NEED EQUALIZATION TRANSFERS AND PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS*

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Abstract

The paper deals with Need equalization formula for intergovernmental grants, and analyses, by a simple model, the impact of parameters changes on productive efficiency of a local government. By this kind of efficiency we mean producing and providing, at minimum cost and at high quality, a output level of a public service at least equal to a standard, fixed by the central government for pursuing horizontal equity among jurisdictions. In some German Landers the municipal transfers system is broadly inspired by such a criterion, and the recent reform of Italian equalization grants system moves in this direction.

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1 Introduction

In many federal countries central government transfers resources to local jurisdictions in order to alleviate the imbalance between expenditures needs and revenues. The aim is to ensure to every citizen the access to reasonably comparable levels of public services within a chosen locality, at a cost in line with what would be paid elsewhere. Therefore, equalization transfers promote horizontal equity by permitting fiscal treatment of identical persons in a federation and by enabling jurisdictions to provide minimum standards of essential packages of public services. Specific notions of equalization are disciplined by many Constitutional acts, as, for instance, in Canada, Australia, Germany (Shah 1996) and recently also in Italy, according to Constitutional act n. 3/2001 and the successive applying bill n. 42/2009.

Around the world, in industrialized countries and in less developed countries as well, we may find many applications of Fiscal capacity equalization and of Need equalization. The former, on the basis of the so-called Representative Tax System (RTS), tends to equalize the difference between standard revenue and the effective local one (at standardized tax rates), while, the latter tends to cover the difference between a standardized local need expenditure, measured on the basis of the so-called Representative Expenditure System (RES), and some benchmark (Dafflon and Mischler 2008, Shah 2010). Combinations of RTS and RES are often also applied. The quoted bill n.42/2009 in Italy disciplines the two criteria according to the typologies of public functions carried on by regions and municipalities. The Need equalization criterion is applied for some essential regional expenditure items, like health care, social assistance, education and public transit (more or less 80% of total expenditure), while Fiscal capacity equalization criterion is applied for the remaining items. Something similar applies for transfers to municipalities.

Equalization systems, as said, are specifically devoted to guarantee horizontal equity but they have also efficiency implications. In this respect economic literature has developed two specific issues. On one hand, it has analyzed the consequences of migration and factor mobility, due to equalization, on productivity of the local firms (Boadway 2006). On the other hand, the economic literature has deeply discussed the efficiency consequences of equalization in terms of the level of tax rates and public expenditure, taking also into account tax competition phenomena. This second body of literature starts from Smart (1998), going ahead, until, at last, Kenders and Koethenbuergcher (2010), who provide a theoretical integrated analysis including most of the results of previous literature, and Kotsogiannis (2010),
who provides an analysis of both vertical and horizontal tax competition with revenue equalization. The main results of this literature suggest that fiscal equalization induces higher tax rates than the efficient ones and public services overprovision\(^1\). However, when there is tax competition, equalization tax distortion may restrain the undesirable “race to the bottom” and then increase overall fiscal efficiency.

In this paper we deal with the efficiency implications of Need equalization by a different perspective, as we look at the consequences of such transfers on productive efficiency in local public services provision. For “local government productive efficiency” in this context we mean that, given the level of a public service output, defined by a minimum standard fixed by the central government, a local government should provide at least this amount, at the maximum level of quality and at the minimum cost.

In order to examine this matter, we build up a simple model where the flow of federal transfers to local governments is given by a revenue sharing of a federal tax and a need equalization grant. The latter is specified along a well known RES rule, now applied in Italy in similarity to those actually applied in other federal countries. According to this, the grant is linked to the gap between a need standardized expenditure index and a standardized local tax revenue index. Further, we assume that local politicians have some preference on cost-inefficiency, as they can acquire political consensus with perks and wasteful expenditures, so they are conflicting with users of public services who want high quality services and low local taxes. As well known, conflicts of this sort originate a specific Principle-Agent relationship (Besley 2007), whose final outcome is conditioned by local politicians accountability. Thus the chance of exploiting cost-inefficiency may depend on the impact of equalization on accountability. In this respect, Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2008) have shown that, with equalized fiscal resources, citizens attach more importance to any remaining variation in public services supply, in terms of quantity as well quality, thus they can more easily punish the rent-taking and incompetent politicians. However, the complexity and the lack of transparency, in defining the exact measure of “potential fiscal capacity and need” to be equalized, may introduce a perverse fiscal incentive that reduces accountability and then efficiency\(^2\). Indeed, yardstick competition

\(^1\)This has also consequences on the extent of the so called flypaper effect (Dahlby 2011).
\(^2\)The link between trasparency of fiscal equalization and efficiency has been recently explored by Duran-Vigneron (2012) by a general model, also admitting mobility of firms and households. He shows how the manipulation of fiscal instruments creates externalities not taken into account in equilibrium. Moreover, because of heterogeneity which enter its objective function, a regional governments may not have the right incentives to behave
effects are limited and monitoring activities by central governments are not easily implementable.

