and rents from legal and illegal ‘waste resources’ (often highlighted as crucial by commentators), is a key ‘economic issue’ that lacks proper investigation.

We move a first step to filling this gap, by investigating, both theoretically and empirically, how accounting for waste related crimes and the presence of the mafia in an area might affect policy and waste management choices, with a specific attention to recycling and landfilling.

In the first part of the paper, we develop a simple model where an agent chooses the level of economic activity, as well as the level of legal and illegal disposal of the consequent waste. The former can be done by separating waste or not; when sorting of waste materials does not take place then recycling is impossible and waste are either (legally) disposed of in landfills or just dumped illegally. When sorting takes place the material is instead recycled. Illegal disposal takes place at no cost, but generates social costs. The theoretical model is based on two strands of literature. First of all, we connect to papers dealing with optimal waste policy in the presence of illegal disposal, in particular to Sullivan (1987), Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995). Specifically, Fullerton and Kinnaman conclude that the optimal fee structure is a deposit-refund system: a tax on all output plus a rebate on proper disposal through either recycling or garbage collection. In a more recent contribution, Choe and Fraser (1999) explicitly introduce monitoring costs into their model and identify the second-best optimal policy. Before choices concerning waste management are taken, an environmental regulator sets the enforcement regulations to fight illegal disposal.

We show that recycling is reduced by circumstances, making illegal waste reduction more complex, while the presence of criminal organizations and of an illegally pervasive behavior, bring about larger illegal dump sites. On the other hand, a larger tax on legal disposal provides stronger incentives towards recycling, as would be expected.

We integrate the economics of waste to literature on the economics of (organized) crime. In particular Grossman (1995), models organized crime as a competitor of the State, in the provision of public services and shows that the existence of the mafia constrains a government's behavior. A similar tradeoff is likely to arise in waste
disposal choices. The role of the mafia in the waste cycle is explicitly analyzed in D’Amato and Zoli (2010), who conclude that, under certain circumstances, a criminal organization operating in the waste cycle and extracting rents through socially costly extortion might lead to larger levels of production and lower levels of enforcement effort. Though we do not model organized crime explicitly and leave the waste tax as exogenous, we add to D’Amato and Zoli (2010) as we explicitly account for the separate vs non-separate collection and as we do not rely on explicit functional forms to get to our testable implications. In the field of studies on regional environmental and crime performances, Almer and Goeschl’s (2010) recent study, shows how public preferences regarding environmental quality and political economy variables may have an effect on environmental crime in Germany.

As for the economics of waste literature, the empirical analyses regarding waste generation and disposal drivers have progressed on the analysis of regional frameworks (Ham, 2009, Hage and Soderholm, 2008; de Jaeger, 2010; De Jaeger and Eyckmans, 2008, Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2009, 2004; Allers and Hoeben, 2010), at EU level (Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2009, EEA, 2009, 2007) and at OECD level (Johnstone and Labonne, 2004). However, we are not aware of studies that bring together waste and crime issues in order to understand waste performances.

It is noteworthy for the waste economics field that our empirical analyses is structured on a unique and rich balanced panel dataset covering 103 Italian provinces, between 1999 and 2008; a fairly long period of time for analyzing economic, policy and management effects over transitions in the waste arena. Waste, economics, policy and social factors are merged together by using various official sources (Ministry of the environment, Home Office, National statistical agency). The provincial level of analysis and the integration with crime municipal data, allows great detail in the assessment of what lies behind different provincial performances, with a special attention to policy factors and crime-related issues. In addition to the socio-economic drivers of waste performance, the policy transition towards an inventive based tariff system is analyzed; all in integration with the potential effect of negative influence on sustainability.

The literature on the economics of organized crime includes, so far, a limited number of contributions. See, among others, Garoupa (2000 and 2007) and Kumar and Skaperdas (2009).

Some new papers with emphasis on spatial flavour were presented at the annual EAERE 2011 conference in Rome during a pre conference on waste.
deriving from crime intensity in the province. Since data availability on crime is limited, and the proxies that are generally used in literature may generate unspecified errors due to their strong link with the level of enforcement (like the number of violent crimes), we can exploit some unique datasets on municipal governments that were turned over by home ministry officials after they were judged guilty of mafia connections. This is a more robust and exogenous type of crime proxy, which we are able to analyses over a dynamic scenario, not just as fixed factor representing the province. The analysis will be provided through the use of a fixed effect model and instrumental variable approaches, that account for potential endogeneity due to the simultaneous determination of policy enforcement and waste performances.

The paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the theoretical model and derives some testable implications; section 3 introduces the empirical analysis, presenting the data set and the methodology we adopt; section 4 presents empirical results and provides comments on economic significance; while section 5 concludes.

2. The Model

We model the waste management choice by a regulated agent (representing “society”) performing an economic activity, that we label as $y$. Such economic activity generates waste, which can be managed in three ways:

- Legally; but in an unsorted way, making recycling impossible; we label the corresponding quantity as $g$;
- Legally; by sorting the different kinds of materials in such a way to make recycling possible; we label the corresponding quantity as $r$;
- Illegally, for example by giving waste to illegal firms that just dump them in rivers, lands etc. We label the corresponding quantity as $b$.

Of course waste must be disposed of in some way; in other words, $y = g + b + r$, i.e. consumption or production must result in an equal amount of waste. We assume that the level of economic activity is given. As a result, and coherently with the empirical
model, illegal disposal is given by the total amount of waste minus legal sorted and unsorted waste disposal, i.e. \( b = y - g - r \).

In the first stage of the 'game', the agent chooses among the different available disposal options on the basis of the related costs and benefits. In particular, the agent is subject to enforcement through an expected fine, which we label as \( F \), and also has to pay a tax on legal unsorted disposal, which is labelled as \( t^7 \). The choices in terms of legal and illegal disposal are accounted for by an environmental authority acting as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the economic agent, and choosing the level of enforcement to be adopted to minimize social costs. The waste tax is, instead, treated as an exogenous variable.