The main results of the paper are the following ones. An increase of the revenue sharing rate tends to reduce the quality of the public service, while it tends to induce the politicians and the public officials to contain production costs. On the contrary, an increase of the rate of the equalization and of the standard tax rate have opposite effects. An increase of the minimum standard of the public service provision has a beneficial effect on cost-efficiency, while the impact on quality is not determined, depending on the structure of technology and costs. However, we find that, if quality and quantity are substitute both in preference and costs, then the local government reduces the quality. Finally, it is confirmed, also in this setting, that organizing the equalization system with adequate transparency and simplicity can improve, through a higher accountability, cost-efficiency.

We have also shown that by this funding mechanism the inefficiencies, in terms of low quality and high costs, can be, in some cases, paid by the need equalization grant and revenue sharing, and then create perverse and contradictory effects on regional financial responsibility.

The paper runs as follows. Section 2 shows the stylized model we are going to elaborate. Section 3 analyses of the impact of need equalization on regional financial responsibility and quality and cost-efficiency levels. Moreover, it contains an analysis of the trade-offs the central government has to manage. Section 4 concludes.

2 The set-up model

We consider a federation with a pre-committed central government and several local governments, not fiscally interconnected each other (Koethenbuergher 2008). Hence we may simply model a local government that, facing a representative consumer-tax payer, provides a local public service, considered as a essential (merit) good by the national legislation. It finances the production costs of quantity $q$ and quality $m$, the latter measured by a real number in a closed interval, with a surtax at rate $t$ on a tax base $B$, which is also taxed, at rate $\tau$, by the central government. More precisely $B$ is the part of a central government tax base located within the jurisdiction. There are no own local taxes but this restriction is only for simplifying the analysis. Indeed, we could consider also a local commodity tax but, if its base
would be inserted in the equalization mechanism, the effect of the latter on productive efficiency should have the same qualitative sign.

The central government remains on the shadow, in the sense it has already chosen own tax rate and fiscal arrangements of the equalization transfers, which are then exogenously given. We want, as said, to ascertain the local government response to changes of these fiscal parameters, in terms of productive efficiency of public services provision. However, we also analyze in subsection 3.4 the main trade-offs the central government is going to face when changing the parameters.

2.1 Consumer preferences

These are represented by the following separable function

\[ V = v(t + \tau, I) + \varphi(q, m). \]  

\( v(t + \tau, I) \) is an indirect sub-utility function of aggregate tax rate and initial endowment of resources (un-taxable income). By duality, this derives by maximizing a quasi-concave direct utility function which depends on a untaxed commodity, the numeraire, and a taxed one, whose value at producer price turns out to be the tax base, \( B \). From now on, \( B \) is disposable labour income and then the untaxed commodity is leisure. Accordingly, by Roy identity\(^3\), 

\[ v_{t+\tau} = -v_I B < 0. \]

Moreover, from consumer equilibrium, it can be derived the consumer reaction function to fiscal choices, 

\[ B(t + \tau), B_{t+\tau} < 0, \text{ i.e. a declining supply of labour w.r.t the tax rate.} \]

\( \varphi(q, m) \) is a quasi-concave sub-utility function of quantity and quality of the public service, with \( \varphi_q > 0, \varphi_{qq} < 0; \varphi_m > 0, \varphi_{mm} < 0 \). Quantity and quality can be complements (\( \varphi_{mq} > 0 \)) as well substitutes (\( \varphi_{mq} < 0 \)); thus the marginal willingness to pay for quality can increase or decrease with the consumption of the service, according to the type\(^4\). With \( \zeta_{mq} \equiv \varphi_{mq} \frac{\varphi_m}{\varphi_q} \geq 0 \) we denote the demand-elasticity of substitution between quality and quantity.

2.2 Local government revenues

The local government obtains funds from three sources. First, the local taxation, \( tB \). Secondly, a revenue sharing over the federal tax yield, \( \alpha \tau B \), where \( 0 < \alpha < 1 \) is the fraction decided by federal government. In this case

\(^3\)With \( X_y \) we mean, as usual, \( \partial X / \partial y \).

\(^4\)As far as health services are concerned, we may find treatments where a high quality of care can favour as well discourage an increase of quantity demanded (e.g. length of stay in hospital)
the revenue sharing goes from central to local governments, like for regional TVA and income tax in Italy, but it can run also in the opposite direction, for yield acquired at locale level, like for business tax in Germany. In the latter case, the local jurisdiction yields $tB$ and transfers $\alpha tB$ to the central government so the model must be accordingly changed (Kenders and Koethenbuergher 2010). Thirdly, the local government gets funds from an equalization grant, if entitled. Indeed, we consider a gross, vertical, equalization process, by which only “poor” regions receive a grant, and the total of grants are funded by federal taxation. Consequently the transfer is given by

$$G = \max[\beta(N - t^sB), 0].$$

(2)

$0 < \beta \leq 1$ is the equalization rate, $N$ the need lump sum component of the grant, to be explained in the successive sub-section, and $t^s$ is the standardized surtax rate, a fiscal policy arrangement.

RES rule (2) is now applied in Italy, for the funding of regional expenditures on health care, social assistance and education, with this specificity:

$$\beta = 1, t^s = t_0 + \alpha \tau = \frac{N}{B_{\text{max}}}. $$

In other words, for only one region, the richest one ($B = \text{Max}B$), $G = 0$ as the revenue sharing rate is established for exactly allowing its budget equilibrium, without any grant: $\alpha = \frac{N-t_0B_{\text{max}}}{\tau B_{\text{max}}}$. All other regions receive a grant exactly equal to the difference between the need term $N$, a standardized public expenditure as we’ll see later on, and the revenues from local taxation, obtained applying a basic uniform surtax rate, $t_0$, and revenue sharing\footnote{Actually, the revenue sharing is on TVA, but in this stylized model we may refer in simpler way to income tax as well.}: $G = N - t_0B - \alpha \tau B$. It is clear that $t_0$ and $\alpha$ are equivalent tax instruments and they are both exogenous for local government: the first one is fixed by the central government and the second one is obtained as solution of the budget equation of richest region. Hence, actually, only $t_0$ is the policy variable.

Rule (2) is also applied for financing public services provided by municipalities within Landers in Germany (Otter, 2008, Egger et al. 2010). In the case of RTS rule, as for the provinces in Canada and as for the remaining regional expenditures in Italy, the lump sum component in (2) is given by $N = t^sB^*$, where $B^*$ is the standardized (average) tax base (Smart 2007,
Kotsogiannis 2010). Thus

\[ G = \max[\beta t^s(B^s - B), 0]. \]  

(3)

Notice that, in both RES and RTS, \( G \), as in (2) and in (3), is a matching grant, linearly and negatively related to local tax base, and we’ll see that this is what mainly matters as far as the incentive to efficiency is concerned.

Summing up we get the following revenues function for a “poor” region:

\[ R = \beta N + \hat{t}B \]  

(4)

where \( \hat{t} = t + \alpha \tau - \beta t^s \) is the “effective local tax rate”, i.e. the perceived local rate to which the fiscal distortion at local level is linked (Grazzini and Petretto 2006). In the Italian case, it would be \( \hat{t} = t - t_0 \), and (4) simply \( R = N + (t - t_0)B \), while in the case of revenue sharing from local to central government, as in Germany, it would be \( \hat{t} = (1 - \alpha)t - \beta t^s \). For both special cases the following analysis should be easily adapted.

2.3 Needs and costs

We adopt the RES interpretation according to which the “Needs” are measured by the product of a standardized unitary cost \( c^s \) with a minimum (essential) standard of output provision, \( q_E \)

\[ N = c^s q_E \]  

(5)

Index \( q_E \) can be thought as a synthetic representation of the wide and articulated notion of Essential levels of health care, explicitly mentioned by Italian legislation for NHS funding. The parameter \( c^s \) is specific to the considered jurisdiction, and it may be estimated or computed by one of the several RES techniques, e.g. the regression analysis (Dafflon and Mischler 2008).

As far as the production costs of the jurisdiction are concerned, we assume this factorized, quasi-linear, function:

\[ C(q, m, e; A) = c(q, m; A)e^{eq} \]  

(6)

\( A \) is a vector of demographic and environmental variables influencing production costs. \( e \geq 1 \) is a variable of cost-inefficiency, an index measuring the impact of perks and wasteful expenditures made by the local politicians.

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\(^6\)In many cases, the system is net (horizontal), i.e. where \( G = \beta t^s (B^s - B) \geq 0 \). Hence, rich regions support the poor ones with a negative subsidy.
and bureaucrats seeking for political consensus and power. Therefore, it is also an index of the incumbent politicians ability or competence in that jurisdiction.

The shape of the cost function is given by the following set of expressions

\[
\begin{align*}
C_q &= [c_q q + c(q, m; A)] e > 0, \quad C_m = c_m e q > 0, \quad C_e = c(q, m; A) q > 0 \\
C_{qq} &= [c_{qq} q + 2c_q] e \gtrless 0, \quad C_{mm} = c_{mm} e q > 0, \quad C_{ee} = 0 \\
C_{eq} &= C_q / e > 0 \\
C_{mq} &= (c_{mq} q + c_m) e \gtrless 0 \iff \xi_{mq} + 1 \gtrless 0, \quad \xi_{mq} = \frac{c_{mq} q}{c_m}
\end{align*}
\]

The marginal costs of quantity, quality and inefficiency index are positive, as all employ scarce resources. The first one may be increasing as well decreasing with quantity as neither \( c_q \) or \( c_{qq} \) are signed. The second one is increasing with quality as we may reasonably assume \( c_{mm} > 0 \). The third one is constant with respect to inefficiency index. The positive sign of \( C_{eq} \) implies that, given (6), quantity and inefficiency are cost-substitutes, which seems conceivable. \( C_{mq} \) is not instead signed, depending on the sign of \( c_{mq} \). If \( \xi_{mq} \) is higher (lower) than \(-1\), quality and quantity are cost-substitutes (complements). In the latter case, the technology exhibits \textit{economies of scope} in producing output with high quality. Actually an innovation increasing the standard of quality may save as well require more resources for producing the service (e.g. physicians hours of labor in a hospital department).