### 2.1 Solution of the Game

In the second stage of the game the economic agent performs waste management taking the expected fine as given. Private management costs (e.g. transport costs, gate fees, etc...) are given by a function \( \gamma(g, r) \), which is strictly convex and increasing in its arguments, i.e. \( \gamma_g > 0, \gamma_r > 0, \gamma_{gg} > 0 \) and \( |H| = \gamma_{gg} \gamma_{rr} - \gamma_{gr}^2 > 0 \), where \( |H| \) is the Hessian determinant. A somewhat stronger assumption is made here for the sake of realism: marginal cost for legal disposal of type \( i \) \( (i=g, r) \) increases more rapidly with disposal option \( i \) than with disposal \( j \) \( (j = g, r and j \neq i) \). Namely, we impose that \( \gamma_{gg} > \gamma_{gr} \) and \( \gamma_{rr} > \gamma_{gr} \). As a result, the total costs related to waste management that the economic agent bears are given by:

\[
C(g, b, r) = \gamma(g, r) + t g + (y - g - r)F
\]

We have already outlined that \( t \) is the tax rate on legal unsorted disposal, and \( F \) is the unit expected fine for illegal disposal. The first order necessary and sufficient conditions defining legal unsorted disposal and legal sorted disposal are:

\[
Y_g(g, r) + t - F = 0
\]

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7 An example under this respect could be a unit landfill tax, or a tariff/tax on unsorted disposal. This latter tax is assumed to be set to pursue waste reduction and recycling, for example by covering higher waste management costs of separated collection and diverting waste from landfills through sustaining (subsidizing) composting. This is the case with waste related taxes/tariffs in Italy, that though not being pigovian in style include some element of economic incentive that we comment below.
Some straightforward comparative statics imply:\(^8\):

\[ g_t = -\frac{\gamma_{rr}}{|H|} \leq 0 \]

That is legal disposal decreases with \( t \), and

\[ r_t = \frac{\gamma_{gr}}{|H|} \geq 0 \text{ if } \gamma_{gr} \geq 0 \]

Note that sorted disposal might be encouraged or discouraged by the tax on legal unsorted disposal, depending on whether sorted or unsorted disposal are complements or substitutes in the agents' cost function\(^9\). Also, note that separability (i.e. \( \gamma_{gr} = 0 \)) would imply \( \frac{dr}{dt} = 0 \).

Turning to illegal disposal, it is easily shown that

\[ b_t = -g_t - r_t = \frac{1}{|H|} (\gamma_{rr} - \gamma_{gr}) > 0 \]

This is to say, an increase in tax on legal unsorted disposal brings about, as expected, an increase in illegal disposal. This is compatible with the received literature on the linkages between government policies and organized crime (see, among others, Grossmann (1995)): the presence of the Mafia as a competitor of the State constrains policy design. In our setting, an increase in the unit tax on legal unsorted disposal has a price in terms of an increase in illegal disposal. Note also that if the two legal disposal options are cost substitutes, then the impact of an increase in the tax rate on illegal disposal is expected to be stronger ceteris paribus.

Turning to the impact of the expected fine, we can easily conclude that:

\[ Y_r(g, r) - F = 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (3)

\(^8\) We will label the derivative of \( x \) with respect to \( y \) as \( x_y \).

\(^9\) The ‘cost substitutability assumption’, is in our eyes the most reasonable when waste generation is fixed and incineration is fixed as well (a sort of neoclassic static world, for example represented in the seminal works on waste allocation strategies based on relative marginal costs comparisons by Pearce and Brisson, 1995). Outside ceteris paribus situations, complementarity may hold.
Note that both kinds of legal disposal increase with the unit expected fine, while the opposite holds with respect to illegal disposal. Also in this case, the size of the impact of an increase in enforcement depends on whether sorted and unsorted legal disposal are cost complements or substitutes.

The environmental regulator chooses the enforcement level (as measured by the expected fine) to maximize social welfare; assuming that fines and taxes are net social transfers, as well as normalizing environmental damages from legal disposal to 0, the regulator's problem can be rewritten as

$$
\min_F \gamma(g,r) + \delta(b) - \eta(r) + \theta F
$$

Subject to (2) and (3), where $\theta$ are unit enforcement costs, $\delta(b)$ are social (strictly increasing and convex, i.e. $\delta_b > 0$, $\delta_{bb} \geq 0$) damages from illegal disposal while $\eta(r)$ are (strictly increasing and concave, i.e. $\eta_r > 0$, $\eta_{rr} \leq 0$) social benefits from recycling. Assuming interior solutions, the first order conditions with respect to $F$ imply:

$$
(\gamma_g - \delta_b) g_F + (\gamma_r - \delta_b - \eta_r) r_F + \theta = 0
$$

In order for the above FOCs to be sufficient, we also need (4) to be strictly convex, i.e.

$$
(\gamma_{gg} - \delta_{bb}) g_F^2 + (\gamma_{rr} - \delta_{bb} - \eta_{rr}) r_F^2 > 0
$$

From now on, in order to simplify comparative statics, and without loss of generality, $y$ is normalized to 1. Some straightforward calculations imply:

$$
F_g = - \frac{1}{(\gamma_{gg} - \delta_{bb}) g_F^2 + (\gamma_{rr} - \delta_{bb} - \eta_{rr}) r_F^2} < 0
$$

and:

$$
F_r = \frac{1}{(\gamma_{gg} - \delta_{bb}) g_F^2 + (\gamma_{rr} - \delta_{bb} - \eta_{rr}) r_F^2} < 0
$$
The relationship between the tax rate and the optimal enforcement level $F$ (how a variation in $t$ affects the optimal unit expected fine) is a key feature of the model insofar as it introduces an indirect effect of $t$ on $g$ and $r$. It depends in a non-straightforward way on the second derivatives of the $\gamma(.)$ function as well as on the features of the damages from illegal disposal and the benefits from recycling. More specifically, we can point out two important cases:

- when $\gamma_{gr} < 0$, (legal disposal and recycling are cost substitutes) then $r_t < 0$. We can therefore conclude that the optimal enforcement level, as measured by the expected fine, increases with the tax rate, i.e. $F_t > 0$. Also, in this case the expected fine reacts in a less than proportional way to an increase in the tax rate, i.e. $F_t < 1$. A possible intuition is that when a tax increase counter intuitively reduces separate collection, social welfare calls for an increase in the fine to discourage the resulting increase in illegal dumping.