Given (6), we may interpret the standardized unitary cost \( c^* \) in this way. Let us assume that central government knows the local cost function \( C(\cdot) \), but does not observe the quality locally realized, being able only to estimate the mean value \( \overline{m} \) from a probability distribution of quality indexes \( \mathcal{F}(m) \). Environmental features \( A \) are observed and employed in econometric analyses for estimating the standardized cost. The variable effort \( e \) is not observed and then not acknowledged in the “contract” defined by the equalization rule. Therefore, the standard unitary cost may be as follows:

\[
c^* = c(q, \overline{m}; A)
\]  

which might be lower or higher than the effective unitary cost \( c(q, m; A) e \), depending on the level of output (returns to scale), the actually realized level of quality and the inefficiency index. However, the former is the most likely (normal) case.
2.4 Local politicians preferences

We suppose they have, as pay-off function, the sum of utility function of the representative consumer (1) and the following benefit function of extra-costs for perks and wasteful expenditures:

\[ a\psi(e), \psi' > 0, \psi'' < 0. \] (8)

where \( \psi(e) \) reflects the preference for cost-inefficiency and \( a \geq 0 \) shows the degree of non-benevolence or rent-taking by local politicians. If \( a = 0 \), they are perfectly benevolent as rightly accountable. If \( a > 0 \) they are in some extent rent-takers.

As underlined by Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2008), accountability depends on institutional rules, in particular on the transparency and simplicity of the techniques applied for assessing the Need index and implementing the chosen equalization. If local politicians can hide the exact mechanism of equalization to voters, can limit or avoid the control over their rent-taking activities. This is easier if, for instance, the technique of estimating the Need index is controversial and even too complicate to be understood in the political debate. In these cases, local politicians may shroud on the fog the rent they get by reporting there is a lack of funds due to the formula which is, in their opinion, specifically damaging the region. Another example of a lack of transparency, favoring the opportunistic behavior of politicians, comes from an unclear definition of tax base to which the equalization applies. If, for instance, the tax base is the reported income instead of the earned one, the local politicians may be induced to do not contrast sheltering procedures (tax avoidance and evasion) carried on by taxpayers (Grazzini and Petretto 2011).

Any institutional reforms able to remove or limit such lack of transparency may, reducing \( a \), improve the efficiency of a local governments in looking for high quality and low costs. More generally, all political reforms improving politicians accountability, as electoral rules towards a more direct selection of majors and regional governors by voters have the same beneficial effect.

Let us now define with

\[ E(q_E, m, e) \doteq [c(q_E, m; A)e - c^e] q_E \] (9)

he discrepancy, positive or negative, between actual costs for producing the standard level and the Need index \( N \), which coincides with the estimated cost to implement the standard. Let, for instance, consider the case where
\( c_s = c(q_E, \overline{m}; A) < c(q_E, m; A)e. \) The extra cost, over the RES level, made by non-benevolent local politicians is represented by the area ABCD in Fig. 1\(^7\).

The local politicians choose their strategies knowing the federal government fiscal choices and the consumer reaction function, i.e. the shape of the tax base function. In the following section, we are going to ascertain, first, how the fiscal autonomy is used for financing extra-costs, and, second, how local politicians, once in equilibrium, would change their strategies on \( m \) and \( e \), in response to changes on fiscal arrangements \( \alpha, \beta, t_s \), on the minimum standard \( q_E \) and also on parameter \( a^8 \).

Figure 1 here

### 3 The impact of equalization on financial responsibility and service quality and cost efficiency

#### 3.1 Equilibrium

The equilibrium of local government is obtained by solving the following maximization process w.r.t \( q, m, t, \) and \( e \):

\[
\text{Max} \quad W = v(t + \tau, I) + \varphi(q, m) + \alpha\psi(e) \quad (10)
\]

s.t.

\[
\beta N + \hat{t}B = c(q, m; A)\text{eq} \quad (\lambda) \quad (11)
\]

\[
q \geq q_E \quad (\mu), \mu(q - q_E) = 0 \quad (12)
\]

The corresponding Lagrangian is the following function\(^9\):

\[
L = W + \lambda[\beta N + \hat{t}B - c(q, m; A)\text{eq}] + \mu(q - q_E) \quad (13)
\]

\(^7\)This overspending, not fundable ad infinitum by local taxation, can become the source for a debt increase due to soft budget constraint syndrome (Vigneault 2007, Weingast 2009, Breuillé and Vigneault 2010).

\(^8\)These changes have, of course, also effects on local tax ratee \( t \), but here we may disregard them as we are concentrating on productive efficiency.

\(^9\)Notice that for a rich region we may insert \( \beta = 0 \) in (11) and (13).
The multiplier $\lambda$ reflects, as usual, the marginal cost of taxation, while the multiplier $\mu$ reflects the benefit of the service as a merit good and also the cost of strengthening the binding minimum standard constraint. By applying the envelope theorem to the maximum function $W^*(\alpha, \beta, t^*, q_E, a)$, we get:

$$\frac{\partial W^*}{\partial \alpha} = \lambda \tau B > 0, \quad \frac{\partial W^*}{\partial \beta} = \lambda(N - t^*B) > 0, \quad \frac{\partial W^*}{\partial t^*} = -\lambda \beta B < 0,$$

$$\frac{\partial W^*}{\partial q_E} = \lambda \beta (c^s + \frac{\partial c_s}{\partial q_E} q_E) - \mu, \quad \frac{\partial W^*}{\partial a} = \psi(e) > 0.$$

Therefore, given the marginal cost of taxation, the maximum local government objective function is increasing with the revenue sharing rate and the equalization rate, and decreasing with the standard tax rate. The sign of the objective function change w.r.t. the minimum standard $q_E$ depends on the comparison between the benefit of alleviating the budget constraint with a higher grant $\lambda \beta \frac{\Delta N}{\Delta q_E}$, and the opportunity cost of allocating resources on production instead to other tasks (e.g. quality as well perks), $\mu$. Finally, of course, the local politicians pay-off function in equilibrium is increasing with the degree of rent-taking opportunity $a$.

Clearly, in the RES Italian case, only these effects are meaningful:

$$\frac{\partial W^*}{\partial t_0} = -\lambda B < 0, \quad \frac{\partial W^*}{\partial q_E} = \lambda (c^s + \frac{\partial c_s}{\partial q_E} q_E) - \mu, \quad \frac{\partial W^*}{\partial a} = \psi(e) > 0.$$

Now the objective function is decreasing with the uniform tax rate. Notice that, in this case, the politician is indifferent on the level of revenue sharing rate, as all changes of it are compensated by the need equalization grant.

The F.O.C.s of maximizing (10) are as follows:

$$(q^*) : (\varphi_q + \mu) - \lambda C_q = 0, \quad q^* = q_E$$

$$(m^*) : \varphi_m - \lambda C_m = 0$$

$$(t^*) : \lambda = v_I \eta(\alpha, \beta, t^*)$$

$^{10}$However, notice that economies of scale, $c_q < 0$, could even reduce the standardised cost and then the grant.
where

\[ \eta(\alpha, \beta, t^s) = \frac{1}{1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{(t^* + \tau)^2}} > 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (17)

is the Marginal Cost of Public Funds (MCF), positive as long as the sub-national government is always on the upward-sloping section of its Laffer curve, with \( \varepsilon = -B_{t + \tau} \frac{t + \tau}{B} > 0 \), the elasticity of tax base;

\[(e^*) : av'(e) - \lambda C_e = 0. \hspace{1cm} (18)\]

Let us now elaborate these conditions for discussing the main issues of this paper.

3.2 Overspending in equilibrium and the role of regional fiscal autonomy for financial responsibility

Taking into account \( (??) \), the expression

\[ E(q^* = q_E, m^*, e^*) \triangleq [c(q_E, m^*; A)e^* - c^*]q_E \]

is the overspending in equilibrium. Consequently, using (4), (5) and (11), we obtain as follows

\[ E(q_E, m^*, e^*) \triangleq (t^* + \alpha \tau - \beta t^s)B(t^* + \tau) - (1 - \beta)c^*q_E \]

Now, we may define \((t^* - t^s)\), the wedge between the chosen surtax rate and the standardized one, as the autonomous fiscal effort (AFE) of the region receiving the transfer. Consequently this is given by

\[ AFE \triangleq (t^* - t^s) = \frac{E(q_E, m^*, e^*)}{B(t^* + \tau)} - [(1 - \beta)t^s + \alpha \tau] + \frac{(1 - \beta)N}{B(t^* + \tau)} \hspace{1cm} (19)\]

which can be positive as well negative.

For regions where \( N \leq t^s B, G = 0 \), the AFE is

\[(t^* - t^s) \leq \frac{E(q_E, m^*, e^*)}{B(t^* + \tau)} - \alpha \tau.\]

Clearly if \( E(\cdot) = 0 \), \((t^* - t^s) \leq -\alpha \tau < 0 \). Thus, an efficient rich region, with no cost-inefficiency and a quality level equal to the mean value and without any grant, applies a surtax rate lower than the standardized one, as long as there is a revenue sharing.
Let us now consider the Italian RES rule and two specific cases of inefficient regions with their respective fiscal efforts to underline a possible inconsistency of the analyzed equalization system.

In the first one, the region has an actual public expenditure higher than the standardized one because it is cost-inefficient and provides a quality at least equal to the mean value, i.e.

$$E(q_E, m^*, e^*) > 0, \text{ for } m^* \geq \bar{m}, e^* > 1.$$  

In this case, by (19), the $AFE$ is

$$(t^* - t) > -\alpha \tau.$$  

It can be positive as well negative. If it is positive, the region bears the burden of its inefficiency, but, if the revenue sharing rate or/and the federal tax rate are high, it could be also negative and the burden of the inefficiency is partially shifted to others. However, in any case, $t^* - t_0 > 0$.