- when $\gamma_{gr} > 0$ (cost complements), then $r_t > 0$ and matters are more complex, as the sign of $F_t$ cannot be determined in general. In this second case, $F_t > 0$ requires

$$\frac{g_F}{r_F} > \frac{\tau_c (\gamma_{rt} + \delta_{rb} - \eta_{rr})}{g_c (\gamma_{gg} + \delta_{bb})}$$

Note that the above condition is more (less) likely to be satisfied the more (less) reactive is unsorted (sorted) legal disposal to the tax rate. It is also more likely to be satisfied the less concave the recycling benefits function is (that is, when the benefits slowly diminish). When at least one of these circumstances hold, increases in $F$ are needed to compensate an increase in $t$. In other words, the less effective is the tax on legal unsorted disposal in increasing sorted disposal and recycling (one of its main goals) the more we should rely on the indirect impact of the unit expected fine to achieve increases in recycling.
2.2 Testable Implications

We chiefly assume that the presence of organized crime and, more generally, a larger complexity of criminal activities in the waste cycle, generates an increase in unit enforcement costs i.e. an increase in \( \theta \). The consequences of such a change can be derived by simply summing up and integrating the results obtained in the preceding section. More specifically:

\[
\frac{\partial g}{\partial \theta} = g_F F_\theta < 0
\]

i.e. legal non-recyclable (unsorted) disposal decreases when the mafia enters the waste cycle (deepens its ‘business effort’ in), making enforcement more difficult and /or complex, and:

\[
\frac{\partial r}{\partial \theta} = r_F F_\theta < 0
\]

i.e. legal recyclable disposal decreases when the mafia enters the waste cycle, making enforcement more difficult.

As a larger enforcement cost, for example; the presence of criminal organizations, implies a smaller enforcement (as measured by a smaller unit expected fine), which means that legal disposal decreases both in terms of recyclable and non-recyclable waste, while illegal disposal increases.

Turning to the impact of changes in the waste charge/tariff\(^{10}\), we get two unclearer cut results:

\[
\frac{\partial g}{\partial t} = g_t + g_F F_t
\]

\[
\frac{\partial r}{\partial t} = r_t + r_F F_t
\]

\(^{10}\) That could also represent as we comment below a shift from a non market based to a market based minded instrument, in addition to an increase of the unit tax.
We can observe that when $g$ and $r$ are cost substitutes (we recall in our opinion a case coherent with static allocative frameworks), i.e. $\gamma_{gr} < 0$, then $r_t < 0$ and $0 < F_t < 1$. In this first case, we can sum up comparative statics in table 1:\(^{11}\):

Table 1 here

The value of $F_t$ has a strong impact on whether the direct effect is stronger or weaker than the indirect one. More specifically, a low (high) $F_t$ implies that the direct effect dominates (is dominated by) the indirect one. It is however also possible, for intermediate values of $F_t$, that the direct effect dominates for legal unsorted disposal while the indirect effect dominates in recycling (i.e. sorted disposal).

When $g$ and $r$ are cost complements, i.e. $\gamma_{gr} > 0$, so that $r_t > 0$, matters are even more complex, as shown in the following table 2.

Table 2 here

The possible ambiguity in the relationships are thus quite easily explained by the possibility of sorted and unsorted disposal to be either complements or substitutes regarding the private management cost function, and by the presence of both a direct and indirect effect related to taxation. This is a key element of the model, which presents plausibility and economic meaning. The first (complementarity/substitutability) refers to the possibility of assuming waste generation and incineration constant (in the short term), the latter factor reflects the complexity of interaction in the effects of different instruments along the waste filiere. The matter is that while the direct effect of an increase in $t$ on unsorted disposal (legal landfilling) is clearly negative, and the direct effect of the same increase on $r$ is uniquely determined by the sign of $\gamma_{gr}$, the indirect effects related to the impact of $t$ on enforcement choices ($F$) are somewhat ambiguous. The reasoning is thus revolving around the potential different weights of such direct and indirect effects. This is surely an empirical issue to a greater extent. As a result, while

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\(^{11}\) **Full mathematical details** are not shown for brevity but available from the authors upon request.
we rely on the clear cut testable implications concerning the impact of the existence of criminal organizations (and/or of a complex enforcement in terms of illegal disposal reduction), we leave to the empirical estimates the matter of understanding how the linkages between waste tax rate and legal sorted and unsorted disposal work in real life.

3. Data and empirical Model

We merged these data with official data on provincial level socio-economic drivers, like value added as a proxy of provincial income, population density and tourist related flows, which becomes a crucial factor considering that it adds opportunity costs to the effects of density. Waste performances differ widely among Italian provinces, making the provincial level of analysis the most indicated one. As we can see from the maps in figures 2 and 3 below, though northern Italy is rapidly evolving towards high level of recycling, which peaks at around 75% in some provinces, the average figure for the country is still dominated by landfilling12. Nevertheless, even some northern regions suffer from landfill criticalities given the increasing lands scarcity in physical and economic terms (opportunity costs) and the non-decreasing stabilized trend for waste generation. It is clear how an ‘average’ national picture is insignificant in providing clear evidence of real dynamics occurring at regional levels, and a decentralized analysis is needed.

The specification tested in the panel-based analysis is the following one, similarly used in other works in the field of economics of waste (Johnstone and Labonne, 2004; Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2009):

12 Other maps on waste generation and incineration figures are available upon request.
(5) \[ \log \text{(waste)}_t = \alpha + \beta_1 \log(\text{economic driver})_t + \beta_2 \log(\text{socio-economic factors})_t \\
+ \beta_3 (\text{environmental policy})_t + \beta_4 (\text{crime variable}) + \epsilon_t \]

Where waste indicators are introduced in *per capita* terms (alternative analyses could focus on total waste, though decoupling indicators and future EU targets that are specified in *per capita* terms), the first terms is an intercept parameter that vary across provinces, and \( \beta_1 \) refers to the main economic driver (Value Added per capita at province level). Other socio-economic factors are added to the core specification as control variables, and possible additional significant drivers of waste generation. In our model, they include population density and tourist numbers. Population density may control for different land values (we assume here that in more populated areas the opportunity cost of land is bigger, something that explains the closure of the Milan landfill jointly with sanitary problems), and for the presence of agglomeration and scale effect. For this reason we assume that it is negatively correlated with landfilling, and positively correlated to recycling, though the latter sign is not to be taken for granted and is valid only if economies of scale are operating. Tourist flows, on the other side, control for different choices made by tourism-oriented municipalities, in which the amenity value of landscapes may play an important role in waste management. For this reason we assume it to be positively related to landfill diversion. The third term (\( \beta_3 \)) refers to waste management/policy oriented proxies, i.e. the share of provincial municipalities and the provincial population covered by the new ‘waste tariff’ regime, which substitutes for the old ‘waste tax’ regime. The new waste management tariff was introduced by Italian Law No. 22/1997, and should in principle substitute for the former waste management tax. The tax, however, is still in force in many Italian municipalities because law 22/1997 provides for a transition phase that has shown to be quite gradual and slow. The tax was calculated on the size of household living spaces, while the tariff is based on principles of full-cost pricing for waste management services and delivers some market based incentives to the system. Effective implementation of the tariff

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13 We test also a squared value added term, in order to account for non-linearity.
14 Part of the tariff covers fixed costs and part refers to the variable management costs. The former correlates to the size of household living space and, as a new element, to the number of people in the family. The variable part is associated with the (expected) amount of waste produced, which is calculated on the basis of past trends and location-related features. The variable part is abated by around 10–20% if households adopt domestic composting and/or join garden-waste door-to-door collection schemes. The tariff is a
system remains highly dependent on local policy decisions and practices, which is partly based on the choices made by the municipalities within the provinces that coordinate waste regulations at local level. Early implementations of the new tariff-based system, therefore, may be a sign of stronger policy commitment. We note that the implementation is heterogeneous even across areas with similar incomes and similar socio-economic variables. The shift from the old ‘non environmentally minded’ tax, to a new tariff system with some intrinsic incentives aimed at augmenting waste performances, should also capture the incentive effect of the latter (although the impact on waste generation, if any, may be not visible in the short term -see the geographical dispersion of the proxy variable TARPOP in Figure 4., TARMUN shows a very similar trend, and its graph is not included for brevity). Though the implementation of landfill taxes is in principle a worthwhile issue to study, given it is heterogeneous by region (eventually province) and dates back to 1996 (ETC / SCP, 2011), there is no data availability from official sources. It must be recognised that landfill taxes as other environmental policy instruments, are often introduced and maintained constant for years. Fixed effects partially captures landfill tax management (such taxes have been generally set at low levels, around 20-30€ per ton, while Nordic EU countries apply taxes in a 50-200€ range). Tariff related covariates present stronger time variability and are then more useful in a panel setting.

Finally, the ‘crime related variable’ has been created thanks to an existing database of the Home Office, showing all the municipal governments that have been turned over, with guilty verdicts of mafia connections in the last two decades. It is worth stressing the originality and importance of such information, which unlike most crime related data does not suffer from endogeneity, ie; where crime levels are not higher in areas where citizens are more prepared to denounce the crimes; or where police enforcement is stronger); usually most official data tends to suffer from such flaws. Given the municipal level of the dataset, we have aggregated the information at provincial level in coherence with our waste data. A value equal to one in our “mafia” variable, means that at least a municipal government inside the relative province has been turned by the Home Office following Mafia spillovers, in a given year.

structural break with respect the old tax insofar it presents incentives for landfill diversion, it should cover higher recycling costs. Most provinces that have introduced the new tariff system also increased year by year the price level.
Moreover, to account the lagged and dynamic effect of crime on institutional and economic settings and performances, the variable assumes the value one for the three years preceding the institutionalization of the mafia connection by the Home Office\textsuperscript{15}. We can reasonably hypothesize that mafia connections had been in place for a period of time, before being recognized and sanctioned.

In the analysis, two different crime variables are mainly tested: a “narrow” one, in which only provinces with mafia connections are associated to a positive value, and a broad one, in which neighbouring provinces are assigned with a positive value, accounting for proximity and geographical spillover effects\textsuperscript{16}. We aim to capture negative spillover effects that are concretely relevant and may be of high importance in some waste production chains, where in most cases, the management witnesses the cooperation of different local public agencies. This is relevant for the economic recycling markets and ‘filiere’ (Production chain), compared to landfill sites that are relatively more circumscribed to the province of reference. (Figures 5 and 6 represent maps for Mafia geographical spreading in the country according to our data\textsuperscript{17}). We highlight again that this dataset is not undermined by the fact that the local level of enforcement and propensity to report crimes by individuals, influences the intensity of the revealed crime, given that the decision to turn over a municipality depends on the action of the Home Office, a top down action. All variables are summarized in table 3.

table 3 here

Figure 1 here

\textsuperscript{15} The use of dummy variables that capture ‘temporal’ lagged and leads effects is diffused in the environmental policy empirical literature (Popp et al., 2011).