In the second case, the region has an actual public expenditure lower than the standardized one because provides a much lower level of quality than the average one, but it is still cost-inefficient, i.e.

$$E(q_E, m^*, e^*) < 0, m^* < \bar{m}, e^* > 1.$$  

The $AFE$ is

$$(t^* - t^0) < -\alpha \tau.$$  

which is always negative, and also $t^* - t_0 < 0$.

In this case, the politician of this twice inefficient region (with low quality and high costs) can surely shift the burden of its inefficiency to all other regions and central government. In conclusion, it may happen that the inefficiencies are paid by the need equalization grant and revenue sharing, and then the system can create perverse and contradictory effects on regional financial responsibility.

### 3.3 The impact of equalization parameters on quality and efficiency

The equilibrium conditions for quality and cost-efficiency, are obtained, by comparing the marginal benefits with the marginal costs of funds devoted to these local government strategies. Thus, using (15), (16) and (18), we have as follows:
\[
MBm \doteq \frac{\varphi_m}{\nu_I} = C_m \eta \doteq MCm
\] (20)

\[
MBe \doteq \frac{a\psi'}{\nu_I} = C_e \eta \doteq MCe
\] (21)

In order to ascertain the effects of changes on \(\alpha, \beta\) and \(t^*\) on \(m^*\) and \(e^*\), we follow a heuristic partial equilibrium approach\(^{11}\). Given the properties of utility and cost functions, in (20) \(MBm\) is decreasing and \(MCm\) is increasing on \(m\), given \(q, t\) and \(e\), and in (21) \(MBe\) is decreasing and \(MCe\) constant on \(e\), given \(q, t\) and \(m\). Equilibrium values \(m^*\) and \(e^*\) are where the two curves are crossing (Fig.2 and Fig.3).

Let consider the chosen level of quality. An increase of the revenue sharing \(\Delta \alpha\), tends to increase the marginal cost of \(m\) as

\[
\frac{\partial \eta(\hat{t})}{\partial \alpha} = \tau \frac{\partial \eta}{\partial \hat{t}} > 0
\]

where\(^{12}\)

\[
\frac{\partial \eta}{\partial \hat{t}} = \frac{\varepsilon}{1 - t - \tau} \left[ 1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{1 - t - \tau} \right]^{-2} > 0
\]

and then it determines a shift to the right to the marginal cost curve in Fig.2. This implies an increase of the equilibrium level of quality.

Figure 2 here

An increase of the degree of equalization \(\Delta \beta\) tends, instead, to decrease the marginal cost of \(m\) as

\[
\frac{\partial \eta(\hat{t})}{\partial \beta} = -t^* \frac{\partial \eta}{\partial \hat{t}} < 0
\]

and then it determines a shift to the left to the marginal cost curve and a decrease of the equilibrium level of quality.

The same result obtains with an increase of the standardized surtax rate \(\Delta t^s\) as

\(^{11}\) This implies: (i) to assume approximately constant the marginal utility of income and (ii) to consider the effect of a parameter change on each endogenous variable (specifically on \(m\) and \(e\)) given the others. The results are less general than in a general equilibrium static comparative framework (see e.g. Dahlby 2011), but clearer and economically meaningful.

\(^{12}\) This is an application to our model of the general proposition by which, under very plausible hypotheses, \(MCF\) is always increasing with the tax rate (see at least Dahlby 2011).
\[ \frac{\partial \eta(t)}{\partial t^s} = -\beta \frac{\partial \eta}{\partial t} < 0 \]

Let us consider the level of productive inefficiency. An increase of the revenue sharing \( \Delta \alpha \), tends to increase the marginal cost of \( e \) with a parallel shift to above of the cost curve \( MC_e \) in Fig.3 and this implies a decrease of \( e \). Opposite is the effect of an increase of \( \beta \) and \( t^s \). Notice that an increase of accountability \(- \Delta a\) gives a shift to the left of the \( MB_e \) curve and a decrease of \( e \).

Figure 3 here

An increase of the revenue sharing rate tends to reduce the quality of the public service, while it tends to induce the politicians, and public officials, to improve the internal efficiency of the productive process. The opposite effect is reached by increasing the rate of the equalization and the standardized tax rate.

Notice that these effects are working throughout the level of the effective local tax rate, \( \hat{t} = t + \alpha \tau - \beta t^a \), while remaining unchanged the aggregate rate influencing the tax base, \( \tau + t \). Changes of the grants parameters \( \alpha, \beta \) and \( t^a \) have, by the way of \( \eta(\alpha, \beta, t^a) \), a different impact on the marginal cost of public funds devoted to increase quality, given by (20), and rent-taking activities, given by (21). This explains why \( \alpha \), which increases the effectively perceived local tax rate \( \hat{t} \), has an opposite effect w.r.t. \( \beta \) and \( t^a \), which instead decrease it. It is also straightforward that any reform increasing the transparency of the equalization system, and then the accountability of the local political set-up, represented by \(- \Delta a\), implies a reduction of cost-inefficiency, without influencing the level of quality.

Interesting enough is also to verify the effects on quality and inefficiency of changes of the essential level (minimum standard). An increase of \( q_E \), if \( \mu > 0 \), implies an increase of \( q \). Consequently, the effect on quality of an increase of the minimum standard of the public service provision is not determined, as the shift of marginal benefit and cost curves depends on the relative shape of marginal utility and marginal cost of quality. Indeed, the sign of \( \varphi_{mq} \) and \( C_{mq} \) is not given a priori. If, for instance, \( \zeta_{mq} < 0 \) (demand-substitutes) and \( \xi_{mq} + 1 > 0 \) (cost-substitutes, no economies of scope), as it is well conceivable, in Fig. 2 both \( MB_m \) and \( MC_m \) curves shift to the left and \( m \) tends to decrease with \( q_E \). However, with quality and quantity

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\[13\] The sign of the effects is of course reversed if the revenue sharing goes from local to central level.
as complements and/or with economies of scope, $m$ might increase too. The cost-inefficiency tends instead to certainly decrease with an increase of the minimum standard, because of the cost-substitutability between inefficiency index and quantity, $C_{eq} > 0$, which increases the opportunity cost of wasteful expenditures. In Fig. 3 the $MCCe$ curve shifts to above and equilibrium level of $e$ decreases.

We summarize the results and implications of previous arguments in Table 1.

Table 1 here

### 3.4 Equalization and central government trade-offs

Central government in choosing fiscal strategies acts as a Stackelberg leader, i.e. it maximizes its pay-off taking into account the reactions functions of the followers, i.e. all regions and consumers as well. Let us suppose it is interested to guarantee everywhere a good level of quality of the local public service but limiting the potential deficit of regions, i.e. the overspending which the regions may incur in. If the central government wants, for instance, to evaluate the policy of increasing the equalization rate $\beta$ and consequently adjusting the revenue sharing rate $\alpha$, it should take into account the incentive of all regions toward quality and cost-efficiency performances.

Let us denote with $i = 1,..n$ all the regions of the federation, with $k = 1,..n_k$ the poor regions for which $G_k > 0$ and with $j = 1,..n_j$ the rich regions for which $G_j = 0, n_k + n_j = n$. The federal budget constraint is as follows

$$Rf = \tau \sum_{i=1}^{n} B_i - \alpha \tau \sum_{i=1}^{n} B_i + \beta \sum_{k=1}^{n_k} (N_k - t^s B_k) \quad (22)$$

where the aggregate revenue is funding both types of transfers, revenue sharing plus equalization subsidies, to the whole system of regions\(^{14}\).

The federal government in evaluating changes on equalization parameters is constrained by (22) and also by the reaction functions $t_i(x), m_i(x), e_i(x), B_i(\tau + t_i), i = 1,..n$ where $x = (\alpha, \beta, t^s, q_E, a)$. Consequently, by implicit differentiation of (22), we obtain

\(^{14}\)There are no national public goods to be financed. However, by considering these would add only analytical complications without changing the main results.
\[
\frac{\Delta \alpha}{\Delta \beta} = \frac{\sum_k (N_k - t^s B_k) - [\beta t^s + \tau(1 - \alpha)] \sum_k \frac{\partial B_k}{\partial (\tau + t_k)} \frac{\partial t_k}{\partial \beta}}{\tau(1 - \alpha) \sum_i \frac{\partial B_i}{\partial (\tau + t_i)} \frac{\partial t_i}{\partial \alpha} - \tau \sum_i B_i + \beta t^s \sum_k \frac{\partial B_k}{\partial (\tau + t_k)} \frac{\partial t_k}{\partial \alpha}}.
\] (23)

From the results of the literature on local taxation efficiency with fiscal equalization and revenue sharing (see at last Kelders and Koethenbuerger 2010 and therein quoted contributions), we know that:

(i) \( \frac{\partial t_k}{\partial \beta} > 0 \), \( k = 1,..n_k \), i.e., for all regions receiving the transfer, the optimal local tax rate is increasing with the equalization rate;

(ii) \( \frac{\partial t_j}{\partial \beta} = 0 \), \( j = 1,..n_j \), i.e. changes on rate of equalization do not impact on the optimal choice of the tax rate by rich regions;

(iii) \( \frac{\partial t_i}{\partial \alpha} < 0 \), \( i = 1,..n \), i.e. the optimal tax rate is decreasing with the revenue sharing rate.

Then, given (i) and (iii) and \( \frac{\partial B_k}{\partial (\tau + t_k)} < 0 \), the numerator of (23) is clearly positive, while the denominator is negative as the first order effects of a change on local tax rates, due to a change in \( \alpha \), i.e. \( \tau \sum_i B_i \), are greater than the second order ones. Of course, this suitably occurs when the Laffer curve is in the increasing tract. Thus, we may say that there is a negative relationship between changes of \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \), being fixed the other fiscal parameters and the federal public expenditure: \( \frac{\Delta \alpha}{\Delta \beta} \big|_{\Delta R_f=0} < 0 \).