\textsuperscript{16} As example, we associate a province with crime relatedness if a (contiguous) municipality in another province is polluted by Mafia. We test two options: using only contiguous municipality or assigning crime relatedness even if the municipality in the neighbouring province is not contiguous to the province itself. The paper presents results concerning the first option, which ended up with showing relatively more robust outcomes.

\textsuperscript{17} Using other (unspecified) sources, the special report of The Economist on Italy published in June 2011 presents similar maps and crime evidence. It is true that mafia activities are polluting legal and illegal business even in the North of Italy. We nevertheless stress that first we exploit ‘official’ Mafia data that refer to mafia activities in ‘public’ institutions (local authorities turned over by Home office) and second we deal with municipal waste. In the North, Mafia is primarily dealing with the trade of toxic waste, often illegally shifted to and disposed in southern regions. Recent news is that a northern municipality was turned over for Mafia connection in 2011 (Bordighera, Liguria), a rare case that nevertheless could signal future expansions of ‘official’ Mafia recognition in the future.
4. Econometric evidence

We summarise the main outcomes regarding recycling (namely separately collected waste allocated to recycling and recovery options) and landfill diversion (legally non recyclable waste disposal). We refer to tables 3 and 4. Though analyzing a rich array of determinants ranging from economic, structural and policy variables, we focus attention to the effects exerted by the diffusion of the new tariff instruments (aimed at full cost recovery, including elements of ‘pricing’ to affect environmental behavior), and by the diffusion of crime (with various assumptions on its geographical spillover). Outcomes relate to fixed effect regressions, that help capture the important idiosyncratic elements and cope with endogeneity, and instrumental variables (IV) regressions (Allers and Hoeben, 2010). We mainly compare the relative fitness of fixed effect and IV, by highlighting eventual changes in economic and statistical significances. We fruitfully exploit a ‘social capital’ indicator that is often used in regional studies; the share of electoral turnover. This is correlated with actions of local commitments to public good provisions (eg; policy actions), but not directly linked to waste performances. Provincial heterogeneity is striking in Italy. Even in the June 2011 national referendum, where citizens voted for/against public good environmental issues (water utility privatization, nuclear power), the turnover averaged 54%, with peaks in some northern regions of 65%, and low shares in some southern regions of around 50%, with even lower shares in rural areas with respect to some urban areas where the voters peaked at 70%.

4.1 Recycling

Consistently with previous analyses on waste generation (Mazzanti et al., 2008) income is non-linearly related to waste performances. The bell shape highlights that separated collection follows the waste generation dynamics and not an exponential one: income drives recycling, but exerts diminishing effects in the end. This evidence also connects to the increasing marginal cost of recycling options (Pearce and Brisson,
1995). The turning point is estimated at reasonably high levels (around 24-25,000€ per capita of provincial value added), but still within the upper range of observed values. More interestingly, the opportunity costs related to incineration and landfilling, and economies of scale, appear to drive recycling performances up in a very consistent and robust way. Recycling rates are enhanced by a denser population, an evidence that confirms recent estimates for the UK (Abbott et al., 2011). Similar considerations are valid when the specification of additional covariate is included (TOURIST), which captures scale effects of waste generation and opportunity costs of eventual disposal without recovery. It is good news that on average the Italian performance seems placed on the right track, besides specific hot spots that could be scrutinized by regional or case study analysis (e.g. the well known case of Naples and Campania region, where high population density, but probably low economic opportunity costs of the land, has not brought about options other than landfilling and incineration).

Moving to the primary focus of the analysis, we also note that how both variables capture the diffusion of ‘cost recovery / market based incentives’ oriented tariffs, by positively affecting separated collection. The economic size is somewhat marginal, but definitely significant. These results could signify that an intensification of the ‘market based’ properties of the tariff would be beneficial. It remains that this tariff is a strong sign of local commitment to addressing waste by means of new and restyled tools. This is what the theoretical model was predicting: higher tariffs enhance recycling performances.

Opposite to this commitment, we analyze the effect of ‘crime related effects’ on the waste performances of provinces. Also consistent with the theoretical prescriptions, where crime is higher and consequently enforcement costs are higher, recycling performances tend to be lower. The dual crime related proxies that we constructed are both significant, and show relevant economic and statistical robustness. The ‘narrower’ crime effect (columns 1-2 table 4) captured by CRIMEnarr is nevertheless less prominent. It statistically vanishes as long as TOURIST enters the regression. The ‘wide’ crime factor (in terms of geographical assumed spillover), is

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18 The correlation between crime covariates and tariff diffusion is negative and quite significant, but under 0.25 value. Multicollinearity is not an issue.
19 We recall that such crime dummies are time variant and assume a lag between the ‘event’ (crime is recognized) and the cause (crime presence). We assume that crime exerts its effects for the 3 years before the presence of crime is formally revealed by the State through judiciary system.
instead very significant across specifications from both a statistical and an economic point of view (columns 3-4). This is truly reasonable, considering that separated waste and collection activities for recycling and recovery are often characterised by strong links in the management procedures between local authorities and waste utilities in the form of associations, consortiums of public-public or mixed public-private nature. The bad news is that waste performances are affected by what occurs in contiguous provinces. The spatial spillovers that characterise crime and specific Mafia networks, negatively affect the waste recycling performance, which in itself depends on the good management of the waste 'filiere' from vertical (waste hierarchy) and horizontal (waste chains, actors and sectors managing waste) integrated perspectives. This is an expected but very gloomy aspect of crime spatial effects. Crime networks spill over specific administrative and geographical jurisdictions.

Moreover, following Greene (2000), we run a modified Wald statistic test for groupwise heteroskedasticity for all the specifications presented. In this way we can test the hypothesis of homoscedasticity, specific to each cross-sectional unit, i.e. 
\[ \sigma_i^2 = \sigma, \text{ for } i = 1, N_g, \]
where \( N_g \) is the number of cross-sectional units. Considering that the test reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity (column 3 and 4 in the table below present heteroskedasticity corrected estimation results), which completely confirms previous empirical evidence (except for the case of population density, which at this present time shows a lower level of significance).

On the other side, specification 5 provides another robustness check, that deals in this case with the potential presence of endogeneity, which may arise in context, like the present one in which the policy variable (TARPOP and/or TARMUN) may depend on recycling (i.e. the dependent variable). In such cases, the eventual presence of simultaneity may cause biased regression results. In this case simultaneity may arise due to the nature of the policy effort: on one hand, regulations may be an important explanatory variable of waste management performances, yet on the other, it is reasonable to assume that provinces with the worst waste management performances, may have implemented more stringent policy measure in the analysed period, in order to fill the gap with respect to the more virtuous one. On the contrary it is also plausible to think that the differences among provinces are structural, where more advanced provinces (in term of waste management performances) are the only ones that are
actually regulating the sector, by widening the differences among efficient and inefficient provinces, both in terms of environmental and policy performances. From an econometric perspective, both these aspects may cause simultaneity bias, which can be addressed through an instrumental variable estimator\(^\text{20}\). For this reason, in column 5 we adopt an instrumental variable approach, instrumenting the policy variable\(^\text{21}\) with the provincial share of Electoral participation (SOC-CAP), considered as a proxy of local social capital (first step IV estimates are available upon request).

Following the literature on Social Capital and regulations (Among others, Ng and Wang, 1993; Hettige et al. 1996), and social capital and development, with an historical emphasis on Italy as case study (Guiso et al., 2006; Putnam, 2001, 1993 [chapter six]; Tabellini, 2010), we do believe that social capital-cultural indicators may be a valid instrument (expected to be correlated with the policy effort and exogenous to the main relationship). The empirical literature that has tried to study Social capital and ‘cultural’ factors has attempted to explain how economic development is driven by cultural issues that are not immeasurable concepts and possess economic contents.

The regression results for the instrumental variables estimations\(^\text{22}\) are reported in column 5. They generally confirm previous results. Nevertheless, the various tests on the instruments used, reported in Table 3 casts doubt on the validity of IV in this case. In particular, if on the one hand we conducted an Under-identification LM test (Hall et al., 1996) that rejects the null hypothesis of under-identification (identification means that the excluded instruments are relevant; correlated with the endogenous regressors), on the other hand a newer Weak identification test (to test whether instruments are only weakly correlated to endogenous regressors, see Stock and Yogo, 2005, who present weak instruments threshold values for their statistics, actually F tests referring to the first stage regression\(^\text{23}\)), it does not reject the null hypothesis that instruments are weak. Additionally, the Sargan-Hansen test (under the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid instruments, and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation), rejects the null hypothesis of instrument validity. Overall, the set of

\(^{20}\) For this reason, recent studies have started to analyse the drivers of environmental regulation (Cole et al., 2006; Alpay et al., 2006).

\(^{21}\) In Table 3 we report only the regression results with TARPOP as instrumented policy variable for brevity.

\(^{22}\) Employment levels were also used but yielded poorer results.

\(^{23}\) All first stage regressions are available upon request.
tests does not strongly support the value of IV estimates beyond what fixed effects can tell. Moreover, we also conducted a Davidson and Mackinnon (1993) test of Exogeneity that does not reject the null hypothesis and seems to suggest that in this case, an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator would yield consistent estimates\textsuperscript{24}. This suggests that fixed effect estimates would be able to quite likely address the endogeneity issues\textsuperscript{25}, through the ‘capture’ of idiosyncratic provincial individual effects.

Table 4 here

\subsection*{4.2 Legal Landfilling}

As already found in previous works on Italian economic value per se (value added), it is not a significant driver of landfill diversion\textsuperscript{26}. Table 5 shows relevant regressions taking as dependent variable ‘waste landfilled per capita’. Already confirming previous evidence at various national and EU scales, but still very relevant, population density is a striking force behind reduction of waste going to landfill. Economic and health related opportunity costs again explain this evidence, which is here affirming that a 1% increase in population density through urbanization leads to a 3% increase in landfill diversion. Again, this is valid on average with Naples as the most famous possible outlier as far as this relationship is concerned. The effect of density is strengthened by the economic and statistical significance effect of TOURIST. In conclusion, where opportunity costs and potential economies of scale are driven by density of populations, and inflows of tourists are higher, separated collection is higher and landfilled waste is lower. This certainly is the primary pre-condition for recycling and recovery options. The effect of tariffs is negative, as expected, and the waste driving forces related to crime sends a very robust messages. Though only in the case of CRIME\textsubscript{Narr} (crime activities revealed within provincial boundaries, not affected by extra province crime spillovers), the likelihood that the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item The same is obtained by the Hausman test.
\item We conclude by noting that specifications that use as dependent variable the separated collection for specific materials (organic waste, glass, and plastic, not shown here) confirm the above results. The wider crime effects dominate from economic and statistical points of view. For glass only, an easy recyclable material, even the narrower crime factor is significant at 1%. Results are not shown for brevity.
\item For this reason LVA and LVA2 coefficients are not included in Table 4.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
structural presence of Mafia networks increases landfill diversion is strong (columns 3 to 5). The significance of the ‘narrow’ spillover effect is reasonable given that landfill management, differently from recovery and recycling activities, is more circumscribed in defined territories, often within a municipality area. Networking issues arise when a landfill is exhausted and waste must be shifted in other areas (as it is occurring now in Naples), but the ‘management’ of the landfill is strictly local. This is not good news in the end. As the theoretical model prescribes, it is also true that crime related activities increase illegal disposal. In the absence of official and valid data on illegal waste disposal, this is an un-testable hypothesis on a direct way. However, we can affirm that crime activities specifically located in the province reduce both separated collection and legal forms of landfilling. The latter evidence might be a positive piece of information, but in the face of increasing waste generation, and the absence of incinerators in the areas mostly affect by Mafia, we end up with the theoretically postulated positive relationship between higher enforcement costs, crime activities on one hand and higher illegal disposal on the other. As in the recycling case, the main regression results are influenced by the presence of Heteroskedasticity. For this reason, Columns 3 and 4, present regression results obtained with a robust estimator. Moreover, also in this case the policy variable can be simultaneous to the dependent variable; it is plausible to think that policy effort is more stringent where waste management is more complicated. It might be for example, that provinces with higher share of waste to landfill may have imposed in the last ten years more stringent waste regulations, in order to fill the gap with more efficient provinces. For this reason, in column 5 we instrumented the management/ policy variable with both the social capital measure and with value added terms. Also in this case IV results largely confirm fixed effect results (we present IV results only for one tariff variable, given substantial similarity), but in this case instruments perform much better than in the previous case, and again confirm a downward bias of the fixed effect estimates. The identification tests reported in the table below in fact do not cast any doubt about instrument validity. The Stock and Yogo and Sargan tests