From the comparative statics exercises of the previous section we may assess that:

\[ \frac{\partial m_k}{\partial \beta} > 0, \frac{\partial m_i}{\partial \alpha} < 0, \frac{\partial e_k}{\partial \beta} > 0, \frac{\partial e_i}{\partial \alpha} < 0, i = 1,..n, \quad k = 1,..n_k. \]

Hence, it turns out that the central government has to consider these compound effects of policy \( \Delta \beta > 0 \) on regions’ choices. First, the quality increases in all regions, but more in the poor ones where there are two positive effects:

\[
\Delta m_k = \left[ \frac{\partial m_k}{\partial \beta} + \frac{\partial m_k}{\partial \alpha} \frac{\Delta \alpha}{\Delta \beta} \big|_{\Delta R_f=0} \right] \Delta \beta > 0, k = 1,..n_k
\]

\[
\Delta m_j = \frac{\partial m_j}{\partial \alpha} \frac{\Delta \alpha}{\Delta \beta} \big|_{\Delta R_f=0} \Delta \beta > 0, j = 1,..n_j
\]

Second, there is an increase of all regions cost-inefficiency (more in the
poor regions):

\[
\Delta e_k = \left[ \frac{\partial e_k}{\partial \beta} + \frac{\partial e_k}{\partial \alpha} \left( \frac{\Delta \alpha}{\Delta \beta} \right) \right] \Delta \beta > 0, k = 1, \ldots, n_k
\]

\[
\Delta e_j = \frac{\partial e_j}{\partial \alpha} \left( \frac{\Delta \alpha}{\Delta \beta} \right) \Delta \beta > 0, j = 1, \ldots, n_j
\]

and consequently on their overspending:

\[
\frac{\Delta E_k}{\Delta \beta} = \frac{\partial E_k(.)}{\partial e_k} \Delta e_k + \frac{\partial E_k(.)}{\partial m_k} \Delta m_k > 0, k = 1, \ldots, n_k
\]

\[
\frac{\Delta E_j}{\Delta \beta} = \frac{\partial E_j(.)}{\partial e_j} \Delta e_j + \frac{\partial E_j(.)}{\partial m_j} \Delta m_j > 0, j = 1, \ldots, n_j
\]

Hence, the central government has to manage a clear trade-off: The policy of increasing the equalization rate, by adjusting the revenue sharing rate, has a beneficial impact in terms of quality of services provided by the system of regions, fulfilling equity concerns, but increases the risk of regions indebtedness, especially of the poor ones receiving the transfer.

4 Concluding remarks

Need equalization is a worldwide used criterion of intergovernmental transfers. Many developed and also underdeveloped countries are applying variants of it. For instance, the constitutional reform recently implemented in Italy foresees an ambitious and sophisticated application of it. The main objective refers to equity concerns, as it tends to reduce the differences in terms of resources for assuring to all citizen the access to a adequate level of essential public services. However, as shown by a wide recent literature, any equalization system, defining a grant inversely correlated to local tax base, has efficiency consequences on the of level of local tax rates and public expenditure.

In this paper we have extended the analysis of these consequences to productive efficiency of local government in providing local public services. With this notion we mean to provide, at the maximum conceivable level of quality and at the minimum cost, a level of the output of the service at least equal to a standard fixed by the central government.

First, we have shown that with this funding RES mechanism, in particular that one applied in Italy, the inefficiencies, in terms of low quality and high costs, can be, in some cases, paid by the need equalization grant and
the revenue sharing, and then create, with a low fiscal effort, a perverse and contradictory effects on regional financial responsibility.

Second, we have proved that, for the general RES rule, an increase of the revenue sharing rate tends to reduce the quality of the public service, while it tends to induce the politicians and the public officials to extend the effort for improving the efficiency of the productive process. The opposite effect is given by an increase of the rate of the equalization and of the standard tax rate, given the opposite effect on the marginal cost of public funds. The effect on quality of an increase of the minimum standard of the public service provision is, instead, not determined, as it depends on the structure of costs and technology. However, in this respect, we have obtained a quite readable condition for signing the effect: If quality and quantity are substitute in preferences and costs then the local government reacts reducing quality. Given cost-substitutability between inefficiency index and quantity, an increase of the minimum standard increases for sure the politician effort toward cost-efficiency. Finally, of course, an increase of degree of accountability and benevolence has beneficial effects on local government cost-efficiency.

In conclusion, the central government, in designing the structure of grant parameters, faces a trade-off between quality and cost-efficiency of local public services provision, at fixed essential output levels, that should be appropriately managed. Higher quality means a more actually equitable public provision, while higher cost-efficiency means harder budget constraint, less potential deficit and a minor risk of bail-out. Should the central government attaches a higher weight to quality (cost-efficiency), it should reduces (increase) the revenue sharing rate in favour an increase (reduction) of equalization parameters.

In any case, all political reforms improving politicians accountability, as electoral rules towards a more direct selection of majors and regional governors by voters, increase, as expected, cost-efficiency and reduces over-spending phenomena, without reducing the level of quality, then with no trade-off at all.

References