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27 We highlight that the presence of crime positively correlates with southern provinces, and negatively correlates to the presence of incinerators. Population density is not correlated with crime at all.

28 In this case, following test results, we only corrected for heteroskedasticity and not for intra-group correlation like in the separate collection case.
perform differently from above. Nevertheless, also in this case, Davidson and MacKinnon’s tests do not reject the null hypothesis, which states that an OLS estimator would produce consistent estimates\(^{29}\), confirming also in this case as the endogeneity correction, due to the inclusion of individual fixed effect in the regression framework, seems somewhat sufficient to account for the presence of endogeneity. This robust result suggests that if waste performances are somewhat a determinant of waste regulation in the province, this relationship is time invariant and probably due to some other slowly changing and institutional aspect that characterized Italian provinces. This is why fixed effects could cope well with this latent fact.

This eventuality confirms the second hypothesis we presented in paragraph 4.1, about the eventual presence of simultaneity. That is, simultaneity, if eventually an issue, may be driven by structural differences that we may observe across provinces. A consequential more stringent and pervasive regulatory effort in more advanced provinces is then reflected in a downward bias in non IV estimations in the table below. Our IV estimates consistently present higher sizes of the coefficient for the instrumented variable, suggesting a downward bias of the fixed effect estimates (similar to what Schivardi and Viviano (2011), found in a provincial based analysis on Italy where they instrument a policy lever by using the share of centre right voters\(^{30}\)).

Table 5 here

5. Conclusions

We theoretically and empirically analyzed how waste management and disposal performances are influenced by economic, policy and crime related factors that constitute the ‘institutional composite setting’. The analysis of such a multi-factor setting is relevant for the assessment and understanding of waste management and disposal performances, especially in highly de-centralized settings, where many idiosyncratic factors of local interest exert their influence. In addition to structural

\(^{29}\) Also the Hausman test, not shown for brevity, confirms this result.

\(^{30}\) We note that though interesting, we believe the share of centre-right or centre-left is not sound in our case. Waste performances are good or bad quite independently on the colour of political coalitions. This is true as anecdotes in Campania (Naples and Salerno, both centre left ruled, with different performances) and in the North as well, where both centre right and centre left governed regions lead Italian waste performances. Other features are more relevant. Moreover the green party is not as relevant as in other countries, usually achieving 2-3% shares of votes.
idiosyncratic factors, such as density or tourism, the transition towards market based instruments for tackling waste is an important aspect. The hot issue is the heterogeneous implementation of such management and policy tools over time and across regions. On such premises, there are two factors of relevance we studied, with reference to the Italian case study: the evolution of waste tariffs into cost recovery and market based instruments, and the occurrence of crime activities that exploit illegal / non market rents. Given its high regional heterogeneity and known plague of the Mafia, Italy is a compelling case study for this analysis. Italy has also experienced a slow transition towards a system of cost recovery and market based tariffs.

The analysis of the extent to which crime (mafia) influences waste performances at local level, is a further unexplored issue in the economics of waste literature that we primarily address, notwithstanding its hot current relevancy in countries such as Italy and possible extensions of the waste-crime issue to other settings in developed and developing countries. We analyse crime effects in a theoretical model, assuming that enforcement costs are positively related to crime. We show that both recycling and legal disposal (landfiling) is reduced by an increase in enforcement costs. Thus, the presence of criminal organizations brings about larger illegal dumping. When cost recovery tax/tariffs are taken as exogenous, their influence is positive on the level of recycling and negative on legal disposal.

We consequentially empirically test the hypothesis that crime activities linked to mafia businesses, that are polluting local public actions in an area, and their potential geographical spillovers, may negatively affect legal forms of waste management and disposal. This would represent at the end of a day a support of illegal forms (or mixed forms of ‘formally legal’ disposal with criminal management) of disposal from which rents generate.

In full consistence to the theoretical model, legal disposal and recyclable waste levels are significantly influenced by waste tariff (pushing them up) and crime (pushing them down). Economic and statistical significance is robust across models and control specifications. We specifically show that separated collection and legal forms of waste disposal are lower when crime exerts its effects. Given the increasing waste generation and the absence of incineration in zones where Mafia is more locally diffused, it is also indirectly demonstrated that crime activities and slow implementation of market based
instruments, positively relates to higher levels of illegal disposal in landfills. Thus, crime activities erode and slow down the enhancement of waste management and disposal brought about by socio economic, structural factors and by the introduction of newly crafted economic minded tariffs. Estimates also show that for separated collection, the negative effect of crime mainly comes from outside the province, thus highlighting significant spatial phenomena and negative spill over of crime that are imported. This is reasonable given the strong networking nature of crime activities and the possibility that they spoil ‘waste infrastructure’ and filiere that are also necessarily characterized by horizontal and vertical types of production chains and by local networking between contiguous provinces. Further research could focus on the extent to which provinces cluster with respect to the variables we used; north-south clusters may emerge. Spatial and clustering techniques may highlight that the issue is not just a north-south breakdown.
References


ETC/SCP (2011), Overview of the use of landfill taxes in Europe, working paper, ETC/SCP Copenhagen.


De Jaeger S. Eyckmans J. (2008), Assessing the effectiveness of solid waste reductions policies: methodology and a Flemish case study, Waste Management, 28, 8, 1449-1460


ETC / SCP (2011), Overview of the use of landfill taxes in Europe, working paper ETC/SCP Copenhagen.


- (2001), Bowling Alone, Simon and Schuster.


Table 1: testable implications for the effect of crime and unit tax on legal disposal – cost substitutability case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \Theta )</td>
<td>any ( F_t )</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( t )</td>
<td>low ( F_t ) (close to 0)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>intermediate ( F_t )</td>
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<td></td>
<td>high ( F_t ) (close to 1)</td>
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Table 2: testable implications for the effect of crime and unit tax on legal disposal – cost complementarity case

<table>
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<td>( t )</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( 0 &lt; F_t &lt; 1 )</td>
<td>- / +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( F_t &gt; 1 )</td>
<td>- / +</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 3: Descriptive statistics (by province) and acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Variable Description</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RECYCLING</td>
<td>Municipal Solid Waste yearly recycled (kg per capita)</td>
<td>115.563</td>
<td>0.0982</td>
<td>378.348</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAND-WASTE</td>
<td>Municipal Solid Waste yearly Landfilled (kg per capita)</td>
<td>318.488</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1898.466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA</td>
<td>Provincial yearly value added per capita (base: Euro 2000)</td>
<td>18267.360</td>
<td>9386.468</td>
<td>30889.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENS</td>
<td>Population/surface (inhabitants/km²)</td>
<td>246.853</td>
<td>31.167</td>
<td>2646.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOURIST</td>
<td>Annual tourist attendances (per capita)</td>
<td>7.225</td>
<td>0.394</td>
<td>58.832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TARPOP</td>
<td>Share of population living in municipalities that introduce a waste tariff substituting the former waste tax (%)</td>
<td>13.500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TARMUN</td>
<td>Share of municipalities that introduce a waste tariff substituting the former waste tax (%)</td>
<td>7.814</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIME-narr</td>
<td>Presence of at least one municipality guilty of mafia connection inside the province.</td>
<td>0.0786</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIME-spill</td>
<td>Presence of at least one municipality guilty of mafia connection inside the province, or in a nearby province.</td>
<td>0.1941</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOC-CAP</td>
<td>Electoral turnover Share (At provincial Level, %)</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Figure 1 – Waste trends in Italy, 1999-2008.
Figure 2 – Provincial Landfilled waste per capita (kg, 2008).

Figure 3 – Provincial separated collection per capita (kg, 2008)
Figure 4 – Diffusion of new tariff scheme, share of population (2008).

Figure 5 – Mafia diffusion (CRIME NARROW, in 2003).
Figure 6 – Mafia diffusion (CRIME SPILL OVER, in 2003).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3§</th>
<th>4§</th>
<th>5^</th>
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<td>LVA</td>
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<td>194***</td>
<td>189***</td>
<td>184***</td>
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<tr>
<td>DENS</td>
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<td>3.304***</td>
<td>2.468</td>
<td>3.359*</td>
<td>1.04</td>
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<td>TOURIST</td>
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<td>1.062***</td>
<td>1.036***</td>
<td>1.051***</td>
<td>0.99***</td>
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<td>0.006***</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.005***</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.004**</td>
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<td>TARMUN</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CRIME narr</td>
<td>-0.093</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRIME spill</td>
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<td>-0.288***</td>
<td>-0.285***</td>
<td>-0.265***</td>
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<tr>
<td>IV tests°</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under</td>
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<td>Identification</td>
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<tr>
<td>identification</td>
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<tr>
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<td>MacKinnon</td>
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<td>1030</td>
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</table>

Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; R2 and F statistics (not shown) present very good fit. § Corrected for heteroskedasticity. ^ IV-estimations results. ° Besides the Stock and Yogo test that shows the test value, we present p-values in cells.

¹ The 10% critical value is 16.38.
Table 5 – Legal disposal of waste

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3§</th>
<th>4§</th>
<th>5^</th>
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<tr>
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<td>-2.86***</td>
<td>-2.73***</td>
<td>-3.07***</td>
<td>-2.91***</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOURIST</td>
<td>-0.746***</td>
<td>-0.731***</td>
<td>-0.079***</td>
<td>-0.077***</td>
<td>-0.667***</td>
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<tr>
<td>TARPOP</td>
<td>-0.003**</td>
<td>-0.002**</td>
<td>-0.006***</td>
<td>-0.006***</td>
<td>-0.011**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TARMUN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.006***</td>
<td>-0.006***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIME:narr</td>
<td>-0.404**</td>
<td>-0.428**</td>
<td>-0.392***</td>
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<td>-0.08</td>
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</table>

IV tests°

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>Under</td>
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<td>MacKinnon</td>
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<td>N³</td>
<td>930</td>
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Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; R² and F statistics (not shown) present very good fit. §Corrected for heteroskedasticity. ^ IV-estimations results. ° Besides the Stock and Yogo test that shows the test value, we present p-values in cells.

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2 The 10% critical value according to Stock and Yogo tables is 18.

3 N is lower than 1030 due to 4 provinces that do not present landfills and other that closed down sites during the observed period. Two stage Heckman procedures were implemented to deal with zero values. Results show that population density and tourism are key factors behind the binary choice of having or not a landfill. The inverse Mills ratio is nevertheless not significant even taking a 10% level. We therefore rely on log-log estimates that exploit the reduced dataset. Heckman estimations are available upon request.